(EDIT: This comment is part of the AskHistoricalFigures event and does not represent Podhajsky's actual words, but it certainly captures some of his feelings during the Second World War.)

It is unfortunate that so many prized horses are so far from their rightful homes. In Hostau, Lipizzaners bearing the brand of a stud farm in Piber, Austria have been gathered with countless other prized horses.^(1) They are the broodmares for the illustrious Spanish Riding School. The others include famous racehorses and other performers across Europe, but it is the Lipizzaners that piques my interest for they are my charges as director of the Riding School. Only the stallions in training in our Winter Riding Hall of the Hofburg Palace in Vienna remain under my supervision.

I am disappointed that the efforts of hippologist Gustav Rau and the Nazi party of Germany have resulted in this collection of fine horses. Though Rau has shown himself to be a capable manager of German breeding programs, I worry what he may do to my horses. It is true that he has done much for Germany’s equestrian industry, which was in a state of disarray following the Great War. The terms of the treaty of Versailles devastated the equine market of the country as the restrictions to their army significantly reduced demand for animals. In their volatile political, economical, and social climate, Gustav Rau managed to secure for himself a position as head of remount and stud farm efforts in German occupied territories. This includes my beloved Austria and the town of Hostau.

Part of my disagreements with the man is his application of the practice of eugenics to the breeding of horses and he has no qualms about breeding full siblings or parent-child together, which is a policy that is very appealing to Nazi ideology and their obsession with purity. He threatens to undo the careful studbooks we have kept for centuries at the Spanish Riding School. I have, through the influence of the school I represent, at least secured some oversight over my broodmares at Hostau which I’m sure Mr. Rau resents. He is not to breed them without my explicit permission, but as my duties largely confine me to Vienna, I worry that he’ll disregard these orders. It is doubtful that I would ever share a bottle with that man.^(2)

I do hope that this war will not drag on; for if past wars are any indication, it is the horses who will suffer the most. As my colleagues in Aachen once stated, “if we as officers and most of all as riders were deciding our countries’ policies, the question of war and peace would certainly not arise, for the horse binds us into one community regardless of the language we may use to make ourselves understood.”

- Colonel Alois Podhajsky, Director of the Spanish Riding School

​

^(1) There were approximately 246 Lipizzaners from Piber in the Hostau collection which were retrieved in Operation Cowboy and given back to the SRS. Two mares had to be put down after sustaining injuries in the move. The rest included racehorses, Arabians, Thoroughbreds, Lipizzaners from other stud farms, and Cossack horses.

^(2) Following the Second World War, Podhajsky noted in his memoir that he did actually share a bottle of wine with Gustav Rau. For all of their disagreements during the war, Podhajsky does credit Rau for rebuilding Germany’s equestrian tradition afterwards.

Week 106

 

Time to move on.

With the vote of confidence of July 14^th 1919, Nitti had secured his Ministerial position – for the time being – and could proceed with the various issues which needed sorting out before the Italian political system could enter the election phase. A fundamental test for the solidity of the liberal State. For the old “constitutional” parties, to see whether they could adjust to the perceived deep transformations occurring in the Italian society with the events of the Great War. For the Socialist Party, both to prove and affirm its strength even on the supposedly unfavorable ground of the representative system, and to determine (if such a choice was at all open yet) whether a cooperation with the liberal institutions was viable. For the new Catholic formation, the Partito Popolare, to seek and consolidate (or discover) its political identity in the electoral fray. For the vast constellation of new movements, appealing to a broad “combatantist” sentiment, and inspired to a more or less “democratic” or “national” tone, whether the experience of the war could in fact coalesce into a proper political action (if not in a unified platform). For the people, the vast, less “political” masses of the Italian populace, to cast their judgment – explicitly or implicitly – on the war, the Great War, its causes, its motives, its moral and material legacy.

This state of things dictated for the most part – as acknowledged by the new Prime Minister in his opening address to the Italian Chamber – the Government's agenda. First – a somewhat urgent, but manageable task – the definition of the new electoral law, with the proportional system replacing the old “first past the post”, a reform of electoral districts and a revision of the electoral body. More pressing, and of much less obvious solution, was the financial crisis – to be addressed first both in terms of liquidation of war expenditure (and therefore of a large portion of the war apparatus) and by ensuring the credit and supplies necessary for transitioning the Italian production system back to peacetime economy – which in turn had found its most glaring manifestation in the recent food riots, sparked by the early inflation episodes following the partial lifting of price and commerce restrictions, and the end of the quasi-fixed exchange rate developed with the Allies. This represented, in turn, only one of the many facets composing the fundamental issue of public order, and what many regarded as a manifest form of social instability, either due to the material or moral consequences of the war or caused by the new ideas and revolutionary propaganda, which threatened the cohesiveness of Italian society and challenged one of the liberal State's main functions; and was regarded therefore as perhaps the main political and administrative test for the new Government. And with the matters of deteriorating public, and social order, Nitti's Ministry was also called to prove its ability to manage the unruly socialist movement; while, on the other hand, the Party Direction had adopted and sanctioned (albeit often through a quite reluctant adhesion of the labor unions and local administration) the maximum program of proletariat dictatorship and Bolshevik revolution and announced, already on July 20^th and 21^st 1919, a first major test of strength, with the general strike to protest the Allied interventions in Hungary and Russia. In this regard, the Socialists had little reason to complain with the new Italian Government, as Nitti was very keen on moving forward as expeditiously as possible with the demobilization – both to contain expenses and to limit the overbearing military presence within the nation – and therefore averse to undertaking any further commitment for Italian troops abroad. This had obvious repercussions on the Italian foreign policy, which was forced to assume a more collected and somewhat diminutive tone, compared to the recent unfortunate attempts to project power during Orlando and Sonnino's tenure. More so, the demobilization process carried in itself the implicit foundations of a reversion of the military to pre-war status – or, which is not the same, of a general adjustment of the military to post-war, or peacetime (for the time being), necessities – that is, of a more or less substantial revision of the Army organization. A process, this one, that would necessarily represent the outcome of some form of negotiation with the military establishment.

Indeed, the designation of the new Minister of War, gen. Alberico Albricci, to replace gen. Enrico Caviglia, had required some additional polishing (and in fact it had been finalized one day after the formal composition of the Ministry), with Nitti abandoning his original plans for an almost unprecedented “civilian” designation which was to bring a more “managerial” focus on the administration functions, leaving the military functions proper to the High Command – for what would represent, in more recent parlance, a sort of “spending-review” - opting instead for a more “organic” choice, pursuing the collaboration of the “ministerial” group within the Army (the most notable figures being Diaz and Badoglio). This decision, which in practice could anticipate (despite the broad and generic enthusiasms for talks of “armed nation”) a rather mild adjustment of the Italian Army to the new necessities of post-war – in fact a re-organization based on a small expansion of pre-war army structures, while simultaneously attempting to limit expenditure by various extemporaneous methods – served the additional (and likely necessary for the new Ministry, given both its international policies and its desire to reduce the impact of military organisms on civilian administration) purpose of isolating and preventing the opposition of the “national” generals (Caviglia, Giardino, the Duke of Aosta) against the new “democratic” policies of Nitti's Ministry. A task made somewhat easier by the fact that those men, despite representing a relative majority within the high ranks and coming out of the war with a significant degree of personal prestige, were often set apart by personal grudges, major divergences of views and further limited in their action by a substantial (with the one major exception of adm. Thaon de Revel) political ineptitude.

As a result, their influence on the various projects of reform of the Italian Army was minimal; as minimal was the objective impact of the most enthusiastic designs for radical and innovative reforms, either developed on specialized press or haphazardly included in political programs as well as debated (and usually in the most superficial manner) in the national press. So that, despite a growing, unprecedented attention for “military problems” (as showcased by the somewhat belated appearance of a new resident military expert in almost every major daily press newsrooms during the early months of 1920 – including those newspapers more closely identified with anti-militaristic positions), which certainly drew impulse from the general attention to “combatants issues”, the handling of military reforms remained safely in the hands of the military administration and bureaucracy.

The choice of Albricci as Minister of War – which had allegedly been suggested to Nitti by Diaz (Nitti in turn had, apparently, put in a good word for the designation of Diaz to replace Cadorna after Caporetto) – and similarly the Ministry's reliance on gen. N. Di Robilant to smooth out things in the occupation zone of Venezia-Giulia and Istria, as well as the designation of gen. P. Badoglio as new Chief of Staff (November 24^th 1919, with Diaz taking a prestigious and rather inconsequential position as General Inspector); all represent elements of the process through which the Italian military came to terms with the new state of things and begun its adjustments to peacetime conditions, as those men were – for one reason or another – the most open to cooperate to the demilitarization of the Italian society. The structural counterpart for which was the maintenance of certain prerogatives of the Italian Army, such as the extension of favorable solutions for the officers, and a discreet consideration for the needs of the military organisms in face of the otherwise very urgent demobilization and meager financial resources.