Yes, land mines were used by all participants in WW1. In particular, I can give you an example from a more obscure battle.

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Graydon Tunstall states in Written in Blood that the Habsburg fortress of Przemysl was defended by

one million meters of barbed wire and multiple minefields

but was not considered to be adequately prepared defensively for the Russian siege. These defenses would prove to be beneficial to the Habsburg defensive garrison during the first siege (9/24 to 10/11 1914) in repelling Russian storm assaults.

... concentrated shrapnel fire at Fortress I/1, while troops and sappers reconnoitered the fortress minefield and barbed wire defensive emplacements.

and then

Tsarist Infantry Regiment 75, meanwhile, launched a storm attack against Fort I/2... but by daybreak it became obvious that the concentrated tsarist artillery fire had again caused no serious damage to the main fortress structure... Any tsarist troops caught between the firing zones and minefields became prisoners of war.

Keep in mind at this point of the siege these were first line Russian formations facing second or third line, even militia level garrison troops in the Austrian fortress.

However, the minefields were a double edge tool, because while they could help keep people out, they also could keep you in. In the doomed breakout attempt of March 1915 which would not have been successful in any event, Tunstall notes:

Habsburg commanders neither reconnoitered the advance area nor oriented most troop units about the minefields that had been dug outside the Defensive District VI perimeter, which they now had to traverse. Only 97th Landsturm Infantry Brigade troops [a 3rd line reserve formation] had been informed of the local field conditions and minefields. This resulted in miscommunication and friction, but also atrocious causalities as enemy artillery fire wreaked havoc when the troops paused and bunched up at the minefields and barbed wire entanglements.

The minefields were also noted to have caused a delay in the deployment in much of the breakout force, which may have caused it to fail if it weren't for all the other reasons the breakout was doomed in the first place (outnumbered, soldiers actually starving and incapable of carrying their gear more than a few miles, insufficient horses to transport supplies and/or artillery to sustain a breakout just to hit the high notes).

So you can perhaps see why a force would NOT deploy mines unless they had no intention to advance in the foreseeable future. If a force was observed removing the mines (or more commonly barbed wire), then the enemy knows that an attack is likely and can reposition reserves and artillery. The removal of barbed wire by Russian soldiers was often a tip for central powers that the Russians were up to something. If the force leaves the mines in place to attempt surprise, they create targetable bottlenecks for themselves that enhance the effectiveness of enemy defensive fire.

Regardless, there's a documented example of anti-infantry land mines in WW1 and their uses and drawbacks.