From 1775 to 1778, the British saw the rebellion in the colonies spread over the northeast, and after the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga, the French started supplying aid, as well. It was time to try something new.

Charles Jenkinson, who was a sub-minister in the Treasury and so thinking about losses and gains, suggested that New England be abandoned and that Britain should concentrate on securing the Southern colonies. They produced all the stuff that England really wanted, and they also were important to strengthen the British hold on Florida and keep the Spanish in check.

While Jenkinson did not get agreement about chopping off the northern colonies and letting them go, there were good strategic reasons for starting military operations in the south. Roads were terrible between the north and south, so if Britain kept her mastery of the seaboard it would be possible to move troops to anywhere on the coast and poor land-locked George Washington would never be able to catch up. And there were supposed to be lots more Loyalists there, good Church of England people, who would support the army. Parliament was beginning to grumble at the widening expense of the widening rebellion, and the help of cooperative Loyalists looked to save the government money. If the southern colonies were subdued, and made to provide a good secure base of operations, it would then be possible for Britain to take its time later in settling the northern colonies.

So, in November 1778 General Clinton, commanding the British forces from his headquarters in New York, embarked a few thousand men for Georgia. They were met there by a couple thousand more from the St. Augustine garrison, and together they soon took Savannah. And then they moved inland, and then, well, even though they would mostly defeat the Americans, they never quite managed to take control of the entire southern territory. There weren't the huge numbers of Loyalists they'd hoped for, and those Loyalists found that, though the British expected them to do some fighting, the British were often not there backing up the Loyalists when hostile Continentals or their supporters threatened them.

Don Higginbotham: The War of American Independence