I can't remember if I have posted this one before...

Anyways - apologies for possible lack of editing - given the general state of things in Italy, by the time of the March on Rome, Mussolini didn't really need recourse to extreme measures in order to secure a position of power (broadly speaking, the Italian political establishment was more than willing to give Mussolini his share in a new government, with one of the major Ministries); but he needed to be careful, since his aspiration was a bit more than that – that is, with the rise of the fascist movement, and the modest affirmation of the National Fascist Party in the 1921 elections, he had begun to realize that a place of Prime Minister was in the charts. And outside of any long term considerations, this would have meant his definitive political legitimization – regardless of the longevity of fascism (which, it is worth keeping in mind, had only three years of life and had spent the first one in a condition of financial and political bankruptcy) – while, for the time being, a large part of his political bankroll on the table (and under it) was arguably of very suspect origin: that is, his ability to control, restrain and incorporate back into civil society and the representative system the forces of a movement which, while it presented an image of itself that was order-bound and in favor of the legitimate institutions, was in practical terms openly defiant of public authority and which we would nowadays by all means characterize as eversive.

At the time – as often was – Mussolini's long term plans appeared vague. It became apparent soon enough though, that his intention was not that of disbanding the movement, since after all, Mussolini's strength as a political leader was to derive from his ability to prove a better apprentice to the Great War sorcerer than the socialists had been, that is: to be able to control the forces he had contributed to unleash within the country.

 

And the establishment concerns were fair enough on this point, since Italy had come out of WW1 in a precarious, if not dire, state.

Many of the issues faced by the Italian Government and political system dated back to the end of the previous century but the war had exacerbated them, while providing very little of the gains promised by the interventionists (contributing to a strong degree of social discomfort – see for instance Einaudi's view on the agrarian question).

The economy had suffered: not only the unrestricted expenses had impacted on the state budget but the end of the fixed exchange rate threatened an inflation process that, if not dramatic per se, was considered a major risk for the weak industrial and economical structure of the Kingdom. The reforms of the debt system attempted by Nitti had been abandoned, and Giolitti's first return to power had appeared to many as a withdrawal of the political system within its shell – the motion of a threatened tortoise – rather than a viable option for the future. When Giolitti fell again, the following governments had the same broad character of temporary remedies, unable to deal with a systemic crisis that threatened the whole of the state and nation.

It must be noted that these political moments of general crisis are in fact more commonplace than the contemporary rhetorics may make them look – every political crisis, to contemporaries, is a fatal affair. But history tells us that Italy has outlived its fair share of these mortal wounds, and it sure had plenty shabby governments which failed to make twelve months.

Anyhow, there was another major factor at play: with the introduction of universal suffrage, there had been a major shift in favor of the two modern mass parties, the Catholic Partito Popolare and the Italian Socialist Party – the latter had gained 32.3% of the votes and the former 20.5% in 1919; the 1921 elections had seen the socialists lose some ground (24.7% for the PSI and 4.6% for the new Communist Party of Italy) while the Popolari had held their ground with 20.4%. for obvious reasons, a government would have had a very hard time keeping hold of the country without the participation of at least one of these two forces.

Outside of practical factors, there were other – more informal – elements painting the picture of this general crisis. Many observers – among economists of liberal school, like A. De Viti de Marco, M. Pantaleoni and L. Einaudi – remarked on the negative impact of the protectionist legislation dating back to the 1880s. Pointing out how those affected the development of both the economical and political world, with governments growing hostage of particular interests, expression of influence groups, constantly pestering the administrations for new protections and privileges, adding new improductive costs and expenses and resulting in a semi-permanent partitioning of the political forces on various levels. This state of things had worsened with the war for the adoption of further policies in favor of strategic sectors: shipbuilding, steel and iron, grains and raw fibers and sugar.

At the same time, more politically oriented observers, such as G. Amendola or G. Salvemini, described the crisis of the political establishment, victim of their own clientelistic practices, with the most representative man – the ever returning Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti – also the most criticized as symbol of the dysfunctional system of government. His repeated attempts to reinvigorate the political forces by bringing either the Socialists of the Catholics into a stable Ministry had failed and his own forces had seen their base of consensus gradually eroded, to a point where the old liberals who led the country in the 1890-1910 decades would combine to make up less than 20% of the electoral basin.

The war was therefore obviously, in the mind of those critical of the establishment's long term policies, followed by weak coalition governments, supported by extra-parliamentary agreements, personal ties and reciprocated favors; governments in all likelihood unable to put an end to the system of privileges they relied upon for their very existence. In this situation, the hopes for structural reforms of the Italian State went very much through the resolution of this “parliamentary paralysis”, as G. Salvemini described it, with the establishment of a strong parliamentary majority – a step that required the inclusion of at least one of the rising people's parties: the Socialists, the Catholics or, perhaps, the latecomers: the Fascists. Who were still arguably smaller and less organized, as well as more “national” in their character, and therefore, even in their eversive motions, may have appeared of a different eversive character than the socialists (the problems connected with a substantial participation of the Catholics to the government are worth their own discussion and I won't attempt one here).

 

On October 16th Mussolini met in Milan with some of his "lieutenants": Italo Balbo. Emilio De Bono, Cesare Maria De Vecchi and Michele Bianchi. Notable was also the presence of the Army Generals – no longer on active duty – Fara and Ceccherini (who in all likelihood were expected to leak some information to the Army and thus to the King).

Mussolini described the political situation arguing that an immediate action was needed: waiting would have meant giving time for a parliamentary solution of the Government crisis. “The revolutionary act of the March on Rome has to be done now or never. Time's ripe and the Government's well beyond that point. Giolitti's ghost is crawling back and you know that with Giolitti in charge there's no thinking of [revolution]”.

It's worth noting that, despite the tone and the words used by Mussolini in order to win over the internal opposition to a risky commitment, in his mind the march was tied in with his political strategy, not a breach of such strategy.

Now, with the general plan approved, the parliamentary maneuvers were to continue, at least as a “diversion for the public opinion and the Government itself”, a way of gaining time. On the 21^st the directive council of the PNF was to give all powers to a quadrumvirate of Balbo, De Bono, De Vecchi and Bianchi. Immediately a huge concentration of men was to take place in Turin and Milan and also in Parma. Meanwhile three “armies” were to form in Ancona, Civitavecchia and Orte, led by Fara, De Bono and Ceccherini. Meanwhile the fascist were to continues the works of the National Assembly in Naples, scheduled for the 24^th.

Mussolini knew that his forces weren't ready at all – as he stated so himself, and after being confirmed in this view by Balbo on October 6^th – but here again the political landscape was what mattered most. This fact did little at first to persuade the military men: De Bono and De Vecchi both opposed the action, favoring a political solution or at least asking for some weeks of preparations. Fara and Ceccherini concurred. Mussolini could not be moved from his goal of an immediate action but agreed to postpone it after Naples Assembly, but to begin to mobilize not later than the 28^th of October.

The military plan for the action was finally established on the 21^at in Florence. It included the occupation of public buildings – i.e. gaining control of local administrations; a staple in the fascist actions of the previous two years – the sending of an ultimatum to Facta's government requiring it to surrender all powers to the fascists and a march on Rome to gain control of the Ministry's Offices. Then the establishment of a Fascist Government somewhere in the central region of Italy.