In the 18th century, France was the case study for an absolute monarchy. The internal turmoil resulted in the French Revolution, which in turn resulted in a series of dictatorships and eventually Napoleon I's empire. After France lost the Napoleonic wars, it was turned back into an absolute-ish monarchy. King Louis Philippe tried implementing a reform to turn France into a constitutional monarchy, but was overthrown in 1848, when a republic was established and Napoleon III came into office. He staged a military coup d'etat and became an emperor of France until 1871, when France lost the Franco-Prussian war. After another period of turmoil, France emerged as a fully democratic nation, and, with a small break for the Vichy government, it stayed that way ever since. Why? What was different in 1871 compared to every other French revolution?
The emergence of the French Third Republic was by no means a foregone conclusion. Indeed, at the time, it seemed rather unlikely. France's Second Republic had collapsed ignominiously two decades prior, and was not exactly a shining beacon of good governance; the more remote First Republic was still associated with the Terror, and it, too, had proven unstable and incapable of lasting.
To answer why the Third Republic succeeded while the other two did not, we need to look at two very different elements — the beliefs of the Republic's supporters, and the actions of the Republic's opponents.
For most of the 19th Century, the political center in France had been constitutional monarchist — the middle ground between republicans on the left and more absolute monarchists on the right. (Though even many on the far right in France were OK with the idea of a constitutional monarchy, even if they wanted any constitution, if necessary, to include much more expansive powers for the monarch.)
But by the 1870s, after experiences with a wide range of different types of governments, republicanism had become a more accepted idea. We can see this change through the life of a man at the center of the Third Republic's creation, and indeed every other significant political turning point of the past half-century: Adolphe Thiers. His evolution from a critic of republicanism to a champion is a good example for the broader changes in France's political culture over this time.
As young man in 1830, Thiers — a lawyer and journalist — had been a key supporter of that year's July Revolution (a reaction to the absolutist tendencies of King Charles X). But Thiers, though a supporter of the ideals of 1789 Revolution, did not want to replace Charles with a republic. Instead, he co-authored a famous declaration urging a constitutional monarchy under a more liberal king than Charles, of which the second point read: "The Republic would expose us to frightful divisions: it would embroil us with Europe." That's a judgment both on the internal political turmoil with which a republic was associated, as well as the likelihood that the other powers of Europe, under Metternich's Concert of Europe system, would invade France to suppress any republic, just as they had imposed the Bourbon Restoration by force of arms in 1814 and 1815.
Thiers got his way in 1830, with the establishment of the so-called "July Monarchy," under which he was a parliamentary leader and twice prime minister. But 18 years later, revolution came again for the July Monarchy, and France again was faced with a choice about form of government. By this point, Thiers' positions had changed. Though still no democrat — he liked the idea only letting people with a certain amount of property vote, and indeed had difficulty as a politician adapting to the new political environment created by the Second Republic's universal manhood suffrage — Thiers was now prepared to tolerate a republican form of government, albeit with a distinct lack of enthusiasm, telling a friend that "they had neither made nor desired the Republic, but that they accepted it." A few years later he took another rhetorical step in favor of a republic, declaring in a speech that "the Republic... is of all governments that which divides us least." But if Thiers now tentatively endorsed a republic, it was a conservative republic he wanted, not one run by men of a left-wing revolutionary spirit; he spoke of how the "vile multitude" has "delivered over to every tyrant the liberty of every Republic." He also communicated with the exiled Orléanist branch of the royal family, trying (unsuccessfully) to arrange the election of an Orléans prince as France's next president — possibly just as a president, possibly as a precursor to a restoration of the monarchy, if events allowed.
The Second Republic ended up falling, not to Jacobinism and Terror, but to a coup led by its own president, Napoleon's nephew Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, soon styled Emperor Napoleon III. Thiers was briefly exiled, and eventually returned to politics as part of the opposition.
That brings us to 1870-1, and the fall of Napoleon III. In the immediate aftermath of the emperor's abdication, it was not yet decided what form of government should succeed it; given that France was still at war with Prussia, a decision on that point was postponed. Thiers, by now an elder statesman, was elected to lead the government of national defense. He was considered "uncommitted" on the question of a republic versus a monarchy, but chose a ministry dominated by republicans. He had been wondering for years whether "a Republic might be inevitable in France" and had developed a personal liking and respect for many leading republican politicians. He was also disillusioned with the various rival dynasties claiming the French throne, viewing princes as unreliable at best.
To be clear, Thiers was still no leftist. If he is famous for anything today, it is for the bloody 1871 suppression of the Commune of Paris, which he directed as head of the emergency government, and which "has made him one of the most detested historical figures in France." But despite this, he was continuing to drift into the republican camp. One factor was watching local elections and seeing the amount of support that republican candidates received — a sign that a republic might have a base of legitimacy and popular support. It's also worth noting the broader context — the successful expansion of suffrage in England, the established success of the American republic, which had come through its great civil war intact, and indeed the acceptance of universal manhood suffrage under Napoleon III, who ruled autocratically but with backing from popular referendums. "By thus unwittingly converting his opponents, Napoleon III became something he had never intended: the godfather of a parliamentary democracy." A republic could now conjure up other visions than that of the Terror, and even conservatives like Thiers were now passionate advocates for it.
But despite the much firmer support the idea of a republic now enjoyed, and despite the role of Thiers, a converted republican, as head of the provisional government, actually establishing a republic was a tall order. That's because the same 1871 provisional government elections that elevated Thiers had also chosen a parliamentary majority of monarchists — about 400 out of 650 deputies were monarchists of one variety of another. This certainly overstated monarchism's support in France — the 1871 elections were held during a national crisis, and produced an exceptional result. But exceptional or not, they counted, and the assembly had a majority that could have voted to establish a monarchy.
And yet they did not. Understanding why takes us to the second part of our answer: the actions of the Republic's supporters.
Continued in Part 2