Week 110

 

The last weeks before D'Annunzio's takeover of Fiume in September 1919 were spent by the Italian Government in a somewhat desperate attempt to find an acceptable – if not satisfactory – accommodation of the Adriatic question, while concurrently delaying the impact of the deliberations taken by the inter-Allied inquest committee in relation to the “events of July”. The results, formalized on August 9^th – one month after the incidents which had caused the death of nine French soldiers – and delivered to the Heads of Delegation in Paris on August 25^th 1919, while not entirely hostile, could certainly appear unfavorable to the Italian position (not that it could be expected otherwise given the circumstances and the character of the Italian presence), advocating for a transformation of the current occupation regime into a proper, temporary, inter-Allied occupation, with the replacement of the Italian command and the substantial diminution of the Italian military presence and administrative influence in town.

Already on July 8^th Tittoni had related his early impression on the matter to Nitti

[…] the Conference chiefs are displeased with what we are doing in Fiume and Dalmatia from the civilian and military point of view, as if the Conference had already deliberated in our favor, while on the contrary it has no intention to. Now, I was able to ascertain that the inquest […] will highlight the excessive amount of troops amassed in Fiume and make the suggestion that an international force not larger than 3,000 men is left in town, split equally for each nation.

The memorandum submitted to the Peace Conference indeed made the following recommendations, starting from the dissolution of the National Council, the self-proclaimed government of the municipality:

Replace the Italian National Council of Fiume by a government, elected under the control of an Interallied military commission which would guarantee its impartiality.

Create an Interallied military commission charged with the supervision and civil administration of the “Corpus separatum” of Fiume and Susak. This commission would be composed of one representative for the United States of America, France, Great Britain, and Italy. It would also control the elections mentioned in the paragraph above. The chairman should be the American or the British representative.

Change the personnel of the Italian command, and the troops which took part in the recent troubles. Notify the new command that its action must be exclusively military and must not intervene in the civil administration.

The Italian troops of occupation east of the armistice line should be reduced to one infantry brigade and one squadron of cavalry, only one battalion of this brigade to be quartered in Fiume-Susak. The commanding general of that brigade could reside in Fiume where he would exercise the tactical command of the Interallied forces. No power should have more than one battalion stationed in the city, the military police included.

Relieve the whole battalion of French Colonial Infantry; Change the personnel of the French base; By reason of the hostility of the Fiume population regarding this base, it is desirable that it should be suppressed as soon as possible. […]

Until such time as a local military police is formed, create, for the maintenance of order, a police corps, either English or American, one battalion strong, directly under the Interallied military commission […]

Yet, as of mid August, and despite the demobilization resumed under Nitti, the Italians still had over 10,000 men in Fiume (13,000 at July 15^th according to the inquest), under command of gen. Francesco Saverio Grazioli – an occupation force whose continued presence since late November 1918 had come to represent, both for the Allied observers and for the Italian public, the intention to transform the supposedly temporary, “inter-Allied” occupation into a permanent annexation. And therefore, according to the different perspectives, either a sign of the Italian tendency to circumvent, if not to ignore, the Allied deliberations, or a a sign of the Italian commitment to the cause of Fiume. Therefore, while the Italian Government (and Italian establishment as a whole, Nationalists included) had always been – regardless and outside of the proclamations of the “national” press – quite cautious about the perspective of a supposed unilateral annexation, the general perception, soon to be confirmed by the publication of the most unfavorable portions of the inquest report on the “national” press, was that any incumbent withdrawal of the Italian occupation force would represent a surrender of Italy's national aspirations over the city.

The Italian Government was well aware of the possible political repercussions of a policy of “liquidation” of the Adriatic question – a foreign policy, that is, which didn't produce, at least, the “Italian peace” which Tittoni had promised to pursue, or that could be sold as such – and of its impact both on internal stability and on the stability of the Ministry itself. Both Nitti and Tittoni had consequently examined thoroughly the problem of how to handle (and possibly delay until a composition was reached) such withdrawal, in order to “neutralize” the threat of the “national” opposition and to prevent a further deterioration of the social and political climate at the border (for all its limitations, Nitti shared a recurrent concern for the the impact of a failed composition with the Yugoslavs on the Italians living in the Eastern coast of the Adriatic). Yet, neither Nitti nor Tittoni had been able to find a feasible solution to the issue, and had eventually settled for a series of evasive maneuvers in the hope of delaying the inevitable evacuation until it didn't matter any longer.

On July 25^th the Italian member of the inter-Allied committee, gen. N. di Robilant, had provided Foreign Minister Tittoni with a long report in order to update him on the ongoing works.

The Conference keeps going and is still far from any conclusion. In agreement to the received instructions, I make no effort to speed things up and I think I have done enough to slow them down. I assume it's the government's intention, or wishes at least, that the decision […] on the definitive fate of Fiume may happen before the Conference of Fiume has expresses her conclusions and, if it is really so, I must certainly concur because the deliberation of the Conference [of Fiume], which in all likelihood will be to our disfavor, would be thus rendered almost entirely irrelevant.

A central problem was how to handle the removal – made necessary both in consequence of the incidents occurring under his command, and due to the need of reducing significantly the strength of the Italian occupation corp – of the Italian commander in Fiume, gen. Grazioli, whom the “national” press had depicted, and perhaps not entirely without reason, as a truly committed Italian patriot. On August 4^th Nitti had written to Tittoni attaching the aforementioned report from di Robilant.

[…] Let me know if you consider convenient, given present situation, to remove gen. Grazioli from Fiume under some pretext; we should examine the possible repercussions of such a decision while the inquest commission works are ongoing.

It is necessary that his departure does not appear like the preemptive recognition of a possible wrongdoing from our side. There is also the possibility that the fate of Fiume is defined before the committee concludes its works; in this circumstance the inquest results would have less relevance and recalling gen. Grazioli […] would not appear to be a punitive measure for his conduct, but a mean to spare him a rather ingrate task. [that of delivering the city to the authorities of a free state]

Tittoni had written back to Nitti two days later (August 6^th 1919) sharing his view that

[…] it would be better to recall gen. Grazioli from Fiume before the inquest Commission proposes it; at the same time […] it's impossible to find a plausible reason which would satisfy the public opinion. The best possible option would be for the matter of Fiume to be settled before the inquest results are discussed. […] Clemenceau and Balfour appear less concerned with the American intransigence. It is better for the public not to know that on Monday we'll be discussing the Adriatic question, in order to avoid a build up of expectations.