Just wondering who was protecting the airborne C47s, and in what kind of fighters. Were there any instances of German fighters engaging the transports? Also, did any have to ditch in the Channel on the way over?
The Ninth Air Force C-47s which dropped forces of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions by parachute and glider during missions Albany (443 C-47s), Boston (378 C-47s), Detroit (52 C-47s with gliders), and Chicago (52 C-47s with gliders) in the early morning of 6 June 1944 (between 0020 and 0400) were unescorted. British Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory was skeptical of the missions, predicted fifty to seventy percent losses among the troop carrier and glider towing aircraft, and urged that they be cancelled; despite intense antiaircraft fire and bungled drops, losses were relatively light.
The following "serials" (groups of C-47s carrying distinct units) lost aircraft:
| Mission | Serial | TCG | Aircraft dispatched | Aircraft lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albany Pathfinders | #2 (Albany) | 1st Pathfinder Provisional Group | 3 | 1 |
| Albany | #13 | 435th TCG | 45 | 3 |
| " | #14 | 441st TCG | 45 | 1 |
| " | #15 | 441st TCG | 45 | 1 |
| " | #16 | 440th TCG | 45 | 3 |
| Boston Pathfinders | #2 (Boston) | 1st Pathfinder Provisional Group | 3 | 1 |
| Boston | #19 | 315th TCG | 49 (48 took off) | (1); 1 aircraft destroyed in preflight accident |
| " | #20 | 314th TCG | 36 | 1 |
| " | #22 | 313th TCG | 48 | 2 |
| " | #23 | 313th TCG | 36 | 1 |
| " | #24 | 61st TCG | 36 | 1 |
| " | #26 | 442nd TCG | 45 | 3 |
| Chicago | #27 | 434th TCG | 52 | 1 |
| Detroit | #28 | 437th TCG | 52 | 1 |
Two reinforcement glider missions for the 82nd and 101st, Keokuk (52 C-47s with gliders) and Elmira (176 C-47s with gliders), were conducted just before sunset on 6 June, escorted by the 354th Fighter Group, which was nominally assigned to the Ninth Air Force, but was on loan to the Eighth Air Force for the time being. There was basically no fighter opposition, but the C-47s that came in over the German lines were subject to heavy ground fire during mission Elmira.
| Mission | Serial | TCG | Aircraft dispatched | Aircraft lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Elmira | #30 | 437th TCG | 26 | 1 |
| " | #31 | 438th TCG | 14 | 1 |
| " | #33 | 435th TCG | 51 (49 took off) | 1 |
In his new book A Breathtaking Spectacle: A Written and Pictorial History of IX Troop Carrier Command in England, Adam G. R. Berry, using period documents and analyzing procedures, confronts one of the D-Day narratives that has prevailed in books written since the war (most notably, Band of Brothers and D-Day, both by Stephen E. Ambrose). Stephen E. Ambrose claimed without interviewing a troop carrier pilot or crew member that they were undertrained, skittish, or even cowardly, and as a result were shocked when they came under fire, taking evasive action to save themselves. They approached the drop zones either too low or too high, and too fast, breaking up their formations and hampering many men from making a safe and accurate exit from their aircraft.
The narrative that Berry presents is far different. Many aircraft were seriously overloaded, which increased drop speed to begin with (to prevent stalling), and only about two out of every five planes was flying with a navigator, which would have been helpful in night flying. See the "Troop Carrier controversy" link below for more information to this end.
As the aircraft approached the west coast of the Cotentin peninsula...it is almost universally reported that a cloud bank was encountered in which visibility was effectively zero (in fact, 1st Lt. Julian A. Rice of the 316th Troop Carrier Group referred to this a “wall of fog”). A very quick glance at Group diaries and mission reports reveal that the cloud density, base, and ceiling varied anywhere between 300 ft and 2,500 ft.
In maintaining a formation as densely packed as they were the night of D-Day, all but the lead pilots had to maintain a visual on the wing tip of the aircraft at the head of each flight. In fact, it was [the] job of the co-pilot to maintain a visual directly ahead of the aircraft, allowing the pilot to stick to the wing tip of the aircraft to port or starboard and adjust accordingly, and they [the pilots] seldom ever looked directly out of the front windscreen of the aircraft.
This procedure is nothing short of impossible in zero-visibility conditions, which is why...troop carrier pilots were well-rehearsed in fanning out the formations to avoid aerial collisions. This procedure was deemed necessary, meaning...the formation was scattered and the pilots were unable to maintain sight of the other aircraft in the formation. They were effectively flying blind.
In order to further decrease the risk of collision, many pilots pushed the throttle forward and climbed to a height above the clouds, anywhere between 1,300 and 2,500 ft.
Before the drop zone was approached the cloud dispersed slightly, though the 48th TCS report[ed] poor visibility over the DZ, allowing pilots to re-adjust, attempt to regain a tighter formation, but more importantly descend the aircraft back down to a height from which the paratroopers could jump, without gaining too much air-speed. In effect, what they had to achieve was akin to trying to keep a car at a certain speed down a steep hill without touching the brakes.
Pilots had to increase the drag of the aircraft by lowering flaps, or in extreme cases even the landing gear, as well as reducing the throttle to allow the aircraft to slow down whilst descending.
Pilots utilised a technique involving reducing the manifold pressure and revolutions to allow the propeller to spin freely in the wind. This created an airbrake effect, but also sounded as though throttle was being applied, which may explain why paratroops report pilots increased throttle and airspeed on the approach to the DZ. In reality, they were clambering to slow the aircraft down.
The Eighth Air Force was also buzzing with activity on the night of 5-6 June 1944. Two missions were flown on 5 June (392 and 393) and three missions (394, 395, and 396) were flown on 6 June.
5 June 1944
Mission 392: 423 of 464 B-17s and 203 of 206 B-24s hit coastal defenses in the Le Havre, Caen, Boulogne and Cherbourg, France areas; 4 B-17s and 2 B-24s are lost, 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 37 B-17s and 39 B-24s are damaged; 1 airman is KIA, 10 WIA and 47 MIA. Escorting are 127 P-47s and 245 P-51s; 1 P-47 and 1 P-51 are lost and 1 P-47 is damaged beyond repair.
Mission 393: In France, 7 of 8 P-51 fighter-bombers attack a truck convoy near Lille; the 8th P-51 bombs Lille/Vendeville Airfield; no losses. In preparation for D-Day, 3 B-17s fly weather reconnaissance over the UK and the Atlantic Ocean.
During the night, 11 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions; 1 B-24 is lost over Belgium.
6 June 1944
The Eighth Air Force reaches its top strength as the 493d Bombardment Group (Heavy) becomes operational, making a total of 40 heavy bomber groups now operational. Heavy bombers fly 4 missions in support of the Normandy invasion:
Mission 394: At first light, 659 of 882 B-17s and 418 of 543 B-24s hit coastal targets in the area of the invasion beaches between Le Havre and Cherbourg; overcast and inability of the bombers to locate (or absence of) PFF leaders causes failure of some units to attack; 1 B-24 is lost, 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 14 B-17s and 1 B-24 are damaged; 12 airmen are KIA, 2 WIA and 13 MIA.
Mission 394: The second mission strikes at transportation chokepoints in towns immediately around the assault area; total cloud cover causes 84 B-17s and 259 B-24s dispatched to return with their bombs but 37 B-24s manage to bomb secondary target of Argentan; 2 B-24s are lost and 1 B-17 is damaged; no casualties.
Mission 395: The third mission is dispatched against the important communications center of Caen; 58 of 73 B-24s bomb through overcast skies without loss.
Mission 395: Transportation chokepoints in towns immediately S and E of the assault area are the objectives of the fourth mission; 325 of 409 B-17s and 125 of 300 B-24s hit targets including Vire, Saint-Lo, Coutances, Falaise, Lisieux, Thury-Harcourt, Pont-l'Eveque, Argentan, and Conde-sur-Noireau; 1 B-24 is lost, 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 11 B-24s and 5 B-17s are damaged; 10 airmen are KIA.
In all, 1,729 bombers drop 3,596 tons of bombs during D-Day. The VIII Fighter Command has the threefold mission of escorting bombers, attacking any movement toward the assault area, and protecting Allied shipping. The fighters fly 1,880 sorties including fighter-bomber attacks against 17 bridges, 10 marshaling yards, and a variety of other targets including convoy, railroad cars, siding, rail and highway junctions, tunnel, and a dam. Very little air opposition is encountered. The fighters claim 26-0-8 Luftwaffe aircraft in the air and 4-0-9 on the ground. Also destroyed are 21 locomotives and 2 carloads of ammunition. Numerous targets are damaged including locomotives, trucks, tank cars, armored vehicles, goods carriers, barges, and tugboats. Targets attacked with unreported results include warehouses, radar towers, barracks, troops, artillery, staff cars, 85 trains, and a variety of other targets. 25 fighters are lost.
Mission 396: During the night, 12 B-17s drop leaflets in France and the Low Countries.
Sources:
Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
Berry, Adam G. R. A Breathtaking Spectacle: A Written and Pictorial History of IX Troop Carrier Command in England During WWII, Volume I, The 82nd Troop Carrier Wing Boston [Lincolnshire]: Overlord Publishing, 2019.
Air Mobility Command Museum web site