When it came to diplomacy (or lack thereof), the NS regime and its leadership were remarkably pragmatic right up until the invasion of the Soviet Union and later declaration of war against the US. Every move that Hitler and his ministers made was calculated; they knew that they could rearm the Reichswehr and later Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine even though the Treaty of Versailles prevented it because the Weimar Republic was already pushing those boundaries without any consequences. They knew from territory swaps in the Balkans and former Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires that they could get away with strategic annexations (i.e., the Anschluss, Sudetenland, and Memel) as long as they used German ethno-nationalism as a justification. With this calculating strategy in mind, the NS regime never intended to uphold the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in the long-term; it was a short-term strategic measure to secure their soon-to-be newly conquered eastern border as they went to war with France and England. National Socialist ideology made war with the Soviet Union practically inevitable because Bolshevism was seen as a Jewish conspiracy to undermine the German nation and people.

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That said, the pact did not seem to have too much of an impact in either Italy or Spain because neither of them were directly impacted by it because they had little competing interests besides the obvious conflict in ideology