In short, all trade was pretty unimportant, let alone merely Indian trade, and to the extent that Indian trade was important, Indian deindustrialisation was harmful. 

The British Industrial Revolution and Trade

The causes of the British Industrial Revolution are highly debated, mainly because it just happened once, while there's a myriad of different things happening with an economy at any one point in time. However there's a fairly clear line of argument that trade in general wasn't that important to the British industrial revolution.  The economic historian Deirdre McCloskey argues that historians, economists and policy-makers tend to over-value the importance of trade for economic development. Back as early as 1981 she (then under the name Donald McCloskey), along with C. K. Harley, estimated that if Britain had had no trade at all (not just not with India, but not with anyone), then in 1860 British national income would have been only about 6 percent lower than it was. 

More recently, in 2014, Clark, O'Rourke and Taylor published a paper estimating that the impact of trade was significantly larger than Harley and McCloskey's 1981 estimate, estimating the impact in 1850s of 25%-30% - but that is for all trade, including with the USA and France, not just trade with India. And even they estimate that in the 1760s the welfare impact of cutting off all trade would be only 3-4% of national income. While 25-30% sounds large, GDP per capita in Britain had doubled over this time period. At the moment, the debate in economic histography over the causes of the British revolution is over R.C. Allen's 'high wage economy view', which argues that the industrial revolution happened in Britain because of relatively high British wages (this isn't consensus, eg Humphries and Schneider have just published a critical article - it's just to give an illustration of the current state of debate). 

Indian Deindustrialisation

As for Indian deindustrialisation being a prerequisite for British industrialisation, it was probably instead a (small) harm. All else being equal, it is better to have a richer trading partner than a poor one, as they can supply you with more goods in return for your exports (this argument dates back to at least Adam Smith, in *The Wealth of Nations, 1776). Indian colonialism, as actually practiced, was destructive, of physical capital (in wars), of social capital (colonial officers have limited knowledge of the country they are governing), and of people's lives (dead people can't work in factories).  And, on the contrary side, clearly Dutch prosperity didn't stop Britain industrialising, nor did British industrialisation stop the USA, or Germany, or Switzerland from industrialisation, nor did the industrialiation of the US and European countries stop Japan from industrialising. To quote Deidre McCloskey (2006) (speaking of empires generally):

But is the average British person worse off now than when Britain ruled the waves? By no means. British national income per capita is higher than ever, and is among the very highest in the world. Did acquisition of Empire, then, cause spurts in British growth? By no means. Indeed, at the climax of imperial pretension, in the 1890s and 1900s, the growth of British real income per head notably slowed. ... Rich countries are rich mainly because of what they do at home, not because of foreign trade, foreign investment, foreign empire, past or present. If the Third World moved tomorrow to another planet, the economies of the First World would scarcely notice it. So too in the 20th century: when after World War II the Europeans lost their empires their incomes per head went sharply up, not down. 

[Note, Deidre McCloskey was writing before China's share of world trade had grown so strongly.]

Colonialism was harmful to both its victims and to the home country's economy. The former is the more important matter morally, but I suspect the latter is a more useful argument for stopping it from happening again, sadly. 

Sources

Clark, O'Rourke and Taylor, 2014, The growing dependence of Britain on trade during the industrial revolution, Scandinavian Economic History Review (working paper publicly accewssible at https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/13258/clark-et-al-new-world.pdf)

 "Foreign Trade: Competition and the Expanding International Economy, 1820-1914," Chapter 17 in Floud and McCloskey, The Economic History of Britain, 1700-Present (1981), Vol. 2, pp. 50-69; reworked in the second edition; Harley used it in the third edition by Floud and Johnson, eds. http://www.deirdremccloskey.com/docs/graham/britain.pdf

Acemoglu, Daron, et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Reply.” The American Economic Review, vol. 102, no. 6, 2012, pp. 3077–3110. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/41724682.

Jane Humphries, Benjamin Schneider, Spinning the industrial revolution, The Economic History Review v72 n1 (February 2019): 126-155

White, Colin, A History of the Global Economy: The Inevitable Accident, 2019  http://eh.net/book_reviews/a-history-of-the-global-economy-the-inevitable-accident/

Deidre McCloskey Keukentafel Economics and the History of British Imperialism, South African Economic History Review 21 (Sept 2006): 171-176. http://www.deirdremccloskey.com/docs/imperialism.pdf