It's an interesting question, as it tests our faith in documents and implications of bias. However, German military documents - at least those not doctored for public consumption - have proven mostly accurate to the German military situation, at least until late 1944. So let's do some data analysis.

Rüdiger Overmans, one of Germany's leading military historians and probably the most distinguished academic in the specific field of German casualties, has a German-language essay called Menschenverluste der Wehrmacht an der „Ostfront“.

For those members of the interested audience that are able to read German, here is the direct link. Even for those who don't understand the language might find the tables full of data useful.

Overmans makes comments in the introduction referring to the popular imagination of mass casualties on the Ostfront (this is addressed in datapoints in Table 5, p. 13), as well as a reference to the contradictory data sets.

Page 3-4 has Table 1, listing Wehrmacht casualties at the Eastern Front by months, broken down by branches of service. The Luftwaffe is listed separately. I'll copy over those specific data points into a table for the readers' convenience. If the table is unreadable to any fellow dark mode users, make sure to turn off the subreddit's theme on the right sidebar.

Month	LW Casualties
06 1941	692
07 1941	952
08 1941	536
09 1941	1.294
10 1941	934
11 1941	597
12 1941	310
01 1942	474
02 1942	497
03 1942	947
04 1942	811
05 1942	1.195
06 1942	1.475
07 1942	1.584
08 1942	1.266
09 1942	1.173
10 1942	609
11 1942	434
12 1942	1.259
01 1943	1.275
02 1943	553
03 1943	707
04 1943	545
05 1943	982
06 1943	1.026
07 1943	1.503
08 1943	971
09 1943	797
10 1943	453
11 1943	208
12 1943	182
01 1944	323
02 1944	379
03 1944	320
04 1944	2.068
05 1944	2.321
06 1944	2.785
07 1944	2.460
08 1944	3.667
09 1944	13.774
10 1944	6.529
11 1944	12.742
12 1944	8.755

This makes for an overall number of casualties of 82,364 between June 1941 and December 1944. Of these, 26,516 were suffered in the just the two bloodiest months of the campaign, September and November 1944. In September 1944 alone, Germany suffered a total of 426,159 - the strength of an entire army group.

If we use the rule of thumb that Germany suffered about a quarter of its casualties during the year 1945 (see Table 6, p. 15: Overmans sums up all casualties in 1945 as Endkämpfe), we could slap another tentative modifier of x1.33 on there and estimate the overall number of casualties, including 1945, to be 109,544. That would be a rather conservative estimate, since you see the tendency of casualties drastically rise in the last few months of recording, but it's the best we have for Overmans. Schramm puts the number at 138,596 - a lot higher than a 109,000 estimate.

Overmans points out that the reason his dataset ends at December 1944 is mainly that the different fronts started to lose their meaning in 1945, as they started merging with each other as Germany crumbled. In his argument, trying to gather the losses of specific fronts in 1945 is a completely futile endeavor. As German units started surrendering in large numbers in 1945, the PoW number exploded towards casualty rates of 100%.

Some important notes.

1. This is overall casualties of the Luftwaffe service branch, not just combat pilots. The German Luftwaffe, paradoxically, also fielded infantry units in the form of Luftwaffen-Feld-Divisionen. These were assembled in late 1942 and transferred to the army over the course of early 1944. Overmans specifically mentions this on page 10. Furthermore, the list will contain support, ground and logistics personnel.

2. Overmans acknowledges in the introduction the varied definition of "casualty", and in his script uses specifically the sum of KiA, MiA, PoW, and a subset of those WiA whose injuries were too severe for quick recovery.

3. These casualties, by the nature of their sourcing, only include those reported through the way of proper Wehrmacht bureaucracy, either by the IIb or the IVb paths of communication. The former were the summed reports made by subordinate military staffs to superior military staffs, whereas the latter were medical officers' reports via the medical bureaucracy within the Wehrmacht. The IVb reports usually were way under the IIb reports, as the medics were not fully informed of each casualty in the field. Although the IIb estimates were more accurate, the IVb reports were often used in the considerations of military planners, simply because they were faster.

4. Casualties that weren't reported or reported too late will not show up in this statistic.

5. Casualty numbers get increasingly unreliable starting in late 1944.

6. Units that were completely destroyed had no one left who even could report their casualties.

The reports that came in too late or were for some other reason not in the original reports Overmans tried to compensate for in Table 2 on page 6, but here, it is not divided by branch, so it doesn't exactly help us with our question. 570,164 casualties failed to show up in Wehrmacht statistics on time by December 1944. With the Luftwaffe suffering less than a hundreth of the army (see Table 1, "Durchschnitt" ('average')), this could statistically indicate maybe 5,000 overall Luftwaffe casualties that went unreported.

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So much for human casualties. The German air force, over the course of the entire war, lost 71,965 military aircraft [43,000 destroyed] (Schramm Vol. 4/1 p. 971), including combat and non-combat losses. Now, while we have established that the Eastern Front made up the overwhelming casualties for Germany, the main weight of Soviet bullets was carried by the German army, not the air force. The average German airman was far less likely to die in combat against the Red Army than the average German infantryman, as about 95.9% of Ostfront casualties were suffered by the army and only 3.7% by the air force and 0.4% by the navy (see Overmans p. 10). Soldiers of the Ostheer, including Waffen-SS, suffered 87% of all Wehrmacht casualties that had occured by July 1944 (see p. 12). That's all theaters and all branches of service, by the way. Army casualties in the east were the absolute majority of casualties even taking into acount all branches and all fronts.

This indicates that the casualties inflicted on the air force, particularly in terms of air planes, would have been higher in the west than the casualties inflicted on the army.

If we zoom in on aircraft losses specifically, attempting to divide up those 71,000 aircraft cited by Schramm, then we can looks at Williamson Murray's Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 for some breakdowns by year and frontline.

Murray cites the overall aircraft losses, not segregated by frontline but subdivided by combat and non-combat losses, in six month periods as follows (p. 304):

Period	Combat Losses	Non-Combat Losses
05-12 1940	2572	1379
01-06 1941	1189	954
07-12 1941	1909	1248
01-06 1942	1816	1480
07-12 1942	2496	1726
01-07 1943	3117	2589
07-12 1943	4302	3475
01-06 1944	8259	3608

The eastern front breakdown of this, including combat and non-combat: 741 average monthly losses/damages (which isn't the exact same statistic as the others, so harder to compare) June-November 1941 (p. 89), 341 average monthly losses June-December 1942 (p. 114), 315 average monthly losses January-November 1943 (p. 148).

Sadly, Murray doesn't provide breakdowns by theater for all time frames, but it is notable that, while the Eastern Front provides the majority of aircraft losses during late 1942 (p. 114), the eastern casualties start flattening off by 1943, when more and more Luftwaffe units are needed against western air defenses. After May 1943, when Western Air Defense, Eastern Front and Mediterranean theater are almost an an equilibrium (333, 331, 331 losses respectively), the Eastern theater falls behind in all months but July and August, when it is barely ahead of West Defense and Mediterranean respectively. In October, the Luftwaffe loses 530 aircraft in the west, 285 in the Mediterranean, and 279 in the east. In November, the losses are 529, 194 and 180 respectively, again with the eastern front at the very back.

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In conclusion, I can't comment on the kill ratios you mention, as I simply lack the underlying Red Air Force casualties.

But in regards to the "humble" nature of the Red Air Force, its performance is lesser than that of the Red Army, as the army vs army comparison between Germany and the Soviet Union was certainly a lot more favorable for the USSR than the comparison air force vs air force.

But it is debatable if that should be accounted to a lower level of accomplishment or military valor by the Red Air Force compared to the Red Army or simply to the contributions of the western allies. The western forces were a lot more defensive when it came to putting boots on the ground between 1941 and 1943/44, whereas the USAAF and RAF started messing up the Germans from 1942 onwards. As a result, the Luftwaffe dedicated itself far more to western defense than by comparison the Heer did.

But it remains to be debated whether such comparative exercises are actually worth it. The Red Air Force looks "humbled" not because of its own insufficiency, but because of the different approaches to warfare between the USSR and the Anglo-American coalition in the west. The USSR could not afford to dedicate itself to aerial warfare to the point where it would be a detriment to Soviet ground forces, whereas the Anglo-Americans had the advantage of being able to invest in aerial commitments, because they had massive bodies of water shielding them from the German ground advance.