All of the available records indicate that the Germans knew essentially nothing about Allied progress in the area of nuclear fission. They knew about the possibility of atomic bombs, and assumed the Allies were interested in them as well, but incorrectly assumed that they (the Germans) were far ahead of the Allies, and since the Germans were not close to doing it, they assumed the Allies were not, either. I have written at some length about this here; there are a variety of sources that indicate this (German scientists were captured and monitored in the immediate end of the war, and the one attempt by German foreign agents to see what the Americans were doing in this area reflects the fact that they didn't think they were doing anything, and said agents were immediately captured).

The surrender of Nazi Germany had nothing to do with the atomic bomb schedule. V-E day was in early May 1945, after a long invasion from the Allies on both sides, and it ended with Hitler committing suicide in a bunker while the Soviets were almost literally at his door. At that time the atomic bombs were still many important months away.

By the time the atomic bombs were starting to look like "real" possibilities, the Allies knew the German defeat was only a matter of time, and so all serious planning about their use was done with regards to Japan. It is extremely counterfactual to imagine the European war lasting until August 1945, but in any event I doubt they would have seriously considered using the weapons there. The tactical situation with respect to late-war Germany and late-war Japan was very different; the perceived "need" for such a thing would have been much less. There would have also been logistical difficulties (the atomic bomb was built for B-29s, and there were no B-29s or B-29 supply chains in Europe).

A more interesting question is, if the atomic bombs were ready far earlier than they had been (e.g., in December 1944), would they have been used in Europe? Roosevelt apparently contemplated it at the time, but among the many tactical objections, it should be remembered that they simply weren't ready to be used then — the atomic bomb effectively did not yet exist.