It is clear that some members of the Truman cabinet, notably Secretary of State Byrnes, saw "diplomatic" benefits to the use of the atomic bombs against Japan with respect to the Soviet Union. "Scaring" is not quite right, but the idea that this would give the US increased bargaining power with the Soviets is very easy to establish from contemporary documents.

"Mainly" is not right, though. It was one "benefit" to the bomb of many. People are complex and can see many benefits to any given thing, and that was clearly the case here. In many ways the use of the atomic bomb in some way was "over-determined" — there were too many reasons to do it, very few reasons seen (at the time) not to do it. Whether they had to be used exactly as they were (two bombs on two cities in three days without warning) is a separate issue.

It also gets complicated when you take into account the multitude of people involved in this effort. Byrnes was one view — an important one, but not the only one. Secretary of War Stimson had his own motivations for wanting to use the bombs, as did General Groves, as did Harry Truman. For some of these people the Soviets loomed large, for others they were not really on their mind. That the atomic bomb was made ready for use at the same time that many in the Truman cabinet were beginning to get very frustrated with the Soviets is partially why there is a confluence around this issue.

This claim, sometimes known as the "atomic diplomacy" argument, was common in the 1980s and 1990s (though it goes back to the 1940s), and while it does have some evidence in its favor (again, that this was a motivation is pretty easy to establish), it fails to tell the whole story. So too does the claim that it was developed to counter: that the only reason that the US dropped the atomic bombs was to save lives. Neither of these capture the full story, which is much more complicated and multi-causal than either argument would let on. Historians today tend to accept that there was a muddle of motivations, that shifted over time and by person, for the dropping of the atomic bombs.

It's is important to recognize that at the time the Atomic bomb was not full of the same connotations that we put on it now. Back during the 30's and 40's Atomic Weapons were simply envisioned as bigger bombs and the myriad secondary effects weren't fully understood at the time.

Opinion on the dropping of the Atomic bombs is fraught but there seems to be 3 key reasons that the Bombs were used.

1. The Allies were very interested in ending the war: The War in Europe had ended several months earlier and the war in the Pacific was in its last stage. Russia had/was about to enter the war in Asia and the Western Powers were amassing a large invasion force that would storm Japan. The Nuclear Bombings were powerful tools in pressuring Japan to capitulate, but they were not sure how effective they would be. If you are familiar with the types of speeches that Churchill was giving when the invasion of Britain looked certain, you will be find many similarities between them and the propaganda that was being broadcast in Japan by the Government as they watched the Allied Forces prepare for a naval invasion and endured the bombings at the hands of the Allied bombers. World War II was a Total War, where in all aspects of the enemy state was viewed as a viable target because they performed vital aid that the state used to continue the war, the Farmer was just as valuable to the War Machine as the Machinist in the Military Factory, for where one provided bullets that armed the enemy soldier, the other provided food that kept him going. Such Indiscriminate weapons were powerful symbols that demonstrated the resolve of those using them.

2. The Soviets were proving to be unreliable: FDR was interested in creating a new world where "spheres of Influence" would be a thing of the past, but with his passing and Churchill's removal from government, Stalin was hell bent on creating a Soviet Sphere of Influence and had been working to establish Soviet Puppet States in Eastern Europe. With their entrance into the Asian/Pacific Conflict the Allies were not sure where the victorious Soviet Armies would stop, and the detonation of such a powerful weapon would showcase a level of technological superiority over the Soviets that would help enforce the earlier agreements. In the days before the end of the Second World War, the Allies were uncertain that the Soviets would heed the agreed upon parallel that would divide the Korean Peninsula and they were relieved when the soviets did actually stop, however I am not familiar with any Soviet Historiography that states whether or not they entertained the idea of continuing on.

3. The War in the Pacific had a very large racial component to it. The Euro-American powers were continuously surprised by the efficacy that the Japanese forces demonstrated and they paid the price for their underestimation of the Japanese. This created a dual impression on the minds of the Western peoples as the Japanese were "childlike monkeys" and "insidious supermen" at the same time, usually this is because the Allied forces would disregard intel or the skill of the forces they were about to face in battle and use the excuse that "they are so sneaky" when they lost. Comparisons of the Japanese to insects and vermin that needed to be exterminated were common at the time, and yes even while they were fighting against racists in Europe the Euro-Americans utilized Racist tactics in dealing with the Japanese. While the extent to which the Atomic Bombings were racially motivated is debatable, it is pertinent to notice that the "white european" Germans were not the subject of Atomic Bombings, and it is hard to imagine that such racist thought didn't somewhat influence the thoughts of the military planners. Earlier in the War such examples are recorded and it can be implied that it was at least present. *

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I hope this has answered your question, if you would like me to clarify or expound on anything mentioned here please don't hesitate to ask me and I will do my best to facilitate an answer.

Best Regards,

R3N3

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Sources/Suggested Readings on the Topic

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War without Mercy By John W. Dower

Details the Racial components of the of the Pacific War

Five Days in August By Michael Gordin

Details the decisions that were weighed and made in the use of the Atomic Bombs on Japan

The Rising Sun By John Toland

Details the history of the War in the Pacific focusing heavily on the Japanese side of the events

Secret Weapons and World War II By Walter E. Grunden

Looks at the many Super Weapon projects that the myriad sides involved in WWII (USA, UK, Nazi, USSR, and Japan)

The Making of the Atomic Bomb By Richard Rhodes

Details the History of Atomic Research from the discovery of Radiation to the Atomic Bomb

Six Months in 1945 By Michael Dobbs

Details and lays out how the world went from WWII to the Cold War

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*On the subject of Racial Stereotypes used in the Pacific War. It is important to note that the Racial Stereotypes employed by both the Americans and the Japanese were not new and didn't simply evaporate after the war. For the Japanese who portrayed the Americans as bestial demons during the war, the Japanese Religious tradition holds that such Demons "Oni" can also be benevolent protects, while the stereotype that they were lazy, decadent and corrupt would become dormant until it resurfaced during the economic tensions between Japan and America in the 1970's and 80's . As for the American Stereotypes, the Childish / Sneaky racial stereotype wasn't newly made for the Japanese, but instead was transferred from the Native Americans to the Japanese when it suited the purpose of the propaganda machine. It would also be transferred from the Japanese at the end of the war to the Russians/Soviets for the majority of the Cold War, and eventually transferred to the peoples of the Middle East when they became "the Enemy". Other aspects of the exotic/unknowable stereotypes would be buried until the economic tensions of the 1970's - 80's as mentioned earlier.