EARL F. ZIEMKE ex-Marine and historian; how accurate/relevant are his writings considered today?

by 4waystreet

Never read any of his works except for some Time lIfe .Specifically "Soviet Juggernaut" and Red Army on the march. Are there better works covering the USSR experience for someone with limited free time to read?

Jon_Beveryman

I have not read all of his work, but a skim reading of Stalingrad to Berlin confirms what I'd guessed based on the time period Ziemke was writing. All but one of Ziemke's Red Army works were written before the fall of the Soviet Union. Most of the works written before 1991 rely heavily on German sources, as access to Soviet archives was virtually nonexistent. Some authors did get around this - John Erickson's Road to Stalingrad and Road to Berlin come to mind - but by and large the Amercan writings on the Eastern Front were written through a very German lens. Stalingrad to Berlin is no exception. The footnotes are, predominantly, references to German documents and memoirs. For instance, Erich von Manstein's self-congratulatory Verloren Siege (Lost Victories) is cited dozens of times. Several official Soviet histories of the war are heavily cited as well - the 1960 Istoriya Velikoy Otchestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuze for instance. However, the official histories are the product of careful censorship, and as such were generally looked at very skeptically by Western historians. The "Notes On Sources" section in Ziemke's Stalingrad to Berlin is quite candid about this. This would not be a problem, were it not for the failure to apply the same skepticism to sources like Manstein. This, as you might expect, leads to a skewed interpretation of the war, in which the Germans were hobbled by the constraints of Nazi fanaticism and worn down by Russian manpower & resilience despite their superior mastery of the art of war.

Ziemke's writing reflects this perspective in a number of ways, such as in his assessment of the Soviet command's professional acumen. He portrays their increased proficiency at war from 1943 onward as the Soviets learning lessons from the Germans and adapting them to their own needs:

One consideration which must have weighed heavily in the Stavka's decision to undertake a summer offensive was the knowledge that the Soviet Army had passed beyond its apprenticeship. In two years Stalin's generals had learned much and, not content to be blind imitators, had adapted the German methods to suit their own capabilities and limitations. While they had not attained the facility of the Germans, they had, at least at the upper command levels, acquired the flexibility so conspicuously lacking earlier and had improved their large-scale offensive tactics...The Russians, for their part, cared less for speed or the fatal stroke; they were content to wear the enemy down blow by blow. Their ultimate objective was to annihilate the enemy, but by the cumulative effect of repeated offensives, not by the single battle--by weight rather than by the skillful blow. (144-145)

This is simply not correct. The Soviet way of war did call for repeated, synchronized offensives, but these were not intended as an attritional cudgel. Rather, the aim was to penetrate into the enemy's depth and, through speed and shock, separate the components of the enemy's forces so they could no longer fight as a cohesive unit. This lesson was not learned at the hands of the Germans, either, but through the Russian Civil War and then years of peacetime theorizing. They did adapt during the war, of course, as combat experience sharpened them, but it is not accurate for Ziemke to describe the Soviet way of war as derivative of the Blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, Ziemke was writing while the Western military-academic establishment was in the throes of the 'Wehrmacht mythos' and so it's not surprising that he depicts the Eastern Front in this light.

This is really terribly long-winded, I'm sorry. I recently wrote a very long reading list for another poster here, which you might find helpful. There's also a lot more discussion there of the 'Wehrmacht mythos' and other issues in English-language writing on the Nazi-Soviet War. Some of the books in there are probably longer and more niche than you're looking for, so here's my short list:

  1. Glantz, David M and Jonathan M. House. When Titans Clashed: How The Red Army Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015. 384 pages, available as paperback, hardback, and ebook.
    This is one of the best single-volume operational histories of the Nazi-Soviet War. It's fairly deep but also relatively quick and easy to read. Unlike Ziemke and many of the other pre-1991 authors, Glantz and House used Russian archives extensively. David Glantz is still the one of the best English-language historians of the Nazi-Soviet War and of Soviet doctrine and theory, though he is unfortunately semi-retired now. Jonathan House's coauthorship saves When Titans Clashed from the worst of the usual criticisms of Glantz's writing, namely his dry "I have copy-pasted and translated this section of a Russian field manual" style. Get the 2015 edition, it's updated a lot from the 1995 edition and is probably easier to find anyway.
  2. Smelser, Ronald M., and Edward J. Davies. The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American Popular Culture. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 342 pages, hardback or paperback.
    I recommend this book as a companion to Titans, as the two of them dismantle many Western assumptions & myths about the so-called "Eastern Front," albeit from different angles. Where Titans presents a less Wehrmacht-centric perspective on the purely military aspects of that conflict and sheds light on the actual military skill of the Red Army, The Myth of the Eastern Front explains the origins of many of those assumptions and is really eye-opening. It's also pretty clean and easy to read, despite the length.
  3. Merridale, Catherine. Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945. New York: Picador, 2006. 462 pages, paperback, hardback, or audiobook.
    Ivan's War is a social history of the Red Army, told partly through interviews with veterans and civilians and partly through memoirs, and contextualized by improved access to archives during the post-Soviet, pre-current-unpleasantness era. It's easier to read and more empathetic than something more academically rigorous, like Roger Reese's Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925-1941. If you're wondering what it was like to be an anonymous rifleman in the wartime Red Army, this is a good place to start. By dispelling the dehumanizing and racist narratives of some of the (largely Wehrmacht-influenced) Western writing on the Eastern Front, Ivan's War also rounds out a sort of mythbusting trilogy with Titans and Myth of the Eastern Front.