First of all, before I start, I'm nowhere near the level of expertise on this subject as Dr. Ray Takeyh, the author of the article. But I'll try to answer your question since I noticed Iranian coup questions have been asked more than once recently, and are still, I think, left unanswered.

I'll try to give my modest insight on the two myths he mentioned in the introduction, and around which the article is constructed. First, that the machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall, and second, that Iran's brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. I'll mainly use Kermit Roosevelt's Countercoup, the Struggle for the control of Iran, in which the operation "field commander" recollects the events that led to the coup and the operation itself, and the National Security Archive's publication of the CIA documents regarding the 1953 coup.

The limited amount of information I found does show that the CIA was not the only player that was responsible for the removal of Mossadegh, and the idea of a coup did not initially come form them, but nevertheless, they helped to put it in place albeit on a limited scale.

Here's a brief recapitulation of the events before the idea of a coup was mentioned:

Mossadegh nationalized the Anglo Iranian Oil Company in May 1952. On July 13, 1952, Mossadegh had his first major clash with the Shah. His demand for extraordinary powers was refused, but the naming of his successor, Ahmed Qavam, met with violent rioting. On July 22, the Shah felt compelled to reappoint Mossadegh and comply with his demand. In September 1952 Truman and Churchill sent their last joint note to Mossadegh proposing a formula for an oil settlement. Mossadegh rejected this, and on October 22 he broke off diplomatic relations with Great Britain.

The idea of a coup initially came from the British, they approached Roosevelt in London in November 1952, after Mossadegh had thrown the British out of Iran, the British wanted American help for the operation. The plan was already laid out but the British refused to divulge the identity of their allies on the ground or the details of the operation without American commitment. Kermit Roosevelt knew that gaining approval from key members of the Truman administration and the President himself would be near impossible as Truman tried to settle the dispute between Britain and Mossadegh peacefully.However, who knows if a new Republican president were to be elected. In addition, Kermit Roosevelt knew the importance of having the Iranian population and army on their side against Mossadegh, if a plan was ever put in motion.

A Republican Presidency under Eisenhower won the White House in the 1952 elections, which also saw Allen Dulles as head of the CIA and his brother John Foster as the new Secretary of State. As Stephen Kinzer writes: "Foster and Allen took a ruthlessly confrontational view of the world. They saw it as a theatre of conflict between two mighty empires, one of which must ultimately vanquish the other." Their first testing ground would be Iran.

(Sidenote: though the Dulles brothers enjoyed a considerable amount of influence within the administration, there is no debate among 21st century academics that Eisenhower shaped his own foreign policy objectives.)

The British came to Washington detailing their plan and convinced the Americans to join in by suggesting that Mossadegh had become to weak within Iran to resist a Soviet backed coup. Washington was already suspicious of Mossadegh's relationship with the Soviet friendly Tudeh-Party. Moreover, at around the same time, the country Mossadegh made his first efforts to force the Shah out of Iran, but mass demonstrations in the streets made sure the Shah stayed (these are the demonstration mentioned in the article that were not supported by the CIA). In addition, Iran's economy was suffering from the British oil blockade, Mossadegh appealed to Eisenhower for economic aid as he saw the US as a friend of democracy and an opponent of colonial exploitation, he wrote: "As a result of actions taken by the former Company and the British Government, the Iranian nation is now facing great economic and political difficulties. There can be serious consequences, from an international viewpoint as well, if this situation is permitted to continue. If prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, any steps that might be taken tomorrow to compensate for the negligence of today might well be too late."

This last sentence suggested that Iran would possibly turn towards the Soviet Union for help, consequently, the fear of this scenario is what would ultimately push Washington over the edge to give the go-ahead for the British operation although Kermit Roosevelt was appointed as "field commander" of the operation.

Eisenhower responded to Mossadegh only a month later and after the plan to overthrow Mossadegh was approved, he wrote: "The failure of Iran and of the United Kingdom to reach an agreement with regard to compensation has handicapped the Government of the United States in its efforts to help Iran. There is a strong feeling in the United States, even among American citizens most sympathetic to Iran and friendly to the Iranian people, that it would not be fair to the American taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil and oil products."

The only matter of dispute between the British and Washington was the oil question, the former wanted to regain control of Iran's oil reserves, but for the Americans this matter was becoming more and more irrelevant given the Soviet threat. The Americans made it clear that the British could only count on US support if the oil question was left entirely up to the Shah. As Kermit Roosevelt wrote: " The British had to agree; they really had no other choice."

I won't go in the details of the coup since it's brilliantly detailed in the article. Though I should mention that although it initially failed, Mossadegh never suspected the United States to be behind it, he was much moer suspicious of the Shah, which put Kermit Roosevelt in an advantageous position to try again.

So, to make a long story short, and I'm sorry if I got carried away.

Were the machinations by the CIA the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall? It was the British, not the CIA, who initially drew out the plan to overthrow Mossadegh. Given the importance of the US on the world stage after World War II, the plan could only have been put in motion with Washington's approval. What is interesting however, is that it was the British themselves who suggested that Kermit Roosevelt be appointed "field commander" of the operation. One could argue that this was to drag the United States into it with the British in order to deflect the responsibility should the operation ever go south.

Was Iran’s brief democratic interlude spoiled primarily by American and British meddling? To my humble understanding of the events after having studied the information at my disposal, Mossadegh sought to revive Iran's nationalistic flame by ousting out the British, which worked. But it seems to me that Mossadegh's measures regarding the Shah were not popular among the majority of the Iranian people and the clerics, who raised the legality question of these measures. The British and American simply decided to act on this to overthrow Mossadegh.

I would love to hear someone else's answer on this question if any other historian would like to share his thoughts?

References

• Roosevelt, Kermit, Countercoup, the Struggle for the Control of Iran

• Stephen Kinzer, The Brothers, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and their Secret World War

• Foreign Relations of the United States Series

• National Security Archives

While I, like /u/Archiiii, would not presume to question the author's understanding of Iranian political history, his article seems premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of how (successful) covert action works. Contrary to popular misconceptions, effective covert action generally does not attempt to create or falsify political unrest, but rather serves to focus, amplify, and draw attention to, existing grievances. Moreover, covert action generally works when it serves to support and further overt policy, rather than working at cross-purposes to it. This is certainly what happened in Iran, as the CIA employed propaganda, political action, and paramilitary operations to covertly destabilize the Mossadegh regime. These included the planting of anti-Mossadegh articles in covertly-backed publications, the coordination of crowds to protest and disrupt government services, and even a false-flag bombing campaign intended to galvanize clerical opposition to the regime.

Perhaps the most important element, however, was the obtaining and publicization of signed firmans (decrees) from the Shah dismissing Mossedegh from power and appointing Zahedi as his successor. These decrees were legitimate, but they were obtained by exerting considerable psychological pressure on the Shah, who was described by CIA officials as "by nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears". These included a visit from his sister, (considered a much more forceful personality) and American former military attache Norman Schwarzkopf, with whom the Shah already had a personal relationship. The emphasis in these meetings was on "maintaining Iranian independence", rather than resolving the oil issue. Crucially, these efforts were undertaken in support of overt US policy, best exemplified by the public statement of Secretary of State Dulles that:

“Recent developments in Iran, especially the growing activity of the illegal Communist party, which appears to be tolerated by the Iranian Government have caused us concern. These developments make it more difficult for the United States to give assistance to Iran so long as its government tolerates this sort of activity.”

This statement, combined with the growing unrest described in the article, convinced the Shah that Mossadegh's government was untenable, and he (at least initially) went along with the plotters. The success of covert action was not so much that the government was overthrown, but than Iranians were forced to choose between Mossadegh and the Shah, to the ultimate benefit of western interests.

There is little, if any, inaccuracy in the evidence marshaled by Dr. Takeyh, but in my opinion his thesis proceeds from a false understanding of the "orthodoxy" of existing scholarship, as well as insufficient explanation of the intelligence aspects of this case. That covert action was marginal in supporting overt policy does not mean it was negligible, and all successful covert action is to some extent pushing on an open door. Whether Mossadegh was "bound to fall" is ultimately unknowable, but covert action had a concrete impact on Iranian politics, whether it was ultimately decisive or not.

This is my first answer here, so I would appreciate any feedback you or /u/Archiiii have.