I'm about to read The Absent Superpower by Peter Zeihan, a self proclaimed geopolitical strategist. I couldn't find any concrete academic review of his books, and so I was wondering if anyone would like to share an opinion about him?
I'm a bit sceptic because he seems to be quite right wing when it comes to politics, which is not an issue but I'm afraid his work might not be objective enough.
Thank you
I say this as someone who keeps tabs on his twitter just to see his thoughts on the news of the day and his opinions. And without touching the 20 year rule except to illustrate a few points on the points he makes. I would also suggest r/geopolitics which has a gaggle of threads on his books and talks, with some healthy debate over the merits.
I think like all analysts everywhere he makes assumptions, and has factors he values some more than other. Thats just how shit works, especially when trying to be predictive.
I think he overestimates a few things.
Namely just how great the geography of the US is for ensuring continued national stability and prosperity. For instance the profitability of shale oil is great, until hurricanes ruin too many Gulf Coast refineries so there is nobody to refine it for further distribution or export. And the Mississippi River system is without a doubt one of the great river systems on earth and does support an immense level of productivity and prosperity(and agriculture!). But that isnt very helpful if the Colorado river is no longer able to be used to support Southern California's water need, a region that just happens to drive a huge % of the national GDP, and has millions of people in it.
Now to his credit he is pretty cognizant of green energy issues for example and talks about them often, and how they will be key in the face of future resource needs. But looking around he sure seems to think the transition is going to be smoother than one might expect.
That there is either going to be a new multipolar equilibrium reached with a more retracted US foreign policy, or that in the meantime while geopolitical foes combat a convenient array of ticking time bombs, none do so in a way that is too rough for the US. China has to either get more young people, find wives for its male population in Africa, and dial back its over leveraged debt issues, certainly wouldnt have the potential for conflict heightened by a US that is no longer as vocal about security guarantees with Asian partners, or worse yet an approval of say a South Korean nuclear program(which to his credit he points to as a huge risk in the region).
Nor how renewed populism is as likely to not be a phase, as it is and what that says about continuing to expect states to action rationally according to their geopolitical needs/wants. And just what world with with an every increasingly digital global community and powerful private companies might look like with respect to the power of nation states. Or how a more nativist US avoids the time bomb of an aging population any better than other states.
Now I do think he is willing to hedge his bets, and his personal politics arent totally at play suffice to say he isnt a fan of the leadership style and personal positions of a certain president and some senior leadership but would argue many of the trends leading to certain outcomes might be softer under other leadership but still present. In part because some of the sort of neo-Isolationist trends he comments on are bipartisan. For instance in a world with the US as a net exporter of petroleum, and minimal actual boots on the ground in Iraq the desire to maintain naval forces in the Persian Gulf as a guarantor against the closing of the Straights of Hormuz becomes a pointless expenditure to some who dont value say, the US's power in maintaining the stability of global maritime trade for the past 75 years.
And that he in general is supportive of a US that retains its century long role as engaged power and as one in a robust alliance system, but that the questioned continued viability of the principles of Bretton Woods(if not its exact particulars) and the post WW2 trade networks combined with domestic developments and an absence of a single unifying foe remove it from the needs column for better or worse. I do think he sees the pitfalls too, but tends to look on the rosy side of falling back to natural resources and two big old oceans meaning that the buffer to figure it out exists before things get too bad. My thoughts are that didnt work great in 1941, and it is even less likely to work in 2041.