I'll try to answer your question, sorry if it doesn't satisfy you.

First, despite its name (and what was believed to be by Arab and Turkish nationalist historiography), there was no general "Arab Revolt" against the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, Husayn, the leader of the revolt, was not an Arab nationalist, and he did not adopt the ideology of Arabism. He was an ambitious dynast who used his Islamic status as a sharif and the amir of Mecca in an attempt to acquire a hereditary kingdom or principality for his family. He even stated that his objective was to free the caliph from the "atheistic" clutches of the CUP regime rather than overthrowing him. Second, Although clandestine support for the revolt existed in some parts of Syria, Husayn’s call failed to generate any organized or widespread response in the Arabic-speaking provinces. Many Arab public figures even accused Husayn of being a traitor and condemned his actions as dividing the Ottoman-Islamic Empire at a time when unity was crucial. Rather than a popular uprising against the Ottoman Empire, the Arab Revolt was a more narrowly based enterprise relying on tribal levies from Arabia and dominated by the Hashemite family. Huge subversion among Arabs in the Ottoman army as had been expected by the British Arab Bureau never materialized, even after Sharif Hussein’s revolt in 1916. No Arab units of the Ottoman army came over to Hussein, and from British intelligence memorandum, many Arab soldiers continued to demonstrate loyalty not only to Islam but also to the Ottoman government. Except for a few thousand tribesmen, most Arabs remained loyal to the empire during the traumatic events of the times

In my knowledge, the Arab mobilization during the First World War was less researched, and the fragmentary evidence we have doesn't help. However, using a general calculation, the Ottoman armed forces would have comprised by 47% Turks and Anatolian Muslims, 37% Arabs, 8% Ottoman Greeks, 7% Armenians and 1% Jews. The motivation for the Arabs to join the Ottoman army varied.

Some enthusiastically joined, motivated with nationalist fervour or jihad propaganda. In Damascus, the population was opposed to Great Britain, Russia and France while the Muslim population of Palestine held anti-British feelings as well. With the onset of the war, propaganda and rumours filled the town that the army intended to invade Egypt and free it from the British rule. The propaganda succeeded in winning the wholehearted support of the Arab Muslims and soldiers, a few weeks before the expedition the enthusiasm and excitement of the people reached a ‘fever pitch’ in Jaffa. Parades and celebrations of all kinds in anticipation of the triumphal March into Egypt were taking place and the enmity against the Entente states was at the centre of the propaganda. Even Arabs that made bitter remarks against Germany for not helping the Ottomans during the war against Italy soon underwent a change and they came to realize that the Ottomans had taken up arms against Russia and that Russia was considered first and foremost the arch-enemy. Reports on German victories also had a powerful effect on them. Similar propaganda was directed at the soldiers who would invade Egypt since many of the Arab soldiers were not acquainted with the disciplined character of military life. To increase their enthusiasm, Cemal Pasha, the theater commander used both jihad propaganda and the argument that the Egyptians were ready to revolt against British rule. He had many Arab scholars preach to the Arab soldiers before and during the first attack against Egypt. These military employees strolled through the camps and delivered vehement speeches. Their orations were so influential among the common Arab soldiers that some had fits of hysteria due to the excited preaching.

On the other hand, some were also forcefully mobilized with no other choice. These forced conscripts had almost no option but to join the army. The alternative was often death by starvation. Moreover, the conscripts, isolated in their camp life, developed a critical distance from the normative ethics of their original communities when they moved to the margins of major cities like Alexandria and Cairo. Families also mourned the loss of their sons, who were the backbone of the family. They dodged conscription with hiding in villages, prepared hiding places in the houses, fields, caves, with Bedouin families or in other out-of-the way places. When apprehended, suspected draft evaders were usually convicted by military court and often sentenced to flogging. Many also mutilated themselves to avoid draft, but since the ultimate consequence of capture was often military service, applying effective deterrent measures was nearly impossible. Many also avoided draft by moving to Mecca and Medina, as the the cities were exempted from mobilization. Evidently, the number of young pilgrims to Mecca spiked during recruitment. For the less pious, two popular options for circumventing military service remained substitution (sending a personal replacement) and payment of forty to fifty liras, which get increasingly higher as the war progressed. For the non-Muslims, changing nationalities, fleeing abroad, or paying the individual exemption fee was the common course to avoid draft

Sources:

A History of the Modern Middle East 6th Edition by William Cleveland and Martin Burton

The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War by Mehmet Beşikçi

A Land of Aching Hearts by Leila Tarawi Faraz