Week 105

 

The new Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Saverio Nitti, earned his first, large but not unambiguous, vote of confidence from the Italian Chamber on July 14^th 1919. It was, as he wrote to Foreign Minister T. Tittoni in Paris, “a splendid manifestation, we had a one hundred forty six votes margin”. Or, as Mussolini's Popolo d'Italia summarized, both the results and the most recent developments

The Chamber approves with 257 votes versus 111 the Government's declarations

Towards the Armed Nation – The electoral reform – The demobilization – The amnesty

Order will be maintained and oppression forbidden

And yet it wasn't really enough to dispel the perception that Nitti's ministerial combination, in its somewhat equivocal character, was not the result of an attempt to political clarification, but rather an expression of the fundamental ambiguity of the Italian political landscape. Nor could the fragmentation and lack of political substance of the opposition forces be taken by itself as evidence of the government's cohesiveness and coherent political design. Indeed, as many speakers pointed out, more or less openly, Nitti's main strength appeared to be the weakness of the alternative solutions and the urgency, given the difficult circumstances, to avoid political instability.

This lack of alternatives, which appeared to ensure, if not Nitti's political action, at least his ministerial position – at least for the time being – was apparent in Mussolini's lackluster coverage of the opening debate. After the Popolo d'Italia had taken its place at the front of the vehement campaign unleashed by the “national” press in the days of Nitti's designation, with the fasci announcing rallies, manifestations and marches, with the combatants and arditi against this “return of Giolitti by proxy”, Mussolini had soon taken a tone of moderation towards the new Ministry, shifting his focus on the upcoming scioperissimo, the “solidarity strike” to protest the Allied interventions in Hungary and Russia. Management of which – and especially of public order during it, unless the Italian Government could prove able to prevent it entirely – could represent a crucial test for the new Ministry, with the position of the Popolo d'Italia adjusting accordingly.

Meanwhile Nitti's solution – argued national syndicalist and acting major of Naples, Arturo Labriola, on July 12^th – was one of “moral confusion and political disorder”. It was indeed quite easy to see the reasons behind the immediate reaction of a part of the public opinion against the new Ministry.

[…] there was a sentiment of great disillusionment. Many different hopes and many illusions had been focused on Hon. Nitti. His youth and preparation inspired confidence. […] When it became apparent that his method was so similar to the old ones, dissatisfaction became manifest. […]

[As for his declaration of vote] The question we need to ask ourselves is the following: did the passage from Orlando's to Nitti's Ministry bring an exaltation or a depression of the moral values of our political world? Did it represent an acknowledgment or a disavowal of the pure […] historical necessities our country needs satisfied?

Orlando had earned the gratitude, not only of the Chamber but of the whole Country, leading both “through the harshest and most difficult moments of our national life”, inspired by “a conceit the beauty and nobility of which shone of their own intimate light”.

[Yet] Hon. Orlando had been forced to include within his political combination forces which inevitably pushed him towards a more and more imperialistic conceit of politics. And with this he had come to be stuck in a cul de sac.[…]

The political deformation suffered by Orlando's coalition during the war changed significantly our program of war; so that those agreements with Yugoslavs, Romanians, Greeks, Czecho-Slovaks, which should have been the true purpose of our post war policies, were in turn finalized by France, with a clear anti-Italian intention […]

[…] Now, Hon. Nitti is faced with many forms of opposition, of contradictory nature and character. I think most of them are justified […] And Hon. Nitti has no reason to look around for the motives of such a strange phenomenon. He should just look for himself […]

The crisis which caused the fall of the man who had been without doubt the most popular Prime Minister of new Italy was born out of the failure of his foreign policy. The latter out of the contradiction between the war goals set by Italy [at the intervention] and the prevailing imperialistic currents within the Councils of Government; the latter out of the absurd endeavor our last Prime Minister had set out to: reconcile democracy and imperialism, Wilson's principles and the appetite for markets of grand capitalism, Fiume's right to self-determination and the right of conquest for Southern Tyrol […] Hon. Orlando wanted to represent, both at the same time, democracy and imperialism, social legislation and plutocracy […]

What was the message of the crisis under these circumstances? That we had to choose: either a new situation of temporary balance, but with all the adjustments demanded by the [diplomatic] failure, or a clear one, with a precise direction; in which case two were the possible courses: […] a policy of Danubian-Balkanic reconciliation or […] the intransigent defense of the nationalistic point of view.

No one who knows the facts of our parliamentary life could imagine that a time for clear solutions would come […] but Hon. Nitti didn't give us an “intermediate” solution, rather a chaotic and splintered one; he gave us moral confusion and political disorder […]

When Hon. Nitti left the Cabinet of Hon. Orlando [Nitti had resigned on January 18^th 1919, among many things, for disagreements with the different branches of the supplies and transportation apparatus; a move suspect of laying the ground for his own subsequent ministerial formation – Bissolati at the end of December 1918 over his disagreement for the Italian international position and territorial aspirations] the common understanding was that of a relation between the attitude of Hon. Nitti and that of Hon. Bissolati. Everyone knew what Bissolati's choice meant. […] The motives behind Hon. Nitti's choice weren't stated, but were interpreted with no objection on his part […] Right or wrong, Hon. Nitti was singled out as the possible leader of a radical-socialist concentration [Nitti's affiliation was with the old Radical Party – not that such a combination would have been “radical” in its socialism – indeed the radical E. Sacchi had been the Minister of Justice who gave his name to the most notorious piece of war legislation regulating public rights].

In other words – continued Labriola – Nitti had not begun his preparations for designation with the reputation of a conciliatory, compromise choice. Rather, for such a purpose, a well respected man, like Luigi Luzzatti, or like the national unity government of Paolo Boselli [it's somewhat telling of Labriola's peculiar perspective on political matters that he could take as a positive example a government which, by general agreement, had been one of the most unfortunate experiences of Italy's recent political history and for most of those involved – Orlando, just to name one – something of an unpleasant chore], would have been preferable. But regardless of such considerations, there was an inherent problem with building a compromise solution around a man with a very particular political figure [on this point, again, while Labriola's depiction of the process of formation of Nitti's government is of some interest, his characterization of the expectations surrounding him is more a reflection of Labriola's own perspective than a correct assessment of the situation – a certain political ambiguity characterized Nitti's action already during his tenure as Minister of the Treasury].

Hon. Nitti ended up having his policies dictated by his opponents; and that as much for internal as for foreign policy. Since, during the period of crisis, his name was associated to the one of Hon. Giolitti […] Hon. Nitti asked the nationalist side to provide the men to represent his conceit of foreign policy. And Hon. Tittoni and Scialoja, to fend off any possible suspicion cast on the purity of their patriotic thoughts, have hastened to display their innocence by enhancing the nationalist character of their policies. […]