Discussing slavery, genocide and general nastiness towards Indigenous Australians, focusing on life after the 1860s.

I thought about and waited all day, whilst doing a First Aid training course, to answer this post. I spent most of my evening on it. It is incredibly long winded, but please don't let the person who will die due to my inattention today die in vain by not reading it.

:)

Week 86

 

The Italian delegation was back in Paris on Wednesday, 7^th of May, or at least "expected there in the morning" according to the official Stefani communication (information on peace negotiations was sparse, and often consisted of delayed reports lifted from the French press). They had left on April 24^th – Prime Minister Orlando first, Foreign Minister Sonnino two days later, leaving behind the Minister of Supplies (and member of the Inter-Allied Committee) Silvio Crespi and former Ambassador to the UK Guglielmo Imperiali (the two were later formally added to the Italian delegation, as a replacement for Salandra and Salvago-Raggi, but for the time being their presence and action was of "informal" character) – after their falling out with the Allies on the matter of Fiume. Back in Italy Orlando had been given the honors of a fallen hero. There was certainly something shallow and artificial in the character of the manifestations of support for the Italian Government, while deeper concerns spoke of the Italian weakness and isolation, of the fact that going up against the US, Great Britain and France could be a poor tactical decision and an even poorer long term determination.

In ten days, after provoking a "great patriotic enthusiasm", the Italian Prime Minister, "obscurely" as the Popolo d'Italia could not avoid pointing out, made his way back to the Peace Conference, while the Italian public returned to follow, as far as they were able to, the diplomatic events and await for a settlement of the Italian matters with a recurrent sentiment of incredulity and discomfort (in fairness, the immediate reaction to the news of the Italian return had been to assume that "a closing was near", as "well informed sources" revealed on the Avanti!; that the Allies must have had made some opening to warrant the Italian return, as contacts had been reported between Italian officials and the Allied Ambassadors – but soon enough it had become apparent that no conciliatory solution had come from the Allies and that, using a quite generous turn of words, the Italians were "free to return without being bound to any previous commitment").

The realization of the Italian political isolation, already largely implied by Wilson's statement of April 23^rd (which the Italian Government had handled somehow, apparently delaying publication until Orlando's reply was ready and by appealing to the national sentiment – not necessarily to the most positive outcome), came suddenly: much more striking since Italy had won the war, and been victorious together with her Allies – hence the sentiment that certain compensations were, if not deserved, nonetheless expected, but better so expected and deserved. In this direction the conduct of the Italian Government had the quite unfortunate effect of increasing, rather than managing, the impact of this sentiment of isolation and betrayal – painting a dire picture of the Allied obstinate and stubborn opposition, favoring to an extent the rumors of obscure interests standing in Italy's way, singing the praise of what Italy risked losing far louder than they did of what Italy had won – ultimately giving their contribution to the affirmation and persistence of the myth of the "mutilated Victory".

As noted before, the objective situation of the Italian delegation was an extremely difficult one. By the time of their departure, Wilson's opposition to the Italian claims had become consolidated, and no matter what openings the French and British were willing to make, their main concern was the absolute impossibility of a break up with the United States over the issue (with the very likely additional consequence of Germany refusing to sign the Treaty of Versailles). Not that the Italians could do much to change this state of things (and in fact, one might argue, they should have acknowledged it long before) but their action certainly contributed to a further deterioration of the relations with French and British, as it cast a shade over the intense last days of definition of the peace terms with Germany. While the idea of a complete break up does not appear to have ever been in Italy's mind, Lloyd George and Clemenceau had at least to consider the possible consequences (even the possibility of being forced to increase their military presence in the Adriatic) – furthermore Wilson appeared to grow increasingly annoyed with the Italian behavior – to the point where the Allies weren't even sure if the wanted the Italians back or not, since a definitive withdrawal would have at least removed the issue of the Treaty of London.

As Lloyd George pointed out (March 3^rd 1919 – morning session, Council of Three – Hankey's summary)

[The Allies] were in danger of a quarrel either with the United States or with Italy. The former would be far the more serious of the two. Putting the matter at its lowest, Germany would not sign the Peace in the former event so that this was a very serious possibility. This made him almost more afraid of the return of the Italian Delegates than if they stayed away.

And further below:

Mr. Lloyd George said he did not wish to put M. Orlando in the position of being able to cast the responsibility on his Allies for their remaining away. Unless France and Great Britain said clearly: “We stand by the Treaty of London” M. Orlando could say: “You threw me over.”

And the British Prime Minister was, of the three, apparently the one more open to a negotiated solution with the Italians (or perhaps the one more concerned with a negative conclusion of the controversy).

Even if the impact on the territorial acquisitions of Italy was almost insignificant (and the Treaty of Versailles would be signed, albeit not to general satisfaction), the deterioration of the relations between Italy and her allies was somewhat permanent and may have strengthened the tendency of certain forces to push for alternative paths to a settlement (that is, military occupation) and furthermore also encouraged the overbearing presence of those groups in matters of internal politics, which had – somewhat traditionally for Italy – precedence over the international ones.

The potential negative consequences of this state of things did not escape contemporary observers. Already on April 29^th former and future Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti had revealed to one of his favorite press correspondents, Olindo Malagodi, his impression of the whole affair, rooted in his somewhat simplistic but certainly practical understanding of international affairs.

Giolitti complains of the policy of the government – writes Malagodi – which has allowed for such a campaign to take place in Italy, and with so much noise, in favor of Fiume and of the Dalmatian ports, that are not destined to us within the Treaty; thus creating the condition for an impression of defeat and humiliation, while on the other hand, in between the many troubles of war and our unfortunate situation, one should be left at least with the moral satisfaction of victory.

Giolitti also appears rather concerned with the perspective consequences of our political isolation, if the fracture isn't repaired, and more so because we have too much need of the United States' assistance in order to overcome the financial and economical difficulties […] - and concludes – When one is called to deal with the strongest [party] and is, as we always are and will be, playing the part of the weakest one, insisting on being right at all costs is a rather dangerous proposition. Hence the duty of those governing Italy will always be to save her from this dilemma: to either risk a material damage or suffer humiliation.