Today:
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In a discussion on the samurai archives forum, someone brought up the story of ninjas taking the Mikawa Kaminogō Castle in 1562. I think this this is actually a good example to demonstrate the problem with not only ninja stories but all such detailed narratives. So it's worth sharing here.
A little bit of background. At the time, Tokugawa Ieyasu had just declared independence from his overlord the Imagawa, after the death of Imagawa Yoshimoto at Okehazama in 1560. As he was an Imagawa vassal, he had been required to live in the Imagawa capital of Sunpu, where his wife and child also resided, who were now hostages held by an Imagawa clan angry at his betrayal. The story goes that ninjas working for Ieyasu took the Kaminogō Castle, killed its lord, and took the lord's two sons as hostages, who were then exchanged for Ieyasu's family, saving their lives. The story is not impossible. However, if anyone were to make up crap, they'll be choosing this one because it ties whoever's involved to personally saving the family member of the Divine Lord (Ieyasu).
The most trustworthy source to mention taking the castle and exchange the occupant(s) for hostages is the Tōdaiki, which only says Ieyasu took the Udono castle and exchanged the castle lord (and others?) for the hostages.
Next up are the Matsudaira-ki and the Mikawa Monogatari.
Matsudaira-ki says if I'm reading correctly (my reading of handwritten Japanese is not good) they began starving out the castle, the castle lord Udono Nagasuke escaped and left his two sons to be caught and exchanged for hostages.
Mikawa Monogatari says that they took the castle by subterfuge or sneaking inside ("shinobi-tori"), killing the castle lord Udono Nagamochi (note the different name) and captured his two sons to exchange for hostages.
Next up on the trustworthy scale (and how far removed from the event they were written) are the Mikawa-ki, the Edited Ietada Diaries, and the original Mikawa Gofudoki.
Mikawa-ki says that in the third month 18 Iga ninjas ("shinobi-no-mono") under a certain Ban Tarōsaemon took the castle by subterfuge, killing the lord Udono Nagamochi (using a different kanji than the Mikawa Monogatari) and captured his two sons to exchange for hostages.
Edited Ietada Diaries (the original version, which is a contemporary course and as trustworthy as you can get, does not cover this time period) says that in the third month, under Matsui Tadatsugu's orders, spies ("kanja") into the castle undetected, which allowed them take Udono castle. When the garrison tried to escape, they were ambushed by Matsui's men, and the two sons of the lord Udono Nagateru (or Nagaaki, depending on pronounciation of the kanji chosen) were caught to exchange for hostatges. Whatever happened to the lord himself the record doesn't say.
The Mikawa Gofudoki, as usual going by a completely different tradition, gives a completely different story. After a battle, they set out to take the castle garrisoned by a certain Matsui Kanpachi. Under Arakawa Yoshihiro's orders, Iga ninjas pretended to be labourers and snuck into the castle where they set fire to the roof, and on that signal the army marched to the castle and took it. Interestingly this account would actually remove the ties to the hostages, which are not mentioned at all.
Now moving into the mid-Edo, we have the Butokutaisei-ki, which says that on the 15th of the third month, under Matsui Tadatsugu's orders, 18 Iga ninjas ("shinobi-no-mono") under a certain Ban Tarōsaemon snuck into the castle at night, killing the lord Udono Nagamochi (using the kanji of the Mikawa-ki) in his sleep and captured his eldest son Nagateru (using a different kanji than Edited Ietada Diaries) and second son Tōsaburō, set fire to the castle, and as the garrison tried to escape the castle was taken by the army. It's fairly visible that the Butokutaisei-ki combined elements of the previous three.
The story kept evolving from there:
The Kanseichshū-Shokafu (Record of Daimyō and Hatamoto Clans) says when they attacked the castle, Hattori Masanari was 16-sai, and led 60~70 Iga ninjas and snuck into the castle and "accomplished martial deeds" and was rewarded with a spear. Hanzō is now involved, either his birth year or his age or the year of the battle is wrong, and the ninja force is four times as large, and specific rewards are mentioned.
The Kōga 21 Clans Ancestral Records says that someone by the name of Narise Hizō (sp?) and 100~ Kōga men were involved but the action took place in the second month. So Kōga is basically saying they did it, not the Iga guys.
The Various Records of the Kōga-Gumi says that in the second month the siege began and under orders from Matsui Tadatsugu, 100~ Kōga men led by Toda Saburōshirō and Maki Denzō snuck into the castle on the 15th of the third month snuck, killed the lord Udono Nagamochi (using the kanji of the Mikawa-ki) and captured his eldest son Nagateru and second son Tōsaburō and burnt to death over 100 of the garrison.
The Edited Mikawa Gofudoki, like the Butokutaisei-ki, combines the Mikawa-ki, Edited Ietada Diaries, and Mikawa Gofudoki, but instead of the Kōga ninja just coming to help all by themselves or are there inexplicably, there just happened to be someone familiar with Kōga people among the Hatamoto to invite them for help (so...Hanzō? the record doesn't say), and the ninja count was increased to "over 80", Nagamochi (using the kanji of the Mikawa-ki) was killed in an ambush set up by Ban trying to escape north, records that he escaped to Suruga is a mistake, and his sons Tōtarō Nagateru (using the kanji in Butokutaisei-ki) and Tōsaburō Nagatada (or Naganori) were caught. Also Nagasuke and Nagamochi were either the same person, or there were closely related and both commanded the castle (the record use "Udono Nagasuke Nagamochi")
Rather the dwell on the details of what happened, what you can see above is the evolution of the narrative.
Mikawa Monogatari, written by a high-ranking hatamoto and member of an important clan was the most popular, and so influential, of the early-Edo records, despite being less reliable that the Tōdaiki.
You can actually see how the story evolved. From they "taking the castle by subterfuge or sneaking inside", someone (not everyone) thought "it must be with Iga ninjas", and with each retelling names are added, actions are added, stories combined, the "correct" information chosen, numbers made up or increased, until we get a narrative vague enough to be possible but detailed enough to be really impressive.
With the evolution from the Mikawa Monogatari account so clear the ninja story really isn't trustworthy. All we can tell for sure from the above is that they took the castle, captured some important hostage, and exchanged it for Ieyasu's wife and son.
Week 90
The early days of July – first peacetime harvest since 1914 – saw the reappearance of foodstuff riots, sparked by the increased prices of perishable groceries, contrary to the expectations of a decrease during season. What appeared to many as a form of "speculation" conducted by shop-owners and producers (an ideal extension of the "hoarder" figure of wartime) prompted public protests invoking the introduction of fixed prices from the local administration.
As these restraints were temporarily introduced, retail sellers had initially attempted to fight back – for instance closing their shops, as in La Spezia already during the second week of June – causing further, more violent episodes, with shops and general stores sacked. From there, riots spread to other Tuscan localities along the coast, occurring until mid June.
After a two weeks interlude – possibly caused by the expectations connected to the change of government taking place between June 19^th and June 23^rd – disorders resumed on the Adriatic coast, starting on June 30^th 1919 in Forlì – a small city of the agrarian region of Emilia-Romagna – and spreading from there to the neighboring regions, traveling with the news and uncontrolled rumors, on July 3^rd to Florence, on the 4^th to Turin, on the 5^th to Alessandria, Palermo, Livorno and Pisa, on the 6^th and 7^th to Milan, Genoa, Rome, Naples and Catania.
On July 6^th 1919 Nitti's Government was forced to authorize the local administrations to establish fixed prices ("a fair price") "on the grounds of the prices set locally by public organisms and cooperatives […] and, when impossible to do as above, with the increase of production cost by an equitable percentage of profit".
These tumultuary measures – to which local administrations made recourse with significant moderation, including the socialist ones – were certainly ineffective as a long term solution; as pointed out by most economical observers (see for instance L. Einaudi in Corriere della Sera - Il giusto prezzo, July 16^th 1919 and Il dovere di risparmiare, July 7^th 1919)who explained how, given the systemic character of inflation, any possible adjustment involved a contraction in public consumption, which served as a natural pressure for a more rational distribution of resources. To better understand the state of systemic scarcity experienced by the Italian economical and productive system, its worth considering that the exports/imports ratio had dropped from around 70% of before the war to 21.9% and 20.0% in 1917 and 1918 respectively (we'll return to the economical situation later on).
At the same time, the Government was certainly ill-equipped to provide a solution that was both systemic and immediately effective, as the definition of the most apparent problems of post-war Italy could only result from a general adjustment of the Italian financial state. So that certain attempts to placate these forms of popular unrest can be explained as both practical and political necessities, the former being quite easy to understand, the latter being dictated by the special character and circumstances of Nitti's ascension to the Ministerial Chair, and by the major difficulties faced by his composite political organism.
There was – to these episodes of unrest – another, more social and less economical character, destined in some way to contribute to the general climate of tension experienced during the months after the war.
It's painful to see – wrote on July 12^th the Bolognese Resto del Carlino, at the end of the last riots – after the authorities have imposed a 50% lowering of retail prices, manufacture shops in particular have been assaulted by crowds of people, of which popular classes were the smallest minority, while the majority was made up by well known gentlemen, owners of mansions, palaces, cars, of ladies in sparkles and jewels, of most polished young ladies […] And these people have literally demolished those shops, spending hundreds and hundreds of Lire and giving preference to luxury items, especially to silk, velvet and lace […]
Which is a somewhat stereotypical depiction of one social and economical phenomenon which had been determined by the disruptions introduced during the war – the people, while their wealth (and more so their perception of wealth), collectively speaking, had not increased and perhaps likely decreased during the war, had nonetheless, also collectively speaking, much more money to spend.
The first source of price increase – argued Einaudi on July 7^th – is the demand from those who have money, lots of it in their hands and want to spend it. People spend more. Cars have reached a fantastic price of 50,000 Lire; hotel rooms have reached 40, 50 Lire a night […] How is it possible, if demand increases and from every side there's someone pushing forward his bills, for prices to decrease? […]
Peace has not extinguished the absolute duty […] of being frugal.
Frugality was somewhat of a psychological incentive to favor saving over spending – see also the various "admonishments" published on the Corriere della Sera (and others) aimed at the general public ("much too timidly" argued Einaudi), supporting the purchase of ordinary securities for small savings purposes. For this reason bonds were sold in the following cuts (with the first tranche of interests being discounted from purchase price – short term securities were paid upfront entirely).
| Duration | Interest | Price | Cuts |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 months | 4.00% | 100 | 500^a to 100,000 |
| 6 months | 4.75% | 100 | 500 to 100,000 |
| 9 months | 5.00% | 100 | 500 to 100,000 |
| 12 months | 5.00% | 100 | 500 to 100,000 |
| 3 years | 5.00% | 99.25 | 200 to 50,000 |
| 5 years | 5.00% | 98.50 | 200 to 50,000 |
a – for reference, 500 Lire could be conceived as a somewhat average monthly salary at the time
But the announcement of the new short term emission was also a way to attempt a consolidation of the Italian debt under more favorable terms and more positive economical circumstances – a choice alternative to the proposed emission of a sizable long term security (a sixth "war to peace" war bond, which Nitti had repeatedly, and with good reason, invoked after the last offensive of Vittorio Veneto when the Italian debt was likely to command good conditions; but which appeared far less convenient in a climate of general disillusionment and devaluation of Italian securities). For reference the fifth great loan had been placed after Caporetto – accounting for over 6 billions over fifteen years, fixed 5% at 86.50 Lire – and the Italian investors had since then appeared nonetheless more confident in short term commitments and open to the purchase of titles (of unlimited availability) which could be treated as alternative to saving deposits.
Meanwhile, another new "ancient" phenomenon had reappeared – that of "land invasions". This one had begun much earlier than price riots, with the first episodes during early spring, and remained mostly confined to the rural landscape of Lazio, partly spreading to other southern regions (most notably Sicily and Calabria), likely due to those regions' traditional forms of labor organization. On March 4^th 1919 three thousand men – largely under guidance of groups of veterans – had invaded funds in the neighborhood of Albano. During the spring and summer those episodes continued, with the peasants taking over the lands of the many illustrious families of Roman aristocracy, Torlonia, Doria, Borghese, Aldobrandini, Valentini, Rospigliosi; and resumed in August with new "invasions", this time in a more organized fashion.
As largely showcased by their subsequent (lack of) development and consistently with the chronic weakness of the socialist organizations in those regions, the land invasions of 1919 never translated into a coherent (or even incoherent) political movement and failed to connect with the socialist or catholic labor organizations to promote a concrete political action. At the same time, those groups and their revendications could not really find one exclusive political patron to commit to, since the cause of "land to the combatants" had been invoked as a solution of the agrarian question by more or less all political forces during the war – a fact which may help understand their fragmentation and their partial confluence into the last stages of agrarian fascism.
Do you know the historical origin of the word "chauvinism?" Much like jingoism, this term for bellicose patriotism originated in one of Europe's mid-19th century wars. The word is derived from the name of the main character of an 1831 French vaudeville play called The Tricolor Cockade: An Episode of the Algerian War. The play is about Nicolas Chauvin, a young conscript sent to Algeria during the French invasion which started in 1830. Chauvin and his comrades are total greenhorns, and they blunder about the stage trying to chase down rebels and harem women.
But although the play is funny, its central theme is the transformation of Chauvin from a goofball into a brave, hardened soldier under the influence of an old veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. The play linked Restoration France's new war to the glory of Napoleon's conquests. At its heart, it was about restoring pride to the French after Waterloo and suggesting that equal glory awaited them in the future in new foreign battlefields.
Much like the Russian Chapeyev, Chauvin eventually turned into a stock character of French story-telling, which always portrayed him as the greatest French patriot of all time, who won historical battles single-handedly despite being shot to pieces, etc. And slowly, the etymology of chauvinism developed to label the state of being excessively zealous about your country.