Since no one else has chimed in, did a quick review of the Nuremberg lit to confirm my recollection was correct, and the answer is pretty much no.

There were a few things going on. First, as /u/restricteddata or others can discuss in far better detail than I, the actual details of what the bombings did were fairly closely held for years beyond immediate death tolls and (to an extent) surface damage. About the last people in the world who were privy to the more gruesome aspects to it were those held at Nuremberg and elsewhere.

By and large, this led to a general view of atomic weapons by most strategic thinkers for a few years after the war as merely a much more powerful and compact version of the strategic bombing that had already defined World War II. The Nazi leadership certainly subscribed to this, and had no problems comparing the Allied raids carried out by Spaatz and Harris' air forces to their own crimes, far lesser in their minds:

Frank to Rosenburg: "They are trying to pin the murder of 2,000 Jews a day in Auschwitz on Kaltenbrunner—but what about the 30,000 people who were killed in the bombing attacks on Hamburg in a few hours?—They were also mostly women and children.—And how about the 80,000 deaths from the atomic bombing in Japan?—Is that justice too?"

Where the atomic bomb came up more often was in the grand view of politics the leadership continued to assess from afar, where most of their interest was in what the development of the bomb would do to US-Soviet relations:

Ribbentrop had his first good laugh in several weeks at the reviewer's comment that Bullitt is in favor of using the atomic bomb "to scare the pants off Russia." As Ribbentrop translated the comment that Russia was only waiting to develop its own atomic bomb to attack us, Goering replied expansively, "Why, of course, every child in the street knows that— anybody who has the slightest political knowledge ... I give them about 5 years' time."

They did not talk about it very much in my presence, but from their smug grins, it was easy to see that they received no small delight from this sign of tension between America and Russia.

This was also - give or take - the relative position of the few people in Nazi leadership who had some idea about their own atomic weapon development, which was that with a focus on plutonium, it wasn't likely to be something that might affect the outcome of the war, but it had a good chance if it succeeded of determining the balance of power after it.

Of those at Nuremberg, only Speer was a member of that group from the spring of 1942 onwards when he transferred out Heisenberg and his group from the Education Ministry to Goering's (relative) oversight and kept some tabs on what they were doing. He had a far less sanguine view of what might happen down the road,

Speer turned from his defense to warn the world of the destruction we might expect in a future war: radio-controlled rockets, aircraft flying at supersonic speed, and atomic bombs, destroying everything within reach; chemical and bacteriological warfare snuffing out all life that remained.

However, even in the extensive interviews with Sereny and his extensive writings, we don't really see him expressing much of a feeling that Germany had dodged a bullet. It's more that he felt the world faced a much heavier caliber one than it had ever dealt with before.

All this said, there may have been those outside the higher leadership that expressed opinions on it later (or were recorded at Trent Park), but as best as we can tell, the bottom line is that the highest leadership didn't really consider it much worse than had already happened to them anyway.

Sources: GM Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary Goldensohn, Nuremberg Interviews Sereny, Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project

While it's not Nazi political leadership, Otto Hahn, Werner Heisenberg, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Kurt Diebner, Karl Wirtz, Eriche Bagge, and Walther Gerlach, that is to say the scientific leadership of the German nuclear program and several geniuses in their own right, were taken into custody by the allies. Hoping to acquire intelligence from them, their conversations were superstitiously surreptitiously recorded, including their response to the Hiroshima bombing. The transcript gives us a rare, reliable glimpse of historical figures' candid reactions. It's actually quite readable (abridged to only 12 pages) so you may want to just read it instead of my disjointed summary.

Though the German scientists were not on track to weaponize their research in 1945, they were still among the world's top nuclear scientists, allowing them a uniquely knowledgeable perspective on the attack. Some like Hahn had even made discoveries that enabled the bomb. The most direct answer to your question as it is phrased though comes from Weizsacker and Wirtz:

WEIZSÄCKER: If we had started this business soon enough we could have got somewhere. If they were able to complete it in the summer of 1945, we might have had the luck to complete it in the winter 1944/45. WIRTZ: The result would have been that we would have obliterated London but would still
not have conquered the world, and then they would have dropped them on us. WEIZSÄCKER: I don't think we ought to make excuses now because we did not succeed, but we must admit that we didn't want to succeed. If we had put the same energy into it as the Americans and had wanted it as they did, it is quite certain that we would not have succeeded as they would have smashed up the factories.
DIEBNER: Of course they were watching us all the time.
WEIZSÄCKER: One can say it might have been a much greater tragedy for the world if Germany had had the uranium bomb. Just imagine, if we had destroyed LONDON with uranium bombs it would not have ended the war, and when the war did end, it is still doubtful whether it would have been a good thing.

So while the scientists were relieved not to have been targets, they were particularly relieved that Germany had not used nukes. It should be noted that though the victims were Japanese, not German, the scientists were horrified all the same:

WIRTZ: I'm glad we didn't have it.
WEIZSÄCKER: I think it's dreadful of the Americans to have done it. I think it is madness on their part.
HEISENBERG: One can't say that. One could equally well say "That's the quickest way of ending the war.”
HAHN: That's what consoles me.

Gerlach though felt the opposite, regretting that they had not worked harder and predicting how atom bombs would be used for all history since Nagasaki, more as threats than as weapons:

GERLACH: No. We never worked on the bomb. I didn't believe that it would go so quickly. But I did think that we should do everything to make the sources of energy and exploit the possibilities for the future. When the first result, that the concentration was very increased with the cube method, appeared, I spoke to SPEER's right hand man, as SPEER was not available at the time, an Oberst GEIST first, and later SAUCKEL at WEIMAR asked me: "What do you want to do with these things?", I replied: "In my opinion the politician who is in possession of such an engine can achieve anything he wants". About ten days or a fortnight before the final capitulation, GEIST replied: "Unfortunately we have not got such a politician".
HAHN: I am thankful that we were not the first to drop the uranium bomb.
GERLACH: You cannot prevent its development. I was afraid to think of the bomb, but I did think of it as a thing of the future, and that the man who could threaten the use of the bomb would be able to achieve anything.

So among the nuclear scientists (except for Gerlach), there was a sense of relief. But not a relief that Germany was spared--relief that the bomb was not used on England. A relief that, in a way, they could claim to be on the right side of history. Weizsacker sums it up:

History will record that the Americans and the English made a bomb, and that at the same time the Germans, under the Hitler regime, produced a workable engine. In other words, the peaceful development of the uranium engine was made in Germany under the Hitler regime, whereas the Americans and the English developed this ghastly weapon of war.

This is a follow-up question: If the war had gone on longer, would the Allies have used the atomic bomb in Europe?

Did the opinions of the difference between the fronts, from the beginning of the war, have an effect on this?

A German soldier would surrender before all hope was lost vs they knew the Japanese wouldn't.