In the first stages of the Cold War, the relationship between President Truman and the State Department was, one could say, pretty close. Both were in agreement that the US needed to take a certain position towards the Soviet Union, and Truman was often advised in this by the State, Navy and War Department as well as the Joint Chief of Staff. This clearly shows that there was a common position taken both the by the White House and the State Department. This attitude and cooperation later evolved into distinct policies like, for instance, the Marshall Plan and the economic aid to Greece and Turkey which laid the foundations for the Truman Doctrine.

When it comes to the Middle East and particularly Palestine, Truman inherited Franklin Roosevelt's incoherent policy which aimed to support to a "Jewish commonwealth" while at the same time promising the Arab leaders that the situation in Palestine would not change if there was no support from the Arab states.

In August 1945 the Harrison Report was published by the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, to raise the issue of the displacement of Jews in Europe during the final year of the war. The report was very critical of the allies' behaviour towards the Jews and even suggested that their treatment was sometimes no different that what they had been through with the Nazis. In the report, Harrison recommended that "the only real solution, of the problem lies in the quick evacuation of all non-repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to Palestine."

Truman, who was extremely moved by the report, asked the British PM, Clement Atlee to ease British restriction on Jewish emigration to Palestine as the British mandate over Palestine was still ongoing. In addition, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was created to study the immigration question.

For the State Department and more particularly, the Division of Near East and African Affairs (NEA), Truman's reaction was hard to swallow. State and NEA made it clear that they did not favour Jewish immigration into Palestine as long as the ongoing Palestine issue had not been definitively settled. The State Department had critical stakes in the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia, which would later evolve into a crucial element of American Foreign policy in the region. As The United States were beginning to settle into Saudi Arabia and its massive oil reserves, NEA and the State Department made it clear to the president in various correspondences that they should not try to alienate Ibn Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, by allowing Jews to enter Palestine, as he wielded considerable influence over the Arab leaders of the region.

Truman recognized this, and decided to continue his predecessor's policy of trying to find a solution for a Jewish Commonwealth, while still maintaining a form of peace with the Arabs. Still it was now clear that the State Department and the White House were in disagreement of the handling of certain specific issues regarding Palestine and the immigration issue in particular. The Anglo-American Committee shared its findings in April 1946 and suggested the entry into Palestine of 100.000 Jewish refugees, to, in the log run, create a binational state rather than two separate countries. Truman was thinking about short term objectives, by focusing on the immigration issue, especially because the 1946 midterm elections were approaching. State feared the repercussions this might have in the Arab world.

On October 4th Truman declared that he was favourable to for the "creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine".

As the State Department expected, Truman's statement had lit up the Arab world. The NEA declared that Truman's proposal "is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicaps and may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world." Truman genuinely believed that immigration would not change the situation considerably.

That situation later evolved when the UN proposed the two state solution at the end of the British mandate. The biggest fear of the State Department when it came to the partition option, was the sending of US troops to the region to diffuse the situation, should Arab reactions degenerate. The Soviets also backed the partition plan, and with Arab tensions still rising, State and the White House imposed an arms embargo on the region. The main objective of all US parties involved here was to avoid sending US troops in the region at all cost.

Two positions evolved around Truman by this time. His closest advisor, Clark Clifford, suggested to lift the weapons embargo so as to allow the Jews of Palestine to defend themselves against the Arabs. The State Department on the other hand, recommended to find a UN trusteeship solution the problem. Truman compromised by accepting the UN trusteeship but by reaffirming that the US' position had not changed, he was still in favour of partition.

Partition however would be hard to accomplish as the Jews in Palestine were close to conquering the land that was promised to them in the partition plan from the Arabs. It was just a matter of time before statehood was declared, in addition, the British Mandate over Palestine would terminate on the 14th of May 1948 at midnight. And this was starting to become an issue for Washington as well; time was not on their side.

Truman requested a pro-recognition scenario against the advice of the State Department, but this was only to see what his advisors would come up with. Clifford drafted a plan that was in line with American objectives in the region but it should be noted that he was heavily lobbied by American Zionists. Clifford underlined passages from newspaper articles to support his recognition plan. Two days before the end of the British mandate, on May 12 1948 Clifford met Truman along with State Department Officials.

There was nothing to consider politically, according to Clifford, Truman should accept the reality on the ground and acknowledge the Jewish state in Palestine in order to prevent further bloodshed. Under-Secretary of State Lovett, was heavily opposed to this idea because this would effectively prevent truce negotiations and would appear as an obvious political move. It should be noted here that Marshall's opposition was not towards the President, but Clifford because it was, in fact, entirely based on political considerations.

Truman's mind was not yet made by that point, but it is argued that he was afraid of losing ground to the Soviets who intended to recognize a Jewish state on the 14th of May anyway. on the 14th, Lovett and Clifford spoke endlessly but Lovett eventually agreed that Secretary of State Marshall would not oppose the President's position. It became clear that Truman wanted to avoid a power vacuum in Palestine at all cost. As a result Truman recognized Israel eleven minutes after it was declared into existence. The arms embargo was not lifted which arguably showed that the United States was still committed to its policy objectives in the region of not sending military personnel to the region.

It should be noted that it was a de facto declaration and not a full de jure, which indicates a concession to the State Department who was not sure as to what a Jewish state would exactly mean in diplomatic terms.

Sidenote: The State Department and the White House were not always on the same line when it came to the United States' oil policy in the Middle East. With the Jewish question in Palestine being directly linked with the Middle Eastern oil policy, one could argue that the rift between the State Department and the White House, that already existed between both crystallized around the recognition of Israel by President Truman. However, it should be noted that Saudi Arabia was economically tied to the US, and that it would have put Ibn Saud in a tight situation should he have instigated other Arab nations to rise up against his economic benefactor.

References and suggestion for further reading

• The Harisson Report

• Michael Ottolenghi, "Harry Truman's Recognition of Israel", The Historical Journal, December 2004.

• Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the present

• Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945

If you have (waaaaaaay) too much time on your hands, I recommend browsing through the Foreign Relations of the United States Series which is a documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions.