'Trap' implies a concealed intention; there was nothing unexpected about the Russian retreat. Retreat was after all the orthodox response to superior force. Napoleon had studied Charles XII's invasion of Russia, and was not surprised by their use of a scorched earth strategy. Nevertheless, he believed he could compel the Russians to fight through extensive preparations and skillful maneuvering; the failure of the campaign resulted from his inability to do so when he had the best chance of victory. The campaign was very touch and go; while both sides had a broad picture in mind for the campaign, their operational plans changed significantly throughout as new possibilities opened and closed.

His plan on the commencement of the invasion was to envelop the Russian armies and destroy them near the frontiers. With a secondary army under his brother Jerome pinning down its Russian counterpart, Napoleon would take his main force around the right wing of the Russian main army and force it south, until both Russian armies were caught in the angle of the Bug, Narew, and Pripyet rivers. The first step in this plan was a march through Vilna, lending this phase of the campaign the name 'Maneuver of Vilna' in French and Russian histories. However, this movement was carried out with insufficient speed on Napoleon's part and energy on Jerome's, as both Russian armies were able to withdraw.

However, their lines of retreat opened a new possibility. As they fell back into the Russian interior, Barclay and Bagration's armies grew even further apart than they had been before. Barclay, commanding the main Russian force, retreated northeast to the fortified camp of Drissa, while Bagration's army fell back roughly due east. Napoleon sought to exploit this divergence, splitting off Davout's powerful 1st Corps from his main force envelop Bagration's isolated smaller army from the north while Jerome's force pressed him from the west. Meanwhile, Napoleon's main force would turn Barclay's left to force them away from Bagration.

The appointment of Jerome to lead a field army in a campaign Napoleon knew would be the most difficult he had undertaken is one of his most puzzling choices. Jerome was frankly not fit to lead a division of 10,000, much less an army of 80,000, and showed his shortcomings when he failed to energetically harry Bagration, vital to the success of the operation. At the same time, Davout failed to prevent Bagration from retreating across the Dnepr, which was crucial for keeping the two Russian armies separated. At the Battle of Mogilev, he contented himself with rebuffing Russian pinning attacks while they constructed a bridge downstream. A more aggressive battle on his part and a more severe defeat for the Russians would have considerably facilitated the ultimate destruction of the Russian armies

Barclay had planned to remain sequestered within the entrenched camp at Drissa while Bagration harassed Napoleon's supply lines, but upon reaching the place, he found it wholly inadequete, and continued the retreat towards Vitebsk, where he awaited Bagration. However, Bagration was not able to make it to Vitebsk, and so retreated to Smolensk. When Barclay managed to extract his army from its position at Vitebsk and united with Bagration for a counteroffensive, Napoleon saw another opportunity. This time, he would again seek to envelop the Russian right by taking Smolensk and cutting their line of retreat towards Moscow; this attempt failed when a tough rearguard action at Krasni stalled Murat and gave the Russians time to regroup at Smolensk to prevent being cut off. Yet another opportunity arose in the immediate aftermath, as the lines of retreat for the Russian armies diverged; Napoleon assigned Junot and his 8th Corps to sever the Russian line of retreat, but Junot's delays crossing the Dnepr and drunken refusal to advance further towards the vital crossroads of Lubino doomed this plan.

This is not to foist blame on Napoleon's subordinates to exonerate him of responsibility for the outcome, mind; he was after all the one who had placed Jerome in command. Moreover, Napoleon also failed to exhibit the great energy of his previous campaigns, often lingering for weeks in places that could scarcely support his army for a day. Nevertheless, it's important to realize that he did not undertake a campaign that had no chance of success and that he demonstrated keen strategic judgement throughout the invasion, adapting his plans to the circumstances. At every turn so far, Napoleon saw a ready opportunity to accomplish his goal; to turn back would have been foolish. Moreover, while after the failure of the Smolensk operations, no readymade opportunity for a smashing victory presented itself, the worst of the privations were also behind the army, as the territory between Smolensk and Moscow is far richer than Lithuania and Belorus.

Napoleon amassed an immense force for the Russian campaign, with over half a million men in the various armies. The very size of this force would aid in drawing the Russians to battle; he was bound to lose men during the advance, but with so many under his command, he would be able to penetrate to such depths in Russia that they would have no choice but to give battle. As it happened, this proved correct. The Russians could not abide the uninterrupted retreat, and offered battle at Borodino so as not to give up Moscow without a fight; there, Napoleon defeated their combined armies. However, he achieved this victory too late, as by that time, his force had diminished from overwhelming superiority to mere parity with the Russians, so the results were not as decisive as desired.