Marshal Michel Ney, was by almost any measure, one of Napoleon’s most devoted servants. Ney’s betrayal of the Bourbon throne at Auxerre was the critical moment in Napoleon’s return from exile. Ney, after promising to return Napoleon to Paris “in an iron cage”, was dispatched by the crown with 3000 men to capture the “invasion” from Elbe. Once he encountered Napoleon’s column, he turned his cloak. Only by switching allegiance at this moment, and moving his soldiers to Napoleon’s insurgency, did Napoleon have enough strength to make Louis XVIII’s position hopeless. Ney had taken a grave risk, as it was obvious that Napoleon’s defeat this time would lead to his execution as a traitor.

Which was, in fact, what came to pass, at the hands of a firing squad, on December 7, 1815. At his trial, Ney’s lawyers had attempted jurisdictional arguments to save his life. Ney ended these suggestions by refusing to renounce his French nationality and refusing to renounce his service to Napoleon. He was one of the most respected public figures in France and one of the most experienced soldiers of his, or any other, age. But he knew there was nothing that could realistically save him.

Afterwards, there were conspiratorial musings that Ney had tried to undermine Napoleon at Waterloo. But these are the sorts of grumbling that follow any great defeat or lost war. Ney wasn’t trying to lose at Waterloo, he just failed. And the classic narrative that the cavalry charges of the afternoon were a spectacularly obvious blunder is a bit simplistic.

The tactical situation in the middle of the battle was complicated by the exhaustion of d’Erlon’s Corps after their near success in the opening attack. The unavailability of that corps, combined with the growing morass at Hougomont, meant the French were very short of infantry. All Ney really had to hand was cavalry, artillery, and the Guard. As the last of these was under Napoleon directly, Ney made the calculation to use what he had as best he could. The French did use artillery in connection with the cavalry well in some places. A few allied squares collapsed and others suffered horrendous losses. But overall the French execution was sloppy and impetuous, like Ney had been for most of his career. Still the plan was not a totally irrational decision considering how close Wellington had come to breaking after d’Erlon’s first attack. There were merits in sustaining pressure on the wavering enemy. Wellington himself later assessed his peril at this moment as bad as at any other point in the day.

So if Marshal Ney had sought to betray Napoleon and lose the battle, at great peril to his own life, he picked a funny time, place, and way to do it.