I'll try to answer your question, sorry if it doesn't satisfy you. Yes, at least after the mid 18th century

In the mid 16th century to early 18th century, the Ottoman Army was actually quite equal to those of Europe. They used flintlocks, maintained a cavalry to infantry ratio similar to their rivals, had an effective light and mobile artillery corps, used their cavalry as dragoons, and so on. Their failure in the 1683 campaign was not caused by military or technological advances in Europe that caused their armies to lag behind, but rather because of shifting diplomatic patterns in Europe that created an alliance of Austria, Russia, Poland, Venice and the Papacy, more determined than ever before. Even in the first half of the 18th century, the Ottoman military continued to enjoy modest successes, defeating Russia in 1710-1711, Venice in 1714-18, Austria in 1737-39, and Persia in 1742-1746. It's only by the War of 1768-1774 against Russia that the Ottoman army is disastrously defeated. So what happened?

By 1768, European militaries had moved away from federative and contractual armies, replacing it with centralized system where government were able to use military force and organized violence even more independently. By contrast, the Ottoman Empire are moving towards decentralized army, largely organized and financed at the local level by governors, tax collectors and elites of town and villages. While this system performed well in short, defensive battles, it wasn't prepared for a lengthy and intensive offensive campaigns like the ones they faced in 1768. These provincial armies are made up of paramilitary bands, mercenaries, tribal warriors, or militias of one sort of another paid out by the central treasury. They are unreliable because they showed up as independent bands with questionable leadership, and it doesn't help that they often flee after the first exchange of fire and have a high rate of desertion.

The Janissaries, arguably the core of the Ottoman army by this time was also very dysfunctional. Their number had exploded in the hundreds of thousands, yet only a portion of them were an effective fighting force, The rest constituted largely fraudulent names in inflated rolls, including long dead, aged, pensioned, disabled, or inactive soldiers who only appeared during ascension ceremonies to receive bonus. This was because during the late 17th century, in an effort to expand the infantry and meet the demands of warfare the Janissary corps was opened to any and all, Muslims, Christians and foreign renegades alike. The Porte tried numerous times to reduce the fraudulent numbers by regularly struck names out from registers, but these didn't solve the problem. Janissary leadership was also not based on meritocracy, but on seniority and heritage, as Janissary families enrolled their sons into the corps. Meritocracy was reserved for the Pasha (Grand Vizier) rather than the Agha (Janissary officer). Pashas-in-waiting had extensive provincial experience as Governors and/or Commanders-in-chief of major campaigns, while the Janissary Agha was generally appointed by the Grand Vizier based on connections and heritage. The Janissaries by this time were also an undisciplined force, more like a rabble which was not the case in earlier centuries. The 18th century Janissary manual included a very comprehensive description of rules, financing, and punishment for crimes but there is no evidence about other forms of military discipline like attendance at roll call, restriction to barracks, even training and drilling. Archery practice was known, but all other forms of military discipline seem to have fallen by the wayside as the corps got bigger and harder to control. Cash rewards on the battlefield for special deeds, numbers of enemy killed, or battle wounds and the continuation of the cult of individual valor become the basis for Janissary combat method. However this doesn't mean a militarily capable Janissary doesn't exist, just in the small minority. For example the Janissary army that fight at the battle of Kartal in 1770 were admired by the Russians for their bravery and perseverance

Additionally, because of their diplomacy over war policy, the Ottomans missed important developments that happened in War of the Austrian Succession and Seven Years' War, ones that most European nations experienced. The utility of maneuverability, the use of formations of smaller numbers of troops and light artillery, the virtue of night attacks, the reintroduction of the bayonet against cavalry, the consolidation of military supply and logistics and the merging of battlefield command are all lessons learned from the Seven Years' War by the Russians, and they utilized it against the Ottomans with great success. Additionally, long absence from war meant that the usually excellent Ottoman supply system was deteriorating, and it collapsed under sudden weight of a large army in 1768.

This doesn't mean that things were all bleak for the Ottoman military however. In exchange for their offensive capabilities, the Ottoman army during this time was renowned for their perseverance and ability to fight in defensive posture, defending from trench lines and other field fortifications. During the war of 1768 against Russia, Ottoman forces were able to dig trenches overnight fortified with a moat and a high rampart and give considerable resistance in the inner ring of trenches, with fierce Janissary fighting and intensive artillery barrage. Skilled Ottoman forces were able to hold out defensive fortifications and repeatedly resisted assaults like in Rusçuk, Nigbolu, Vidin and Belgrade, as long as they're properly reinforced and supplied. Austrian Field Marshall Laudon who took Belgrade after a bloody fight had this to say:

It is beyond all human powers of comprehension to grasp just how strongly these places [Ottoman defensive works] are built, and just how obstinately the Turks defend them. As soon as one fortification is demolished, they merely dig themselves another one. It is easier to deal with any conventional fortress and with any other army than with the Turks when they are defending a stronghold

And in the end, the Ottomans were eventually able to reform their army along European lines, who fought well in their wars of 19th century. Most defeats suffered by the Ottomans during that era were caused by poor leadership rather than inferiority in military technology or soldiery, but that's an entirely different story.'

Sources:

Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged by Virginia Aksan

Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500-1800 Edited by Brian Davies

The Russo-Turkish War, 1768-1774: Catherine II and The Ottoman Empire by Brian Davies

The Seven Years’ War: Global Views Edited by Mark Danley and Patrick Speelman