No, not that we know of. Hitler's plans to eventually "turn on" the Soviet Union shouldn't have been a surprise to anyone who bothered to read his writings.
#Russia's Primacy: Why go to war with the Soviet Union?
Chapter 14 of Mein Kampf, titled Ostorientierung oder Ostpolitik ("Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy"), deals at great length with Russia.
Es sind zwei Gründe, die mich veranlassen, das Verhältnis Deutschlands zu Rußland einer besonderen Prüfung zu unterziehen:
handelt es sich in diesem Falle um die vielleicht entscheidendste Angelegenheit der deutschen Außenpolitik überhaupt und
ist diese Frage auch der Prüfstein für die politische Fähigkeit der jungen nationalsozialistischen Bewegung, klar zu denken und richtig zu handeln.
This translates to (translation by myself, English translations by other translators might look marginally different):
There are two reasons that entice me to subject Germany's relationship to Russia to a special investigation:
Firstly, this question the perhaps most decisive issue in all of German foreign policy and
Secondly, this question is also the touchstone for the political ability of the young national socialist movement to think clearly and to act correctly.
[Hitler 1925: p. 727]
The subsequent citations from German-language literature (see sources) are personal translations in the same way and I will no longer bother to annotate them as such.
So, why exactly is the Russo-German relationship Hitler's most pressing matter in German foreign policy? I will remind you that there is also the Danzig Corridor, the Austrian question, the Alsace-Lorraine dispute and the question of the former German Imperial colonies. There's a bunch of foreign policy conflicts that Hitler would have deemed important, yet he elevates this one onto a pedestal. Why? Well, let's keep reading his book.
The foreign policy of the völkisch state has to secure the existence of the combined race on this planet, by creating a healthy, liveable, natural relationship between the number and growth of the people on one side and the size and quality of the ground and soil on the other.
As a healthy relationship one may only view a state in which the nutrition of the people on its own ground and soil. Any other status, even if it lasts centuries or even millennia, is by comparison unhealthy and will sooner or later to a damage if not the destruction of the people in question.
Only a sufficiently large space on this earth secures to a people the freedom of existence.
[Hitler 1925: p. 728]
Note that I have translated the German word Volk as "people" (as in: a people; the German people; the American people; etc) here as to keep the translation smooth. Nazi German ideology revolves around this term of "Volk" so much that you might as well consider not translating it at all and keep it as volk, especially considering that the related adjective, 'völkisch', has no proper translation to English either. The term Volk has ethnic, racial, religious, cultural and linguistic connotations and is in German viewed as a much closer connection than the English word 'people', making translations difficult, especially considering that the English word related to Volk, 'folk' (as in 'my folks' or 'folklore') has been changed in its meaning to refer to different things entirely. But I'm not a linguist, so let's get back to history.
So this is the Lebensraum ('living space') ideology, sometimes also referred to as Blut und Boden ('blood and soil'). It is the idea of an ethnically homogenous society based on an agrarian autarky within its own national territory. Now, as you might imagine, this was difficult for the Germans, one of the most populous peoples in Europe with one of the highest population densities and considerable urbanization and industrialization combined with a decline of agricultural jobs. So, not only would the Nazis need to transfer some Germans back into agricultural jobs, but they would also need more space to actually have arable land to work with. This land was not available in Germany, but it laid, geostrategically speaking, somewhat close: Ukraine. Not in France, not in Britain, not in Belgium, but in this breadbasket of Europe that was by then firmly in the hands of the USSR. Hitler himself recognized this.
As much as we recognize the necessity of a conflict with France, this conflict would stay without effect if it stayed the greater picture of our foreign policy. The conflict can and will only then gain usefulness if it serves to cover an enlargement of the living space of our people. Not in the acquisition of colonies do we have to see the solution of this question, but exclusively in the acquisition of settling territories which increase the size of the motherland itself and therefore feed not only the settlers in the deepest of unions with their homeland, but also secures advantages for the entire amount of space, which lay in their combined size.
[Hitler 1925: p. 741]
Holy run-on sentences, Batman (did I mention Hitler writes like a fifth grader? Because he does write like a fifth grader). Anyway, now it gets spicy.
Therefore, us national socialists knowingly draw a line under the foreign political goals of the prewar period. We will continue where it began six centuries ago. We shall stop the eternal Germanic campaign towards the south and west of Europe and will guide our eyes eastwards. We at last conclude the colonial and trade policy of the prewar period and transition to the soil policy of the future.
[Hitler 1925: p. 742]
This chapter is by the way titled Wiederaufnahme der Ostland-Politik, 'Resumption of Ostland policy'. That policy was of course a war of aggression.