I have noticed quite a bit of interest in the Roman military on this subreddit. Most questions, however, seem to revolve around the army of the Republic or Principate. There does not seem to be as many questions asked about the military of the later Roman empire. Since this seems to be the case, I thought it would be appropriate to write a text answering the broader question of what defined the later Roman army. Hopefully some of you find it interesting. I am still rather new to this sub and to reddit in general so I apologize if this topic has already been covered or if the text does not meet all of the mods expectations.

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The Late Roman Army: Some Defining Features

The late Roman army was in some respects rather different from its predecessor during the early Empire. This is especially the case when it comes to the organization of the military and its field armies. During the early Empire there were no dedicated field armies. Instead, when the need of a larger army arose in a particular area, the legions and auxila stationed in that region were reinforced by detachments (vexillationes) from other forces drawn from all over the Empire. After the campaign these vexillationes would, in theory although not always in practice, return to their original stations. By the time of Constantine I (272-337) this procedure had changed rather drastically and the army had seen a comprehensive reorganization. The process of this reorganization is far from clear and has been the subject of much scholarly debate. The transformation of the Roman army that took place during the third century A.D should not be understood as an intentional process carried out with predetermined goals. Instead, it seems that the genesis of the late Roman army was partly a result of various military challenges faced by the Romans at different times – compelling them to continuously adapt and evolve their military – and particularly a result of the reforms of Diocletian (244-311) and Constantine I. This all lead to the division of the army into several field and frontier armies as well as a new classification of the troops. A law from the year 325 (that is during the reign of Constantine I) recognized comitatenses, who served in the field armies, and ripenses, alae and cohorts who served in the frontier armies. The term limitanei is also sometimes used to denote all the varying frontier troops. The earlier practice of using vexillations from other units had thus been replaced by a formal division of the military into mobile field armies and stationary (more or less) frontier forces. This can be contrasted with the most common classification of troops during the early Empire: the distinction between citizen legionaries and non-citizen auxilia troops.

This brings us to another defining feature of the late Roman army: the number and social status of its milites (i.e soldiers). It is notoriously difficult to estimate the size of the late Roman army. This is due to the diverging source material (primarily statements about troop numbers in historical narratives and figures in the Notitia Dignitatum) and to the uncertainty of the unit sizes of the army. However, a reasonable compromise between estimations gives us the figure of circa 500 000 soldiers serving in the late Roman army. In general, the Roman army officials had two ways of obtaining manpower: voluntary recruitment and compulsory conscription. In both cases it was important that the potential recruit met certain standards in regard to social background, age, physical fitness et cetera. There is some scholarly dissent regarding the role of conscription during the early Empire, but there is little doubt that from the time of Diocletian conscription became a major source of manpower for the army. It was probably Diocletian that introduced the system of hereditary military service that forced the sons of soldiers to be inscribed in their father's units. There seems to be some evidence that military service became rather unpopular during the late Roman Empire. This is in part reflected in several laws enacted in order to punish those who sought to avoid military service by mutilating themselves. There were however material and judicial benefits granted to military members which must have guaranteed a steady stream of volunteer recruits; for example soldiers received regular donatives and were exempt from the poll tax.

A particularly defining feature of the late Roman army was the recruitment of “barbarians” or non-Romans. A. D. Lee mentions “the Gurkha syndrome” in Roman recruitment policy of this time. That is, the Romans were very interested in recruiting peoples they perceived as exceptionally proficient in warfare regardless of whether these groups lived within or outside of the Empire's borders. In fact, this so called “Barbarization” of the army used to be (and still is among some scholars) thought of as a destructive process and a reason for the army's ultimate decline. Pat Southern and Karen R. Dixon definitely maintain this traditionally negative perception of the recruitment of non-Romans in their book The Late Roman Army (1996). They argue that the catastrophic losses in the battles of Adrianople (378) and Frigidus (394) brought with them not just a quantitative loss of manpower but also a qualitative loss of trained and experienced men. The Romans responded by recruiting large numbers of barbarians which indeed solved the former problem but not the latter. Furthermore, Southern and Dixon argue that in order to teach the recruits how to fight effectively in the Roman way a core of experienced soldiers was needed. It was also necessary to “Romanize” the barbarians and this could only happen when the Roman culture was preeminent within the army. According to Southern and Dixon, after the battles of Adrianople and Frigidus, it was no longer possible to integrate the barbarians or to train them as Romans. This led to a decline in military effectiveness and ultimately, at least in the West, to the end of the army.

Lee and Sarantis disagree with Southern's and Dixon's view. Lee contends that the non-Roman recruits were de facto military competent (which is why they were recruited in the first place) and points out that there are two reasons why scholars have gotten the somewhat erroneous impression that the late Roman military was dominated by non-Romans. Firstly, there are a significant number of units with names of foreign peoples. Yet, this does not reveal much about the cultural and ethnic make-up of those units other than where they were originally formed. Secondly, there are a large number of commanders in the late Roman army with “un-Roman-sounding” names. Lee points out that ethnic identity is a complex matter that cannot be limited to a discussion of binary categories of Roman and non-Roman. Lee also cites a recent statistical analysis that shows that the number of commanders with foreign names were less than a third of the total number of commanders at any given time and this figure does not seem to have increased over time. Sarantis argues that the “barbarization” of the army was in fact beneficial to the Romans because the varying non-Roman types of troops, who fought in different manners, offered a greater tactical adaptability to the Roman army. Moreover, there is no evidence, according to Sarantis, that the recruitment of non- Roman soldiers lead to a decrease in military effectiveness and training.

Week 91

 

The last month in Vittorio Emanuele Orlando's Ministry went by rather aimlessly, as if the elements of weakness which had already severely compromised his political and diplomatic action had eventually compounded to determine its final exhaustion and deterioration. While the Italian Prime Minister – at times himself unsure whether his government could, or should continue – spent his residual energies in an effort to hold his composite ministry together, he was unable to promote a coherent diplomatic action at the Peace Conference and his persistent absence from Italy limited his ability to intervene in internal matters, where his presence (Orlando had been Minister of Internal Affairs since June 1916) could have been somewhat beneficial. Additionally, the weakening of his Government and its growing exposure to the right (paired with the "maximalist" tension in the official socialist field, but Orlando wasn't looking there for parliamentary compositions) made it impossible to address those central political, social and financial needs, to confront which Italy (or, some would argue, the Italian liberal system) required a policy of reforms, made only more urgent by the additional effects of the war.

For these reasons, while Orlando could claim that his action had left the Italian interests largely "unprejudiced" and while the Italian internal situation was, on material grounds, perhaps less dramatic than what a certain "constitutional" field was accustomed to represent at the time, neither the contingent nor the fundamental problems appeared any closer to a solution – and the new Government led by Francesco Saverio Nitti, assuming office (very rapidly) on June 23^rd 1919, carried in itself similar elements of weakness and appeared in many regards to even lack the means of a systematic intervention.

[…] The task of Orlando's successor was an extremely difficult one – writes R. Vivarelli, who is nonetheless critical of Nitti's general political action – It was not only a matter of facing the problems of demobilization [the Minister of War, Caviglia had halted the process around March-April 1919, for various different considerations, and likely with Orlando's agreement], financial crisis, transition from wartime economy to peacetime one; but also of reconciling the necessities of this transition phase with a policy of reforms which, by meeting the people's expectations, managed to absorb the climate of popular tension and excitement and to give the victory its internal substance. But in addition to the financial and social crisis, it was a political problem which made the action of the new government even more uncertain; it was necessary to come, within a few months, to new elections […]

In this general pattern, the diplomatic matters – which, still according to Vivarelli, had been left by Orlando "unsolved and immensely deteriorated" – constituted an additional, and persistent source of tension, wearing down on the government's action and diminishing its internal authority, affecting the conduct of functionaries and administrations, inspiring a sentiment of "national subversivism", promoting the idea of an action parallel or even antagonistic to that of the government, the justification of which resided in the defense of supreme national interests, that the Government was constrained not to, unable to or unwilling to pursue.

Evidence of this state of things and its repercussions on internal matters can be found in communications with local authorities around the time of the great "solidarity" strike – the scioperissimo - of July 20^th and 21^th 1919, which constituted the first test for Nitti's ability to maintain public order and fight back the "threat of Bolshevism", after he had been called into office at the end of the first bout of price disorders and land occupations. The general strike had been proclaimed to protest against the intervention of Entente troops in Hungary and was supposed to showcase the unity of the major labor organizations throughout Europe. If, in general terms, the strike revealed instead the lack of unity of the European unions (the French CgdT being the most notable, last minute, but the British Unions had also distanced themselves from the initiative), the Italian workers joined instead the manifestations in large numbers.

But the nature and character of the strike were quite the opposite from the violent, decisive clash against the bourgeois reaction conjured by both sides during its preparations. Participation was substantial, yet moderate and orderly, and the socialist unions themselves took various steps to prevent a violent escalation and insisted on setting a precise duration of 48 hours – additionally we know that railroads, post service and even city transportation continued to function for the most part (with the help of certain incentives from the government) – so that the entire scioperissimo resolved in a great "demonstrative" action, a "revolutionary parade", as it has been called. Which besides highlighting the substantial equivocation between the "maximalist" revolutionary line of the socialist direction and the actual direction taken by the socialist movement, offered a convenient ground for the "national" forces to promote a narrative where the strike, and in general episodes of Bolshevik violence, had been contained (and could be contained only) through their contribution.

The fascists, despite their rather small numbers (but operating alongside with many other small, local "anti-Bolshevik" associations), took the opportunity to violently denounce the subversive action of the Official Socialist Party, expression of a "bastard race dishonoring Italy" and offered their assistance – by means of one constituent of the Milanese fascio, Michele Bianchi – to the local authorities, "to maintain public order". These proposals – and the two-ways contacts between civil authorities and civilian "order" groups – assumed with time the form of a more or less constant pattern, where the government had to acknowledge and to contain the "national" side in a manner that certainly contributed to the general ambiguity of the position of those groups and associations.

On July 19^th Nitti – speaking at the Chamber on the matter of public order – had expressed his confidence on the sense of responsibility of the leaders of the labor organizations, and confirmed his view that the government action needed to distinguish between economical and political agitation. At the same time, alarmed by various reports detailing suspect subversive initiatives, he attempted to bolster the public force and encouraged "the most vigilant surveillance". There local authorities – whose ranks appeared often, after the war, insufficient to maintain public order – were more frequently than not open to encourage the support of those groups who wanted "to perform their patriotic duty by making themselves available to public authority" (to cite Nitti's circular from July 14^th 1919), either to better control and restrain actions which may incite public unrest or just to support "the national side". On August 7^th 1919 for instance, the Prefect of Bologna (G. Pedrini – personally involved with the local Fascio di Combattimento) asked for the authorization to provide subsidies to an "Anti-Bolshevik League", in consideration of the fact that "given the political condition of this province, it is necessary to bolster all those elements which may represent a barrier against the subversive groups and encourage the growth of the constitutional ones". A request which Nitti declined, making nonetheless an exception for one small subside for a publication.

In this fashion, the weakness of Nitti's government, as well as his need to maintain decent relations with the "national" field (remember that the Fascio Parlamentare, diminished but certainly hegemonized by the nationalists and national right, had been the first parliamentary group, with the socialists, to side against Nitti) and to rely on their cooperation for the purpose of public order (in the sense exemplified above), compelled him to open the way to certain forces of "national subversivism", whose ultimate purpose and political action was not infrequently one of "disorder". And this was not in fact a later development, as showcased by the famous results of the Rossato-Capodivacca inquest (see a brief treatment in De Felice, R. Mussolini, vol. 1) which detailed how, in preparation for the upcoming election, Mussolini had resolved to invite a certain number of, let's say politically active, individuals, to serve as "security" during his electoral campaign – while, in principle, those men, partly civilians, partly arditi, with a significant component coming from Fiume to offer their assistance, were destined to protect the Popolo d'Italia and the various political initiatives within the city of Milan, the inquest committee concluded that those squads had been employed "for the purpose of intimidation and violence".