Ludwig van Beethoven is certainly best known for his symphonies, but, is he?

I'll use some rhetoric questions in this comment, I'm sorry, bear with me, I assure you it has a reason.

I've written extensively about him in my lectures, mainly regarding his lesser known works, of which there are a myriad. I will not talk about them now however, but instead I'll focus on the alleged fame of his symphonies; why I say alleged; and about my favorite of his symphonies.

Is he actually known for his symphonies?

Partially. Almost anyone who lives, has heard Beethoven's fifth symphony, but have they? That is the first movement of the symphony, allegro con brio. But, as the idea of first movement implies, it's just a part of the symphony. Calling it "just a part" is far too reductionistic, unacceptable even, but for the purposes of my thesis today, it is necessary.

What is a symphony?

The history of the term is old, older than what we nowadays conceptualize as "art music". Etymologically, dictionaries trace its origins to the Greek language, to a word signifying harmony. Musically, according to one of the most essential musicological works, A Survey of Musical Instruments by Sybil Marcuse (1975), it dates to the late Middle Ages. It became a purely orchestral form of composition with Joseph Haydn, colloquially known as the "Father of the Symphony".

Biographer Giuseppe Carpani added in Le Haydine (1823), a letter written in April 1808 in Vienna, which reads "When leaving Vienna (...) emerges a worthy and humble little house, surrounded by silence. There (...) resides the creator of the most beautiful harmonies in the world; there rests the God of instrumental music, one of the few true Geniuses of the XVIII Century (...)."

Haydn composed 106 symphonies, which are very different in length to what we now know as a symphony, but very similar in depth and in structure. See, Haydn's symphonies were quite short, some of them being as short as 17 minutes of score time, such as his 12th Symphony.

What we now understand to be a symphony comes from the late classical and early romantic periods, and we owe it to Beethoven. Before him, symphonies were shorter, but had the same structure: a piece composed in at least three separate, distinctive movements, scored for an orchestra of no less than 30 instruments.

Austrian musicologist Richard Specht wrote two great books on Beethoven: Beethoven as he lived (1933) and Ritratto di Beethoven (1947 [published posthumously]). He says "Foreigners who, at the beginning of the XIX century arrived to Vienna (...) would comment on seeing a singularly unkempt man, who would abruptly make his way through the crowds. (...) He'd often stop, suddenly, without noticing that he was disturbing others: black and fiery eyes, raised as if to contemplate something sublime, a congested face riddled with smallpox, a powerful forehead, a tight mouth, tense all of him, as if in waiting."

Beethoven's symphonies, much like himself, are masterpieces of complexity. They go above and beyond in showing, without being programme music, emotions, feelings: deep sorrow, hate, despair, but also hope, joy and longing for a better future. Beethoven's symphonic compositions are a Gestalt, a complex interrelation of each part, there is a constant emotional as well as technical feedback among every movement. This is why I said that, while one may know very well the famed first compasses of the Fifth's first movement, the symphony as a whole is much more complex, nuanced and therefore, from a musicological standpoint, there is a necessity to listen to it and analyze it in its entirety. I'm not, however, implying that one may not enjoy listening to just one or two of its movements, but rather, that from a technical as well as historical viewpoint, they cannot be cleaved, nor discriminated, even if its in with a specific morphological objective in mind.

Beethoven's Seventh Symphony

In Ludwig van Beethoven (1975), a biographic compilation, Renato Pinto explains that when Beethoven composed his Seventh (he started working on his Eight at the same time) between 1811 and 1812, he was deeply saddened by two factors that marked his final years. His ever-growing deafness, and his loneliness. His tempestuous personality, as well as his deep hatred of the aristocracy, (certainly a paradoxical quality of his identity, since he was financially maintained by those he despised), had left him isolated. While he was undoubtedly famous, and his concerts and presentations were attended by the crème de la crème of Viennese society, his everyday life was lonely, spent in ostracism and isolation.

In 1812 he met with famed poet Johann von Goethe in the city of Teplitz. Goethe remembers their encounter by saying "I've learnt to know Beethoven. His talent has disconcerted me; he is, unfortunately, an unbridled personality. He certainly does not lack sanity in finding the world a despicable thing; but proceeding thus he will not be able to better it, for himself nor for others. All of this is quite forgivable and understandable; his hearing abandons him and this is a fact that harms less the musical aspect than the social one. Laconic by nature, he is twice as much due to his deafness".

During his stay in Teplitz, he dedicated himself to writing his Seventh, while being affected by his sorrow as well as by physical pain. Pinto says "(...) we're interested in inquiring about Beethoven's mood in this crucial period of his existence: he's a restless, unsatisfied man, always ready to react violently when faced with the aristocratic society who, however, are always paying attention to his art". His partially self imposed isolation led him to be in dire economic troubles, since he had distanced himself of many of his wealthiest patrons. In a letter to his lifelong friend Nikolaus Zmeskall, written on February 19th, 1812, Beethoven tells him "(...) I no longer wish to continue living here (in Vienna) to feel insulted thus. When it is persecuted, art finds refuge anywhere. Daedalus, locked in the labyrinth invented the wings that took him soaring through the airs. Oh, I too shall find those wings! (...) my kingdom is in the air".

This words are key in understanding his Seventh. A grand, majestic piece, filled with sorrowful longing and melodies that evoque that which he lacked, companionship, love, heartfelt encounters. But with a distinctive movement that defies those feelings, with a motif that repeats itself in the final movement: the Allegretto, the second movement, the most well known of them all, often performed separately. The motif is clear, that "kingdom in the air" is written in the score: his isolation is marked by the oppressive rhythm, which shrouds the melody. But, according to Sir George Grove in his Beethoven and his Nine Symphonies (1896) the melody is set free in the recurring motif of what he calles "the temple"; a harmonious melody carried by violins and repeated by winds, signifying a refuge, a shelter that protects the purity of the joy, that will be a key element of the final movement, Allegro con brio, filled with dances and ritornellos (immediately repeated chords or even entire melodies).

According to Pinto, if in the Sixth symphony, the Pastorale, Beethoven spoke of the finding of joy in nature, in rocks and streams and forests, the Seventh speaks of the need to find joy within oneself.

---------

I'd like to note that all of the translations are my own.

The last question i remembered about this is like from 2017, and so because this is one of my favourite subject i decided to write stuff about it

Circassian Refugees and Their Settlements in Syria and Transjordan after the Russo-Turkish War

The Russo–Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and the following treaties of San Stefano and Berlin of 1878–1879 resulted in the loss of a large chunk of European areas of the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus. These regions were populated by large numbers of Muslim Turkish-speaking people, including Circassian immigrants and refugees recently settled in the Danube after the Russian conquest of the Caucasus. During the war, Circassian soldiers and irregulars fought the Russians and Bulgarians whose virulent animosity and brutality towards the Russians incited the latter to respond in kind. Additionally, the Ottomans sent two Circassian units to help in the fight against the Russian invaders in the Caucasus. Inevitably the local Circassian population rose up against the Russians leading to a Russian expeditionary force under General Kondukov landed on the West coast of the Black Sea with the purpose of pacifying Circassia. Consequently, claiming that they were creating transborder problems and disturbances, Russia insisted that the Ottoman government remove these communities from the Balkans and newly acquired Russian lands in the Caucasus. As a result, the entire Circassian and Chechen populations of Thrace and Macedonia were dispersed into Anatolia and the Arab provinces followed by further 2 million people who were forced to leave the Caucasus in terrible conditions, travelling overland and by sea between 1878 and 1879. An estimated 500,000 died along the way from harassment, disease, or starvation which i won't tell in detail because it's quite some depressing stuff

Ottoman Administration and Circassian Refugees

The Ottoman government had set up a special department to manage refugees called Idare-i Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu (General Commission for the Administration of Immigration). It was established in 1860 to manage Tatar and later Caucasian refugees under the chairmanship of Sadik Paşa. Eventually, after the flow of immigrants relaxed it was closed down in November 1865. However, with the new flow of refugees after the war by the sultan's order the commission was re-opened again, still under Sadik Paşa. Moreover, the Sultan stated that since the majority of the arriving immigrants were "destitute and in need of charity and mercy and had taken refuge here because of the enemy's aggression on their lands, it was essential for the entire population of Istanbul to fulfil their obligations of hospitality and protection as already evident in the willingness of everybody to aid the immigrants." Consequently it led to the establishment of a lane Komisyonu (Charity Commission) composed of 10 members whose main purpose was to collect aid and distribute it to Muslim and Christian immigrants arriving in Istanbul. The Charity Commission was to distribute food, provide health care and find employment for the immigrants in the lists provided by the Immigration Commission. The Ottoman Government’s view was that charity and hospitality was a Muslim religious obligation. Those arriving were in the main destitute and in need of charity and mercy and had taken refuge because of the enemy’s aggression on their lands, it was essential for the entire population of Istanbul to fulfill their obligations of hospitality and protection as already evident in the willingness of everybody to aid the immigrants. This altruistic position of the Ottoman Government, based on moral or religious principles, was also supported by the fear that Muslims who remained on lands conquered by Russia might be conscripted into the army and forced to fight against their Muslim brethren as had already been done in the past by Russia. By encouraging Muslims who desired to leave these Russian newly annexed territories and settle in Ottoman territory, such fears could be mitigated. About 10 years later in 1887, the Ottoman government under direct instructions from the Sultan after considerable debate made a basic decision concerning the immigration of Muslims from the Balkans and Caucasus. During the debate one group claimed that the Ottoman long range interests would be served better if the Muslim population remained in their native lands though ruled by a non-Muslim authority. Another group contended that the immigration of Muslims would increase the Ottoman manpower, augment the number of potential soldiers, and contribute to the rise of national income, and concurrently weaken the enemy by depriving it of population and income. However, the chief argument in favour of free immigration was the classical Islamic principle that any Muslim who did not want to live under non-Muslim rule should be allowed to immigrate and settle on Muslim lands and be accepted and cared for. The proposal then was prepared by Cemalettin Efendi, the head of the Muslim Community of Eastern Rumelia. The şeyhülislam's office sent Cemalettin Efendi's original proposal with a supporting letter directly to Sultan Abdulhamid stating that the life of the Muslims under foreign rule in Rumelia and elsewhere had become difficult, that their religious and cultural rights were continuously violated and, consequently, they should be allowed to immigrate. They proposed to the Sultan to urge these Muslims to immigrate not only in order to save themselves but also to strengthen the Ottoman human resources to withstand Europe's future attacks upon the Muslim Middle East. In order to meet the expenses of the immigrants, it was decreed that all government offices with the exception of some military departments should attempt to save 2% from their budget to be used for the settlement of the newcomers. The conferences decided also to establish Muhacirin Komisyonu Alisi (High Immigration Commission) under the "chairmanship of his highness the Caliph" whose members were to be appointed by the Sultan. This Immigration Commission was to function alongside the old Idare-i Umumiye-i Muhacirun Komisyonu. The immigration policy initiated by the Ottoman government after 1887 successfully encouraged Muslim immigrants and consequently the rate of arrival increased. In order to accommodate the newcomers it was decided in 1893 to establish a new General Immigration Commission consisting of 13 departments to deal with all of the problems involved in the settlement of the migrants and abolish the old ones. However, there are still problem with immigrations like mistreatment from locals or officials. In order to deal with the difficult problems caused by immigration, the Sultan decided to revive the old Muhacirin Komisyonu Alisi by involving in it technocrats drawn from various ministries who could provide practical solutions rather than ideological palliatives to immigration and settlement problems as was often the case. Shortly afterwards the by-laws of the Commission were drafted, and its name was changed to Muhacirin-i Islamiye Komisyon-u Alisi (High Islamic Immigration Commission). This Commission functioned under the chairmanship of the Sultan and superseded the authority of all other existing bodies. Its chief purpose was to set policy governing the movement of all Muslims from the Balkans and Russia, beginning from their place of origin to the place of settlement in Anatolia, Syria and Iraq. The Commission also proposed to deal with all the problems encountered by the migrants in their country of origin, such as aiding them to secure the necessary travel documents and the permission to sell their properties and take the proceeds with them, and helping them to arrange transportation to their chosen destination. As far as the settlement policy itself was concerned, the Commission proposed first to locate suitable sites possessing cultivable lands in all the Ottoman vilayets including Syria, Baghdad, Basra, as well as Benghazi and Tripoli in North Africa. Then it proposed to build houses for the migrants and to provide for their maintenance until they became self-supporting in the shortest possible time. Finally, it issued directives to the officials in the vilayets to do their best to facilitate the immigrant's adjustment to their new homes and the development of harmonious relations with the established population.

The Ottoman government developed after 1878 a rather simple but practical settlement policy. The Muhacirin Komisyonu issued the basic instructions to the settlement commissions and officials established in each vilayet. The muhajir (refugee) according to these instructions were to be given land from miri properties or from properties purchased by the government from private individuals for distribution to the immigrants. Some individuals donated land for settlement of the immigrants free of charge. Until the completion of their houses the muhajir were to be distributed among the population of the established villages and supported by them, each ten families was to support one immigrant family. The migrants were prohibited from leaving their assigned localities. The chief duty of the iskan (settlement) official was to implement the above decisions.

Week 93

 

News of severe incidents occurring in Fiume on July 6^th 1919, worse than those which had taken place immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles and continued through the subsequent week, reached the Allied authorities piecemeal the next day. The events – in themselves expression and culmination of a progressive deterioration of the Italo-French relations, and of their echo within the public opinion and repercussions on the "on the ground" attitude of the occupation forces, in particular within a region that was, as we discussed last week, especially exposed to a radicalization of tension (the significant concentration of military personnel might have been already enough to cause friction) – brought to a possible further erosion of the relations between Italy and her allies, one that the apparent best efforts from the new Italian government could not solve. Rather, the appointment of an inter-Allied commission, its findings and its deliberations – while not entirely unfavorable to the Italian side – advising for a substantial revision of the occupation regime, became new elements of the nationalist propaganda and served as one of the factors which made Fiume the point of origin in D'Annunzio's action two months later.

More or less undetermined plans for a forceful action, transforming the Italian occupations on the Adriatic coast in a permanent annexation – whether with the Government's acceptance of the new status quo or in opposition to a "defeatist" Ministry which was therefore to be replaced with a new government (form) expression of the true national forces – had been circulating since the early stages of the Italian diplomatic difficulties at the Peace Conference, and especially increased since those had become public knowledge.

Up to around the end of April – writes R. Vivarelli – the objective of all those vague determinations of Adriatic expeditions appears to be Dalmatia alone, and in particular the most recurring name was that of Split; but, since the month of May, the city which begins to gain traction is Fiume.

No mention of the Adriatic port town had been made in D'Annunzio's Lettera ai Dalmati of January 14^th , one of his most effective rhetorical nationalistic pieces, where the "altars" chosen to receive the poet's devotions were those of "Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, Traù, Ragusa, Cattaro, Perasto" – where Dalmatia, the whole of it, had come nonetheless to be the symbol of all the Latin lands on the other side, which belonged to Italy, "down to the innermost coves of Cattaro's labyrinths".

In between fortunate images of the small, clean altars of Latin, Venetian, Republican values, pillars and lions, marbles sinking in sacred waves, names of patriots old and new – remnants of a most honored civilization, to be contrasted with the "Croat scum", a "collection of villainous dregs" which laid conspiracies against the Italian victorious arms, against an "immeasurable victory, which goes far beyond the old pacts" – in between reminders that Italy had vanquished two enemies, "the one outside and the one inside" and sacred appeals "to remind us, o Lord, of our crimes and theirs", echoes of a grand, glorious past, "Italian and Roman", and hints at recent betrayals, such as the attempt to "deprive Italy of her naval prey" consumed "by the collection of the southern Slaves [sic], with the favor of an allied power", D'Annunzio concluded rejecting beforehand the French, British and American peace, which amounted to the consummation of a "new peace of Campoformido", and invoked instead for Italy "a Roman peace, the only one befitting her".

How to achieve, or to impose, such a pacem Romanam against the many insidious enemies of the Italian aspirations was a different matter entirely – and one which could not find a satisfying answer in literary devices. Such aspirations did nonetheless involve a prosecution, after the end of the military conflict outside, of the political conflict inside (or perhaps of the anti-political conflict inside), resulting in the institutionalization of the national will, as the true, genuine source of political authority, above, over and against the parliament's will. Under this light, the appointment of F.S. Nitti, that is of a "parliamentary man" through and through, as Prime Minister – which had already left a few political opponents of less extreme orientation (see for instance the opinions of S. Crespi in his memoirs) less than favorably impressed – was not only of extreme detriment to the cause of Italy's aspirations outside, since Nitti had appeared committed since the beginning to finding an agreement with the Allies, even at the expenses of a few painful sacrifices, but amounted to an explicit (if perhaps momentary) defeat of those vague designs for a radical transformation of the Italian state. And to a lesser extent were the expression that the establishment – and the King himself – looked, for the time being, at the parliamentary institutions as the most stable and dependable centers of political power.

This "disavowal" – and the relative weakness and dispersion of the radical and "national" forces – wasn't really enough to in turn make Nitti's Ministry strong. Additionally, and more closely related to the Italian diplomatic misfortunes, there was the general impression that Nitti had come, at the end of Olrando's tenure, as somewhat of a "trustee in bankruptcy", to liquidate the Italian diplomatic assets in exchange for a few pieces of consolidated capital.

A spectacle – explained the Marquis of Cesarò, from the pages of the "national-leaning" La Vita Italiana of July-August 1919 – of neutralist men and groups […] called to liquidate a war they didn't want, to realize aspirations they don't feel for, to renovate an Italy that they want to maintain as is for their arrangements of old; this spectacle keeps the Nation away from the new Ministry and has inspired every sort of doubts towards the new Prime Minister […]

Such a general perception (since general it appeared to be, albeit under different shades), which Nitti was unable to address effectively – partly because of his personal character and partly because of the many significant difficulties faced by his Ministry, which certainly contributed to his failure in reconnecting the institutions with the "nation" – made his course of action, in the attempted resolution of the Adriatic question, a narrower and more troubled one than it was already. Meanwhile, the new Foreign Minister Tittoni had just arrived in Paris, after the signature of the German Treaty which had been discreetly left to the previous delegates, and found the relations between Italy and her Allies already at a low point – a state of things the Allies themselves made no effort to conceal, but rather spelled out in Balfour's memorandum of June 28^th 1919 (which Tittoni received in the evening of June 30^th after his first council meeting). His early attempts to improve the situation had been met with a mixture of indifference and resentment (the Italian Foreign Minister drew a distinction between a "quite cordial attitude on personal ground" and "vibrant irritation against his predecessors" – July 4^th to Nitti – but we know that the Allies had looked at his designation with explicit mistrust) and Tittoni himself appeared soon enough to come to terms with the reality that no diplomatic success could come from his action, only a more or less honorable defeat – furthermore, there was no special urgency to address the Italian matters (as they had been thoroughly "subject to reservation" and "left unprejudiced"), and anyways, given how the situation had been handled during the past few months, "no resolution appeared in sight", as Tittoni concluded after his exchange with Pichon on June 30^th – so that the early meetings of the delegates were usually dedicated to sorting out various mutual recriminations.

On July 4^th Nitti had received news from Tittoni who expressed his view that "we won't be able to get what the Country wants", and proposed already his return to Rome to address the Senate. On the 6^th and 7^th Tittoni had remarked to Nitti how the anti-French attitude of the Italian press had a particularly negative impact on the French public (on the 4^th the French Embassy had made an informal step inviting the Italian Government to moderate "the sensationalist tones of the press reports from Fiume" – Foreign Office Undersecretary Sforza to Tittoni, July 4^th 1919), while on the other hand Clemenceau appeared to exert a moderating influence on the French press. The French Prime Minister especially had appeared on July 6^th "anxious to prevent further incidents and to avoid perturbations in the negotiations between the two governments".

We agreed – Tittoni continued his relation from July 6^th – that I was to write to Gen. Grazioli and he to Gen. Savy with an express invitation to find an agreement in order to prevent new incidents and recommending them the utmost degree of cordiality.

And on the 7^th – before he had received news of the last incidents

As telegraphed, Clemenceau promised me he was giving instructions to Gen. Savy for an agreement with the Italian commander. But I don't think withdrawal of the French detachment to be possible. The Supreme Council […] won't ever agree on a non-international occupation; even more so if we consider that, regardless of the final deliberations of the Conference, it's a fact that Fiume is both outside of the Treaty of London and of the armistice line. […] I wish you to insist with High Command to ensure […] a return to peace, otherwise my position at the Conference, which is already so difficult due to the disastrous state inherited from my predecessors, would become impossible.