We can break this into 2 questions, one of intent, and one of capabilities and acceptable risk.

On the intent question we can say yes, if only for the political capital that Soviet ground forces ashore in the Home Islands would bring to things like occupation zones post war, etc. And for capabilities it wouldnt be pretty but there was something approaching the ability to land division sized elements ashore.

At various times in 1945 it had even enjoyed various levels of US support. About 150 landing craft, small combatants, and support vessels had been transferred to Soviet ownership through Alaska(Soviet crews would arrive for training then sail back with their new craft) under project HULA which had begun in mid April. These craft represented the majority of Soviet amphibious and landing support craft, from LCI's, to minesweepers, to frigates and sub chasers. These ships along with some good old disposable destroyers and cargo ships running ashore or to seized docks were how the USSR landed in the Kurils and Sakhalin in August 1945.

Those landings were sloppy affairs with Soviet casualties pushing 25% or more in the initial landings against definitively second rate Japanese forces.

As to the plan, the Soviet Pacific fleet had a plan supported by Stalin to land essentially 2 reinforced infantry divisions one at a time to the port of Rumoi on Hokkaido's western coast. With a date of 24 August selected as the invasion date. Once again it would be an affair of half measures. Aircraft would be very much pushing their range to support the landing forces, escorts would be limited to less than a dozen destroyers and a gaggle of smaller ships. Several of the smaller combatants would also then pull double duty as transports for the landing force.

There were several things going in the Soviet's favor though. Mostly that the Japanese military was not in position to effectively counter this threat, the vast majority of forces left were in Honshu or Kyushu awaiting an invasion by the US and Western Allies. What forces were in Hokkaido were mostly along the East coast against possible US actions, or to the South where now sunk ferries connected it to the rest of the nation. The lack of ferry craft also hindered the ability of the IJA to reinforce its garrison on the island. And in the end so long as one Soviet soldier was on the islands when the war ended it could theoretically have been called a win.

Of course the Japanese govt finally conceded and the surrender was announced on August 15th. Stalin did push for the landing to still happen and the Hokkaido forces to surrender to the Soviets. Truman pushed back and demanded that they be included under the general surrender of forces in the Home Islands that was being handled by MacArthur in Tokyo Bay. So the operation was finally canned in late August and that was it.

Had the war continued, short of Soviet leaders in the Pacific getting cold feet, or active US intervention to stop it, sometime between late August and late September a Soviet landing was certainly in the cards. it just would have been a landing nobody would have wanted to be parted for all the cut corners.

Thankfully the Wilson Center has actually translated and released several relavant docs.

The proposed plan: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122335

The replay from Truman to Stalin: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122333

Memo postponing the landing and attending to other immediate troop dispositions: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122340