For a siege I can understand it, but in cases such as Cannae my understanding is that the Romans had numerical superiority and that the ‘reason’ why Hannibal won was the trick with his center pulling back and his wings advancing to surround the romans. Apparently it is supposed to be obvious that then the battle is lost for the romans.
What I don’t understand is why this was so bad for the romans. Would the results really have been the opposite if the romans has the ‘outer track’ in the circle? Is it solely a case of the surrounded soldiers panicking or is there some more tangible effect? If there is a big hole of empty space in the middle of the surrounded soldiers is there still an effect? If not, could the surrounded part not push outwards, creating such a hole? I have many questions and I feel I’m missing some key points of understanding. I hope you can enlighten me :)
First, let me give some very broad generalisation that apply to the armies of many ancient societies in Europe and the near east. Obviously, tactics, equipment and formations differed between these societies, but we can observe a few commonalities:
Firstly, the line of battle was based on the assumption that men cooperated to meet a threat in front of them. If you were in the front rank, then soldiers protected your left and right, and reserves waited behind to reinforce if you or one of your comrades fell. The tight organisation of hundreds of men facing weapons, shields and bodies in one direction had a multiplier effect, both physically and psychologically. All you had to do was face one man in front of you - block his weapon, and try to get past his defence. Any distractions from this simple task could be ignored because you knew your back and sides were watched by others.
However, if the line is flanked, this basic calculus fails. The guy on your left is no longer protecting you- he's watching the cavalry circling around the line. The guy behind you is no longer ready to step in to hold the line if the guy on your right gets hit. Suddenly, you have to do a lot more than just worry about the enemy in front. You have to watch your flanks as well, and you have to deal with creeping fear that you're about to be overrun. You now have to consciously worry about the physical location and threat posed by every single person around you, not just the guy in front.
Second, protection of flanks in many ancient armies was the responsibility of cavalry, skirmishers and/or archers. These specialist or auxiliary forces were not expected to fight toe-to-toe with heavy infantry, and tended to be most effective when attacking from distance or when highly mobile. Their effectiveness would diminish if the main line was flanked and pushed inwards. They would be less likely to fight effectively in confined quarters against heavy infantry. For example, at Cannae, Roman cavalry on both flanks were unable to simultaneously hold off the Carthaginian cavalry AND protect the Roman flanks from Carthaginian heavy infantry which moved to flank the Roman line. Thus, the flanks collapsed and the Romans were encircled.
Third, battlefield communication in classical warfare was primitive and often ineffective. Once the infantry line had engaged, it was very difficult to reform and redeploy. Soldiers on the front are too busy trying to kill, and not be killed by, the guy in front of them. In the noise of battle, a shouted order might only be clearly audible for a few meters, necessitating extensive repetition and distortion of orders along the line. And even if you could hear an order to withdraw and reform the line, can you really act on it when you are locked in battle with someone trying to kill you? And if you reploy reserves eithout pulling the front ranks back, too, you risk leaving the line unsuported and vulnerable to collapse. Thus, mid-battle orders were usually restricted to ordering uncommitted reserves or cavalry to reinforce or exploit a particular weak point in the line, with no real attempt to reconfigure already committed formations.
To offer some commentary focused on Cannae in particular:
Before the Marian reforms, Roman soldiers were organised by veterancy (and sometimes by social class). This was very different to the image we generally have of imperial legions of uniformly trained heavy infantry, well drilled and disciplined. In this periodic, the oldest (and often wealthiest) soldiers - who were also the most likely to be veterans - tended to be concentrated at the rear, while the youngest and least experienced occupied front ranks. This meant the front ranks would suffer the heaviest casualties, and the line would naturally be pushed backwards as it met real opposition, indicating where the better equipped and more experienced reserves were needed, and they would move up from the back ranks to reinforce. For this strategy to work, there needs to be some flexibility in the movement of the lines - the less disciplined frontline soldiers (hastati) could still hold the line by letting it flex back, and the more disciplined reserves (principes and triarii) could see where the line was weakening and advance to support it. If flanked or encircled, the frontline has less freedom to step backwards as they are pressed, and the reserves are less likely to recognise and move to prop up weakening spots in the line, as they are more likely to turn to meet flanking enemies. Meanwhile, panic can set in among the young men of the first ranks as the line begins to collapse without support. Once the basic discipline of the front line fails, men are no longer working together as an army to defend one another, and they will be slaughtered by a more unified and disciplined opposing army.
The Greeks knew that it was the god Phobos who rules the battlefield.
According to Polybius the Romans had 86,000 fighting men, about half that number were Romans and the other half were allied peoples. 86,000 men is a massive army for the time, it is a logistical marvel that they were even able to get to Cannae. The army of the Romans were led by two consuls, these men being of the highest rank in the republic, would switch every day who was the supreme commander of the Army. The two consuls were Paullus and Varro, Polybius mainly blames the Varro for losing the battle, as Varro was far too reactionary. The Roman army made camp on the river, Aufidus. The Romans of course now had to feed this massive army of theirs.
There was a supply depot that the Romans must have planned on using but Hannibal had taken the depot at Cannae and positioned his army in between the Roman army and the depot. According to Polybius’ History the loss of the depot “caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district”. After the Romans made camp, Hannibal sent a small inconsequential ambush that led to few casualties, but it did make the Romans feel confident as they pushed it off, Varro was in command on that day. On the next day Hannibal offered battle but Paullus refused, so Hannibal began harassing the Romans that were gathering water for the army.
The next day was ‘the day’ and Hannibal offered battle again. The Roman army, had eaten little for two days, had little water for a full day, and Varro was in command. Varro was confidant and lined up all those men in a deep formation so that he would pierce the center of Hannibal’s line. 86,000 men fell into Hannibal’s trap when they began marching that day. Hannibal was in the center of his line surrounded by his average troops while his best men had the flanks. Hannibal did this so that he could make sure that the center feel back in a controlled way, while his flanks remained strong. Also Hannibal’s cavalry led by his brother Hasdrubal was of a much higher quality, and was able to defeat the Roman cavalry. As for the Roman allied cavalry “when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river, came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled”. In previous battles Hannibal had destroyed the more veteran armies of the Romans and this huge 86,000 man army was rather green. Now this, hungry, thirsty, and raw Roman army was attacked in the rear by Hasdrubal and fully surrounded. 86,000 men stirring up dust, all yelling and adding to an unintelligible haze of confusion, effectively making themselves deaf to orders and blind to opportunities.
So to review Varro’s/Roman’s position at the time when Hasdrubal had attacked the rear....
Rallying men in such a situation would be an example of extraordinary leadership. But Varro was not an extraordinary general, and all the reasons above caused Phobos to rule the battlefield once again.
All quotes were pulled from here: https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/polybius-cannae.asp
I have a question. How is someone supposed to "source" this?