How effective was strategic bombing really?

by Pashahlis

It began in WW1 with the Zeppelin and Gotha bomber air raids, followed by the German Blitz and Allied Bombings of Germany, Japan and others in WW2 (and many other bombings by both sides), Vietnam saw a heavy bombardment, the NATO bombings of Serbia, and so on.

Yet,it seems that in every case, the bombings were futile. Losses were high and its effects rather limited, even in WW2 it did not seem to have the desired effect on the output of the German War Machine. Or even forcing a surrender. Hell you might even argue that it increased the defenders morale.

So, how effective was it really? My question isn't focused on WW2, it is a general question spanning all wars that involved strategic bombing.

Brisbanealchemist

Answering your question is giong to be extraordinarily difficult, for a number of reasons. My area of interest is the European Air War in World War II, so I am going to try to limit my comments to something I know a little about.

In terms of assessing the effectiveness of the Bomber War in WWII, you need to consider the emphasis on the theory of the time, which was "The bomber always gets through" and bombers were effectively considered to be next wonder weapon (so to speak). In reality, the most modern air force at the start of WWII, the Luftwaffe, had light to medium bombers (the HE-111, JU-88 and DO-17/217) which had limited bomb loads and therefore limited capacity to cause damage to industry that would fource countries to sue for peace. -The bombing of Rotterdam by the Luftwaffe which resulted in the surrender of the Netherlands can be considered a false positive in terms of the effectiveness of this approach.

The London Blitz, where the Luftwaffe attempted to bomb the British into submission failed because the bombing was (relatively) indiscriminate and didn't do enough damage to industry to really make a difference to British war industries.

The RAF at the start of the war was flying medium bombers (such as the Whitley and Wellington) which carried small bombloads, were underpowered and essentially deathtraps for crews (this is probably a discussion for another time) and the British approach to planning operations was haphazard and bombing results were less than impressive (as per the Butt report). This resulted in Sir Arthur Harris being appointed to the helm of Bomber Command and he set out on improving the effectiveness of Bomber Command, through a number of methods:

  • Changing tactics to minimise losses by putting as many bombers are possible over targets in waves (a wonderful example is the 1000 bomber raid on Cologne in 1942);
  • The introduction of sophisticated electronic navigational aids such as Gee, Loran and H2S to improve navigation to targets (in an effort to reduce error from as high as ~10 miles to actually hitting the target);
  • The introduction of the Pathfinder force (PFF) to accurately mark target aiming points (and in some cases, mark turning points to assist navigation)
  • The introduction of heavy bombers capable of hauling large (~7 tonnes) bomb loads to Germany;
  • The formation of 100 Group, whose purpose was to counter German defences using electronic warfare;
  • The establishment of a night intruder force, whose task it was to hunt German nightfighters over their home bases;
  • Training of aircrews on an industrial scale.

Harris was also instructed to change his targetting approach to complete economic warfare and it included specific orders to disrupt, dislocate and demoralise the German workforce (I can't remember the exact wording, and I don't have my sources with me). Harris, being Harris, took this quite literally as an opportunity to go carte blanche on cities as the major targets, and he set out to attack industrial areas, transport hubs and other significant infrastructure assets. -Given that the RAF was expecting bombing error of about a mile, this meant that many civilians would be hurt and killed, but it also meant that important infrastructure such as housing, roads, schools, water, electricity and gas (to name a few) would be disrupted in the area, and the German economy wasn't really geared up for that.

These strategic attacks on cities did grind away at the economy, but it wasn't until the RAF (and the USAAF) started focussing more on the oil refineries that drove the German war effort that Germany's ability to really wage war was impacted significantly.

The outcome of the European Air War was essentially the destruction of Germany's economy, and analysis by historians on the conduction of the campaign points to the idea that attacking petroleum, oil and lubricant (POL) facilities earlier probably would have ended the war much sooner. However, that is the benefit of hindsight, and doesn't consider the hubris of the main players, the misconceptions of the decision makers and the operational realities faced by crews. Was strategic bombing effective in World War II? Definitely. It showed what happens to economy when you set out to systematically dismantle it.

Some of the sources which are useful:

  • Bomber command by Max Hastings;
  • The Bomber War by Robin Neillands
  • Tail End Charlies by John Nichol and Tony Rennell
Abrytan

Hi there, not to discourage further answers but you might be interested in u/BadgerFest's answer to a similar question here and u/amp1212's here.