I'll first tackle the phraseology to get through any potential confusion there, and then move towards a discussion of the actual agreement-making process in the Suez actions.
The first point is that of the 8 years prior; the Israelis at that point were not yet Israelis, really, as the state had not yet been declared. However, Zionist forces (to varying degrees and with varying tactics) were indeed waging a guerrilla campaign against British forces, and this was not exactly looked upon favorably by the British government, which labeled the guerrilla groups terrorists (again, to varying degrees and with various forms).
The British reaction to the Haganah's operations, largely subservient to Ben-Gurion and to the movement that had virtually exclusive control of the state's political apparatus from 1948-77, was very different from the reaction to Irgun operations, which formed the parties that morphed (after significant changes) into Likud and won control of the state finally in 1977. The main reason is because the Haganah eventually dropped its guerrilla campaign against the British, while Irgun ramped up, seeking to assume the mantle of the main resistance group.
To understand the progression of that, it's crucial to understand the place of each group's activities in the larger context. The Haganah suspended anti-British operations during WWII, and Irgun did as well (until 1944). Lehi, a tiny and much more radical group, did no such thing, and continued operations throughout the war, eventually assassinating Lord Moyne (the British minister of state in the Middle East) in November 1944. Irgun had resumed its operations around February 1944 themselves, but the mainstream Zionist group was the Haganah, and they denounced both Irgun and Lehi quite strongly for resuming operations.
Following the Lord Moyne assassination, Lehi felt that reprisals were coming that they couldn't survive from the mainstream Zionist movement, so they announced they were suspending operations. But this was too little, too late. The Saison, or hunting season, was declared by Haganah on Lehi...and Irgun, which ended up being the focus. Haganah cooperated with the British, rounding up Irgun and Lehi members, assaulting them and confiscating their weapons, and handing some of them over to the British, or giving their information to the British. This continued through March 1945, at which point the Haganah reassessed, as WWII was coming to an end.
By October 1945, thus, the Haganah once again changed tack. Now it cooperated with Irgun and Lehi, but again in very different ways. While formally allied, the Haganah focused on freeing illegal immigrants from British detention centers, blowing up British patrol vessels and centers from which it prevented that illegal immigration (which the Haganah sponsored/assisted), and blowing up railroad tracks used by the British military. They even blew up bridges leading into surrounding Arab states in a huge coordinated campaign in June 1946. Irgun and Lehi, by contrast, were far more willing to target civilians or accept civilian casualties, and thus engendered far more ill will. The British response was shaky and uncoordinated. There was little appetite for fighting, so the British raided small kibbutzes (agricultural communities founded typically with socialist values) alleged to be holding illegal immigrants, and killed civilians in the ensuing panic. Other raids likewise typically failed to adequately find/target the guerrilla forces.
In November 1945, however, the Anglo-American Committee was formed. The British wanted to draw the Americans into any solution, since they were getting pushback for resisting Jewish immigration into the area. In response, the Haganah suspended its operations, hoping it would help build goodwill and allow the inquiry to proceed apace. When the inquiry published its report in May 1946 was when the Haganah resumed operation, and that led to the June 1946 attack on the bridges I mentioned above. Irgun and Lehi did no suspension.
At this point, however, the British became more resolute in response. They launched Operation Agatha, trying to find and arrest Haganah leaders. While the operation was not really successful, it did convince the Haganah that the military campaign had played out its course. It was in August 1946 that the Jewish Agency Executive formally met and suspended the military campaign. In response to this impending action, which really slowed operations in the weeks leading up to it by the Haganah, Irgun and Lehi decided to ramp up operations, to assume the mantle as I mentioned above.
Thus from 1946 through the British leaving in 1948, the Haganah had taken a pretty backseat role in the guerrilla campaign. Given their later control of the state, it makes sense that the situation was viewed very differently, and they were not viewed as negatively as, say, Menachem Begin (who led Irgun). From August 1946, most of the insurgency by Haganah focused on clashes with Irgun and with Arab militias.
That's a long description to give you some context, and also to clarify that 8 years prior is a bit of a mistaken description for when the leaders of what became Israel's leadership and military backbone had last waged an insurgency, and 10 years is a better description (and the insurgency was far more mild than that of the other guerrilla groups at least by comparison).
Still, some level of animosity may have resulted or been expected. Yet that wasn't really what came up in discussions about Suez, as far as I can find. That's not to say that the British were happy to have the Israelis involved, though; while the French pressed from the start for Israeli involvement, the British were reluctant. The opposition was because they felt that:
Cooperation with Israel would result in a perception among Arab allies that there was an "imperial" plot hatched with Israel, rather than one the British had come up with and only brought the Israelis into for assistance in British goals which were, in their minds, justified.
They worried the anger of Israeli involvement would create a broader regional conflagration between Israel and the Arabs.
I cannot, however, find any evidence that animosity from the prior period carried forward. Israel had ingratiated itself to the West, British included, and seen a more friendly government in 1951 with Churchill's return to power, thanks in part to the Cold War and its overtures to the US. I think that created the background that led the British to see Ben-Gurion as far less controversial to work with while he led Israel, despite having led the Haganah.
The same is not true for Irgun and Lehi. In fact, the head of Irgun was Menachem Begin, and he was denied entry into the UK in the 1950s, and was described as a terrorist leader. Begin had hoped, as a member of the Israeli Knesset, to turn over a new leaf with the British with a visit. It was not until 1972 that he managed to visit, after visiting with British ambassadors and diplomats and speaking glowingly of the UK, and after those diplomats were convinced finally that he had changed his views and that time had passed enough to allow him entry. That ill-will took a long time to dissipate, and MI5 even called him a security threat in seeking to thwart any visit by him, and eventually took the tack (when this argument became absurd after a number of years, since it was clear he was not exactly as an Israeli government cabinet minister going to bomb the UK) that his visit would inflame Palestinian supporters and Palestinian terrorist groups like the PFLP and thus pose a security risk to those in the UK when he visited. As I mentioned, this eventually dissipated and he visited 5 years before becoming Israel's Prime Minister, but the contrast shows the different views of Ben-Gurion and Begin that the British leadership had within the 8 years following Israeli independence.