I'll try to answer your question, sorry if it doesn't satisfy you. It's rather complicated, and involved layers of European diplomacy and Ottoman internal policy so bear with me

Background: Ottoman Neutrality

From 1740 to 1768, peace prevailed between the Ottomans and their European neighbors, as the Ottomans pursued a policy of strict neutrality to address internal matters and focus on other fronts. This policy was suddenly broken by a rather sudden Russian attack in 1768, and later with the Austrians in 1787. These wars cost heavy defeats for the Ottomans, and it revealed the weakness of their military and the need to reform. When the revolutionary wars broke out, at first the Porte (or Selim III in that matter) still inclined pursue a policy of neutrality. Selim’s first experimentations with the system of alliances were the treaties signed by Prussia and Sweden, yet these alliances did not save the Ottoman Empire from defeat in the last war with Russia and the Habsburgs. Convinced in the need of peace at home to carry out an extensive reform program, Selim pursued for neutrality. That's why even though the majority of Ottoman elite knows what's happening in Europe and how crucial it is, they still maintained neutral stance towards all nations including Revolutionary France. One particularly interesting incident about this is the complaint from Austrian chief dragoman, protesting French revolutionaries who wore tricolor cockades in Istanbul in an audience held in 1793. Rasid Efendi, the Ottoman Reisü’l-küttab (Chief Scribe), argued that the Porte would not interfere with the Revolutionaries even "if they put baskets of grapes on their heads". On another occasion, the dragomans of these states once again protested to Rasid Efendi that the toleration of the Revolutionaries ran counter to the Porte’s policy of neutrality. Rasid Efendi then told that all the French residing in Istanbul were the guests of the Porte by reason of trade treaties and that any sort of intervention with their dress would violate neutrality because it meanr expressing disapproval of their conduct in the same manner of their adversaries. However, as the war grew larger and with multiple victories from the ambitious Revolutionary France, it's clear the Porte must eventually pick a side

Ottoman-French Alliance?

Ottoman-French relations were directly shaped by the Revolutionary wars. The Porte refused to recognize the Republic and its ambassadors. On the other hand, it continued to honor its former treaties with France and held secret audiences with Descorches, promising him to recognize the Republic as soon as it received formal recognition from a European state. In times of low prospects for victory, France sought to conclude an offensive alliance with the Porte so as to divert the armies of its enemies. Despite a series of secret audiences with, Descorches largely failed to accomplish his mission. The Porte strictly followed neutrality in the First Coalitions and after its dissolution in 1795, the Porte seriously (albeit, unwillingly) considered to ally with France in reaction to Russo-Habsburg and Anglo-Russian treaties. Nevertheless, Franco-Ottoman alliance was not a foregone conclusion. In fact, when Selim heard that a European peace will be concluded through the mediation of Denmark and Sweden, he suggested three policies to follow: Ottoman mediation for restoration of general peace, recognition of the Republic, or forming an alliance with France. A secret meeting held by the Porte concluded that whichever measure was to be taken, it should conform to the "current international law". As a number of European states including Prussia recognized the Republican regime in France, the Porte kept its early promises and officially gave its recognition to the Republic by accepting Verninac as the Republican ambassador. Upon the final partitioning of Poland between Prussia, the Habsburgs and Russia, the Porte grew lenient to seek an alliance against a possible encroachment by Russia and Austria.After all, the Austro-Russian treaty (January 1795) explicitly mentioned ‘the Greek Project'. Verninac had clear instructions to incite the Porte to declare war on Russia so as to spare Poland from further partitioning and to secure the appointment of an Ottoman permanent ambassador to Paris. Polish refugees also sent a representative, Oginski, to the Porte to offer an offensive alliance against Russia. Paris, however, grew reluctance for an offensive Ottoman alliance as it felt itself secure enough after signing the treaty with Spain. Consequently, the alliance with France was signed by Verninac and Ebubekir Ratib with the consent of Selim on 24 May 1796. This was a defensive treaty in which the two powers guaranteed their territorial integrity and secured 30,000 troops and 20 warships in 4 months if one of the parties came under attack. The Porte also stipulated that it would not be involved in any war with Britain. However the new regime of Directoire did not ratify the treaty to avoid any future commitment to the Porte especially when the future was replete with uncertainties. Despite this supposed alliance, The Porte still found the revolutionary France untrustworthy. They're especially discontent with French military presence in Italy and Adriatic after 1795. They closely scrutinized the Toulon fleet, for they saw a threat in it for the Morea and Albania. In 1796, Dubayet, a new French ambassador proposed for yet another offensive alliance with the Porte. The terms of the treaty proposed by Dubayet was outrageous, by the Porte's standard. According to the first article, were Paris and Vienna to fail to conclude peace, the Ottomans would send 100,000 troops to Trieste and Fiume so as to join with the French army so that the two allies could cut off the Habsburg army deployed in Dalmatia and Istria from the interior and could march on Vienna. A French fleet of 12 warships was to be put under the Ottoman Grand Admiral and wait at the Dardanelles only to be used against Russia in the Black Sea in the case of a possible Russian declaration of war. After the war, the 'provinces' of Albania, Istria and Dalmatia might either be converted into tributary republics of the Sublime Porte or put under direct Ottoman rule, provided that the Porte would appoint Christian Directoires and abstain from interfering with their religion. The Grand-vizier believed the French had ill-intentions and Dubayet must have submitted the draft with the prediction of its refusal which the French could use as a pretext for their future aggression against the Porte (1/2)