I was a bit reluctant to answer this one - I had thought to only link the answer by /u/k_hopz - since my point of view on the matter and the sources I have availble may affect my perspective on the issue. But I think it might be useful at least for the purpose of clarification, since your question seems to conflate two different aspects of the problem.

The usual narrative I am more familiar with involves the idea that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was already on his way to collapse before the Great War, due to a combination of ethnic and administrative tensions and outdated bureaucracy. And this one is largely and abundantly rejected - more in this answer by /u/k_hopz - even by authors who have no special commitment to the legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire such as the Italian from Fiume, L. Valiani (La dissoluzione dell'Austria-Ungheria).

In this sense, I wouldn't put it as a matter of recent revisionism - even if less outdated sources may certainly contribute more nuance to the picture.

On the other hand, the situation of the Empire at the end of the Great War was, to the best of my knowledge, a very dire one. Outside of the obvious financial, material and social considerations, the Great War (and with it the action of the Allies) had contributed to promote the action of those groups who sought for a dissolution of the Empire, so that the entire construction appeared to many broken beyond repair. Czech, Polish, (southern) Slavs, Romanians were not only seeking for a consolidation of their national structures but also for a possible way to avoid suffering the worst consequences of the collapse of the Empire. A process that was, broadly speaking, encouraged by the Allied powers - while at the same time the Austro-Hungarian government was forced to ask for an armistice after (or about the same time of) the collapse of the Italian front.

At the same time, the news of the Russian revolution had made their way into the Empire - so that they had already begun to affect quite seriously the Hungarian government, where the matter of a promised land reform had caused social and political tension for a while.

In fairness, there were still those who doubted the eventuality - notably Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino didn't regard it as a likely outcome by August 1918 (and actually insted that it was mostly "a ruse" well into 1919) - but most of the great forces involved with the war appeared to point in that direction.

I would be careful therefore to conflate the two situations - Austria-Hungary before the war and after the war - just as much as we should avoid reading its eventual fragmentation as evidence of the intrinsic weakness of the Empire. The Great War was a colossal labor for both the institutions, the people and the governments of all the nations involved and many of those had to face more or less dramatic periods of instability.

In this general context, the Austro-Hungarian one had lost a war which - purposedly or not - saw the dissolution of the Empire as one desirable outcome. Even contemporary observers from Austria-Hungary showcased a certain awareness - that I am hesitant to call "resignation" as Valiani did - of the consequences of a complete defeat, after the last efforts to come to a separate peace had failed to come to fruition.

This post may also include answers which are relevant to your question.