Prior to 1925 the First Amendment only applied to the Federal Government and was reluctant to overturn State laws that restricted speech.

For example, in 1897, in a case called Davis v. Massachusetts the Supreme Court upheld a law that gave the Mayor of Boston pretty much complete control over who could give a speech on public property.

That changed in 1925 with Gitlow v. New York. Gitlow was charged with Criminal Anarchy for advocating the overthrow of the government. The Court held that the "freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Mr. Gitlow however lost the case as the Court also held "a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace, is not open to question." This part was mostly overturned in 1969 when the Court held that governments could only restrict speech that encouraged 'imminent lawless action'

The holding that the First Amendment applied to states would stand though, and began a process by which nearly all of the Bill of Rights were held to apply to state governments.

After that, the court had generally struck down regulations around protests or demonstrations. For example, in 1940, the court stuck down a law in Alabama that essentially banned picketing businesses. Previously they had struck down bans on handing out literature, canvassing, and other protest activities. They had also struck down laws that required a permit for a protected activity, but gave the city or state wide discretion in who to grant one too or that were clearly designed to suppress speech or protest.

In 1941 the Supreme Court heard a case called Cox v. New Hampshire. Here the Supreme Court unanimously held that state and local governments could require a license (or permit) protests on public property. The case stemmed from a group of Jehovah's Witnesses who marched in the City of Manchester. They were convicted of violating a state law which granted cities the ability to license a "parade or procession upon any public street or way".

In upholding the law in Cox the Court differentiated between laws that regulate the content of speech, or wholly ban protected activities, and those that only sought to regulate the "time, place, and manner" of speech. Specifically the Court embraced language from the New Hampshire Supreme Court which held that the license served to "to prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure convenient use of the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the risk of disorder."

The Court also held that charging a fee was acceptable, so long as the fee was "to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed."

Subsequent to Cox the court has further expanded and clarified the Time, Place, and Manner concept. In one more recent case, Ward v. Rock Against Racism they outlined a four pronged test. A regulation must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored, serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternatives.

Basically requiring permits has been seen as constitutionally permissible so long as the purpose is related to things like public safety or ensuring the organized use of public spaces. If it is aimed are preventing speech all together, or allows discretion based on content, it would be invalid.