Week 108

 

Having secured its parliamentary position with the vote of confidence of July 14^th 1919, and with the (more or less realistic) perspective of stabilizing the internal social and economical situation, the Italian Government could resume its efforts to normalize the Italian relations with the Allies and Associate. Something that was regarded as a necessary prerequisite for both a satisfactory (albeit not “fully satisfactory”) solution of the Adriatic question and for an extension of somewhat favorable credit conditions after the end of the “quasi-fixed” exchange rates with US dollar and pound sterling.

Indeed the Italian Foreign Minister and Head of Delegation, Tommaso Tittoni, had taken the way back to Paris on July 12^th without awaiting for the pronunciation of the Italian Parliament, in order to resume his efforts as urgently as possible. His brief statements to the Chamber on July 11^th had been, due to the sensitive nature of the ongoing negotiations (and to the difficulty of the Italian position, as well as to the tense relations with the Allies), of extremely generic character, inspired to ideas of national unanimity and to the necessity of pursuing an “Italian peace”. Furthermore the Minister of Foreign Affairs had carefully highlighted the need to resume negotiations (both in his public address and in a private confrontation with a parliament delegation), so that no questions or reasons for delaying his departure were to be expected. He had likely been more upfront in his relation to the King – the contents of which were understandably more private – with Victor Emmanuel III, albeit supportive of a policy of annexations, concerned over the threat of a new falling out with the Allies.

Additionally, his, also quite generic, statements to the Senate on June 25^th – where Tittoni had been forced to open up a bit more (with references to the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne and to certain colonial compensations), in order to secure the “national-conservative” leg of the Ministerial table – had been enough to provoke an immediate reaction from the Allies (Lloyd George had complained directly to the previous Foreign Minister and acting Head of Delegation, S. Sonnino), which appeared to confirm their (largely unjustified – as Nitti, and to a degree Tittoni as well, were invested in restoring cordial relations with, at least, France and Great Britain) impression that the fall of Orlando's Ministry represented an affirmation of “Germanophile” tendencies, embodied especially by the former Italian Ambassador to Paris (in this regard, the tense relations between long tenured French Ambassador to Rome, Barrere, and certain Roman groups, of which Tittoni may or may not have been an expression, appeared to contribute to the French diplomat initial poor disposition towards the new Ministry).

As a result, the atmosphere Tittoni had found two weeks before in Paris, where he arrived the day of the Signature of Versailles, had been even worse than the Italian senator had reason to expect. Italy's weak diplomatic position had been summarized, according to the Allies' (and Associate's) point of view, in a memorandum composed by Lord Balfour and delivered to Tittoni on June 29^th – as usually pointed out, the document had been composed for the purpose of addressing the claims made by the previous Orlando-Sonnino Italian delegation, and was originally intended for them; yet it was delivered to the new delegation nonetheless, and clearly addressed (in a fairly explicit and quite unfavorable manner) points which had been touched by Tittoni in his recent speech. The memorandum (which we have examined before) in fact challenged the entire foundations of the Italian diplomatic efforts, from the ambiguous nature of Italy's claim over both Fiume and the portion of Dalmatia included within the Treaty of London, to the failed ratification of the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, to the vague and ill-defined nature of Italy's colonial claims, to the various indiscretions of the Italian occupation forces.

Tittoni's first challenge as Head of Delegation had been therefore to produce a proper response to such an explicit condemnation of the Italian diplomatic position – first informally, and then in written form – while avoiding any further escalation which would have prevented, or at least delayed significantly, the reopening of a direct cooperation with France and Great Britain, and especially with the two leaders, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, whose support was essential in order to persuade Wilson to reconsider, at least in part, his position on the Adriatic question. His efforts had not been made any easier by the series of incidents occurring in Fiume in early July between the Italian main occupation force and the French troops, underscored by a growing hostility towards the French in the Italian press and by a series of alarming (and often exaggerated) reports of widespread anti-French sentiments, and culminating in the death of eleven French troopers on July 6^th 1919.

Reports on these acts of violence had reached Paris in a somewhat fragmentary manner during the day before Tittoni's scheduled departure (July 8^th 1919), with the French (apparently) understanding the full extent of the event only later during the day (and after Tittoni and the other Heads of Delegation had come to an agreement on the formation of an inter-Allied investigation), creating something of a misunderstanding between the Italian and French delegations and contributing in all likelihood to Clemenceau's anger the following day, when the Italian financial delegate and former Undersecretary for Supplies, Silvio Crespi, was left alone to deal with the French Prime Minister.

Therefore Tittoni – who had just managed to deliver the Allies the Italian reply to Balfour's memorandum (a “very powerful” document according to Crespi's memoirs) – had additional reasons to hasten his return to Paris, besides avoiding the attention of the Italian press and political environment. He had in fact to make a new assessment of the Italian position as well as to remedy and contain whatever further damage might result from the recent events.

News of more concerning (or rather, puzzling) developments had occurred while he was mid way between Rome and Paris. On the day before (July 9^th – without time indication) Nitti had received an uncustomary direct communication from Clemenceau, in which the French Prime Minister announced his intention, "in consequence of the massacres" of French soldiers in Italy, to "withdraw the mixed brigade" from Italy and, even more puzzling, to maintain "a battalion stationed along the Modane-Trieste railroad", that is on Italian ground, to "ensure the functioning" of the supply line for the Army of East.

En raison des massacres dont sont victimes les militaires français en Italie, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaître que j’ai donné l’ordre de rapatrier la Brigade mixte française encore stationnée en Italie.

Toutefois, en vue d’assurer le service de la ligne de communication des Armées d’Orient, je maintiens, jusqu’à nouvel ordre un bataillon échelonné sur la ligne de Modane à Trieste, ainsi que les éléments sur la ligne de Vintimille à Tarente.

Nitti was honestly surprised by the uncustomary communication, and took a couple of days before writing to Tittoni (on his way back to Paris – hence to Genoa and Turin, July 12^th 1919) that it

[…] may be worth raising the issue of the extremely unusual manner of one Prime Minister addressing directly another one […] It seems necessary to make strong objections to the alleged motivation for the withdrawal […] It also seems necessary to remark that the French troops currently in Italy can withdraw according to their own schedule, but cannot change their deployment in such a way as to exert a control and surveillance over railroad lines, which would be unjustified by the circumstances and incompatible with the dignity of Italy.