Actually the colonies were active participants of sophisticated financial system that was operating at the time. The entire colonial economy was dependant upon it and in many ways it was the disruption of this financial system that precipitated the war of independence.

The basic conditions that brought this about was Britain was experiencing a vast credit boom. Indeed if one looks closer, one can see it wasn’t just Britain. The whole of Europe was experiencing a vast credit boom.

This was the era of huge proliferation in banks, the 1760’s saw the creation of the Bank of the Rothschild’s for example, and also saw the London financial market grow in size and scale with scores of Banks being created (echoed in Amsterdam, Paris and other places).

And the relationship with the colonies was fairly sophisticated. In the first part- if you needed capital? You got it in London.

There was no concept of overdraft here. A ‘letter of credit’ literally was the method ustilised mostly in London at the time, and it became the system used by the colonists for virtually all capital investments.

Obviously the rate upon which a individual colony depended upon London financial markets depended upon the local conditions. Somewhere like New York could facilitate local short term credit needs via its own local lending houses. New England fishermen however, would require short term loans facilitated via London.

But it was in the northern Canadian fur traders and even more, the southern agricultural colonies that the economic relationship between London and the colonies really became ingrained.

A system was developed- tobacco plantations would sell their crops in London; based on the sale value the plantation owner would be given a letter of credit for a set amount of cash; they could instruct an agent (usually of the bank they were working with) to purchase goods in London on their behalf against the profits of the tobacco sales; if the goods cost more the plantation owner would be issued a credit note which they had a year to pay (at zero interest; going up to 5% after 12 months) which they usually drew down with the next years crop.

For those who made a profit, obviously they would be encouraged to invest within London financial markets and indeed several did (mostly on the stock market).

The credit was much easier to get and offered much better rates than anything the northern colonies could offer.

For those who needed a quicker return of profit however, lending firms from Glasgow and Edinburgh had cornered the market. Small lending houses in these Scottish cities specialised in sending over single operatives who would buy crops there and then based on credit notes underwritten by these Scottish houses, facilitating a quick return for colonists (it is estimated this system of small Scottish operators became so successful that eventually up to three quarters of the colonial tobacco crop was purchased this way).

These were NOT large scale businesses; they were usually very small lending houses; but there was simply a lot of them.

In time this easy credit system was replicated within the colonies itself; the aforementioned New York system utilised it and in Virginia internal transactions were regulated by state issued notes of credits.

The colonies were utterly dependant upon London based financial systems and had been for decades.

Of course the system was open to abuse and was abused within London with alarming regularity. One of the best ways was to issue a credit note in London; then take the London credit note up to a Scottish branch of the same bank, use this to underwrite a greater credit note, and return to London to sell this credit note for profit (paid in the form of an even greater credit note) while drawing down the original credit note and writing it off on the Scottish banks accounts.

It wasn’t just bankers in Britain who were making profit on such nonsense. The credit notes Virginia was issuing were underwritten by a base of credit given by the London banks to the colony. Credit underwritten by credit.

It was an unregulated free for all.

Which meant incredibly good profits were made, but the system was exceptionally vulnerable. And in 1772 it finally all came to a head.

With the collapse of the Neale, James, Fordyne & Down Bank the first ever full blown credit crisis in modern history took place. Scores of banks in London and Scotland collapsed (including the Ayr Bank, one of Scotland’s biggest); the credit crisis exploded across Europe; slamming into the Netherlands, France and Russia. The system in London was saved by the Bank of England becoming ‘Lender of Last Resort’ for the first time.

And it’s impact on the colonies was fairly catastrophic.

Immediately the colonies had to pay up- the lines of credit were gone. The small Scottish lending houses no longer existed so this option was lost to them. Those who had invested into London now found themselves having lost most of their savings as the stock market collapsed and even colonial financial systems took a pounding.

Indeed when it was discovered that the letters of credit that Virginia had been issuing had been counterfeited to such a high quality that no one could tell the real from the fake, there was a short term collapse of that colonies entire financial system.

The need to cover their debts was probably the reason behind the the loss of bullion from the colonies; the colonists had serious debts and it meant that they were having to pay off these with their entire reserves.

It is a fair assumption to make that the credit crisis of 1772 was an important element in the later the American War of Indepedence. The colonies suddenly found themselves going from profiting from the financial system to suffering; Colonists found themselves now in hoc to British bankers (legally, after all they HAD spent the money) and in many cases had been reduced in circumstances (for many the financial crisis had appeared to be something beyond their control happening in far away London, but the reality was they were happy customers enjoying the loose regulation of the system).

I will only mention that in 1776 the three northern colonies who owed the most money to merchants in London (New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts) were dwarfed by the debt owed to Britain by Virginia (more than those three combined).

In answer to your question- the colonies were very happy participants of the British financial systems; it wasn’t just ‘they paid taxes’ model; they profited from their relationship with Britain; from Canadian fur traders to southern indigo farmers, they were integrated into a complicated and sophisticated financial mechanism, that saw them profit and become wealthy; they based their own emerging financial systems upon the self same model, and the transatlantic element (not just to London, but clearly to Glasgow as well) was no impediment to them successfully utilising said system; right up until the same system they had done so well out of fell apart.

And then they were very unhappy indeed.

The economic relationship between Britain and the colonies is a woefully under examined area of historical research. Luckily we do have a few in the field. May I recommend the excellent article which also backs up the points I made above.

The British Credit Crisis of 1772 and The American Colonies Richard B. Sheridan The Journal of Economic History Vol. 20, No. 2 (Jun., 1960), pp. 161-186

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2114853?seq=1

It’s an excellent breakdown of the complex and fascinating relationship between the colonies and the London financial system.