I can't speak specifically for the analyses you're referring to, but in more general terms, the Falklands War saw the British willing to take some extreme risks to retake the islands while the Argentines were extremely risk-averse. Most prewar observers were likely working under the assumption that the declining British military wasn't going to be able to launch an effective campaign to retake the islands, especially not without incurring casualties that the British public would not accept, and that the Argentines were going to fight tooth-and-nail and defend the islands to the best of their abilities without any major morale concerns.

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For the British, nearly everything about the war was operating well outside of what one would consider normal, sustainable operations. On the naval side, the British had mobilized every carrier it could get its hands on and a significant portion of its navy along with multiple ships requisitioned from the merchant marine. Ships like Atlantic Conveyor were hastily modified with helicopter platforms, allowing the British force to take on more aircraft (both fixed and rotary wing) than the carriers alone were capable of. The carriers themselves were crammed with as many aircraft as they could fit on them, and the flagship, Hermes was actually slated to be retired when war broke out, only to be pulled back into service. The British had a force of Sea Harriers for the Fleet Air Arm, but a force of the more strike-oriented Harrier GR.3 was also brought along, requiring some nontrivial modifications to make it suited for operating at sea. The Royal Navy lacked effective defenses against Argentine Exocet anti-ship missiles, but they managed a stopgap in the form of picket patrols and the use of picket helicopters to serve as decoys to confuse the missiles' guidance systems. Along similar lines, the Royal Navy ships lacked effective defenses against low-level aircraft, and the Argentines were aware of this thanks to the fact that they also operated the same Type 42 destroyers that were in the British task force.

Compared to the British task force, the Argentines had a reasonably numerous navy in the theater operating far closer to home, complete with a fleet carrier and land-based aircraft support. The airport on Stanley was long enough to support Argentina's Mirage III fighters, which, being supersonic, held significant performance advantages over the British Sea Harriers. The British were able to disable Stanley airfield with the Black Buck raids, which themselves were extremely unorthodox operations. Several Vulcan bombers just about to leave service were hastily refitted with refueling probes and hardware for anti-radiation missiles, and the bombers and a fleet of refueling aircraft were deployed to Ascension Island, the closest British base to the Falklands. The raids themselves were almost absurd - 13 aircraft (11 Victors and 2 Vulcans) were required to get a single bomber to the Falklands and back in a convoluted daisy-chaining of refueling aircraft. But their impact was significant, as one raid laid a bomb square in the center of Stanley airfield, leaving it unserviceable to all but C-130s and orther short-takeoff aircraft. The result was that Argentine aircraft were forced to operate from land bases at the very edge of their refueling range. The Mirage IIIs were now nearly useless, as they had a very short loiter time over the Falklands and had to limit combat maneuvering to conserve fuel, largely negating their performance advantage over the Sea Harrier.

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And then we get to the point about Argentine morale. Even before the war, morale among the Argentine military was low, and the war itself is often portrayed as a hasty attempt by the Argentine regime to distract from troubles at home by going after an easy irredentist target. That meant that any major loss was an even greater liability than normal, and the Argentines were going to be very risk-averse. When the British declared their exclusion zone around the islands, the Argentine navy tried to "play it safe" by operating outside of this zone, but the sinking of the Belgrano with heavy losses in personnel saw the Argentine surface fleet - including its aircraft carrier - withdrawn from the war completely so as to avoid further losses. Once the Argentine Air Force and Navy had been removed from the area around the Falklands, the situation for the Argentine forces on the islands would be poor for any force, and the Argentine force was largely poorly trained and unenthusiastic conscripts. Once they were cut off and facing the full force of the Royal Navy and some of the best forces the British army had to offer, morale plummeted, and looking at battles in the campaign, it shows. Casualties among ground forces were surprisingly light given the numbers involved, and the Argentines were generally quick to withdraw or surrender once the British had the advantage in any engagement.