A lot of the complaints about Vietnam-era fighter aircraft are often overblown pop-history that miss a lot of the context. With respect to American aircraft in Vietnam, the issues with the missiles and aircraft armament in general tend to be vastly overblown, while the real source of the problems (poor air-to-air combat training) tend to not receive the attention it deserves. There was also the problem of the conservative manner in which the VPAF operated their aircraft, which usually meant that they would only appear in the skies at all when risks were low and potential damage was high.

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As far as the F-4 goes, it's helpful to look at its design and history. The F-4 had its origins as a project for a naval strike fighter, but before it really took shape the Navy shifted development requirements towards a fleet-defense interceptor. The resulting aircraft was very large to accommodate the kind of range and endurance the Navy needed in a fleet defense fighter, and it had a two-man crew to handle its radar and associated payload of missiles. A payload of up to eight missiles could be carried, but no gun was included in the design, as it was expected that the fighter would always be engaging from stand-off distances long beyond the range of the guns. Despite the large size, however, the F-4 was hardly an unwieldy aircraft, and as part of McNamara's efforts to standardize the aircraft inventory, it proved to outperform the F-101, F-105, and F-106 in all of their respective roles (reconnaissance, strike, and interception). With the Navy, the F-4 was significantly more capable than the fighters that came before it - particularly the F-8, which had similar wing loading, a lower thrust-to-weight ratio, and significantly lower climb rate without even getting into factors like payload and range.

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The problem once the F-4 got to Vietnam ultimately boiled down more to training of crews with regards to weapons deployment and air combat than it did the aircraft or weapons themselves. Most pilots went into Vietnam not properly trained for fighting anything but a bomber, and prior to Vietnam there was little focus on training crews for engaging smaller, nimbler aircraft at relatively close ranges. As a result, failures of missiles often came from the fact that crews were firing the missiles outside of their engagement envelope, as they generally weren't trained to engage anything that wasn't a straight and level target and lacked the training to maneuver into a position where they could fire successfully. Despite the poor reputation of the F-4's missiles (particularly the radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow), however, the missiles performed surprisingly well. AIM-7s fired by F-4 Phantoms were credited with 60 victories in Vietnam (10 USN and 50 USAF), while USAF F-4s firing the generally more reputable AIM-9 were credited with 32 kills.

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The reaction to the problems the F-4 was having in Vietnam differed by service. Both the USAF and USN would massively improve air combat training for their crews, but the Navy opted for a dissimilar air combat training program (DACT) that became known as Top Gun, while the USAF instead relied on more traditional air combat training. Critically, while the USAF listened to pilot complaints and installed guns on their F-4s (in the shape of external gun pods or integral mounts on later variants), the Navy continued to fly F-4s without guns through their entire career. The results were impressive - the USN's air combat exchange ratio rose from about 4:1 to 20:1, while the USAF's exchange ratio continued to hover around what it had been prior to the introduction of the gun. Ultimately, by the end of the Vietnam War, the F-4 Phantom's guns didn't appear to have been much of a benefit, accounting for only 15 victories.

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Let me know if you want me to elaborate more on some of those points.