I know of Operation Unthinkable but it was unrealistic and there is a good chance the Soviets knew of the plan beforehand.
What an interesting question since it goes directly against 75 years or so of international relations theory, but the answer is still...no.
The underlying problem that NATO faced throughout the Cold War was that it simply didn't have the troop strength to win a conventional conflict. Indeed, one of the motivating factors behind Churchill's bizarre Unthinkable was that he still had dreams of living up to the obligations Britain - and therefore by Churchillian logic, anyone remotely allied with Britain 6 years later, including Italy - had failed to provide Poland in the opening days of World War II, but also realized that after May 1945 American troop transfers to the Pacific would make the manpower for this unavailable.
That Allied infantry divisions were outnumbered by Russian ones almost 3 to 1 even then did not really seem to play into Churchill's 'strategy', but it certainly was noted by his staff in their vocal rejection of it. That was just the beginning. By late 1945 the United States was under immense pressure to demobilize - Jean Edward Smith captures a great story of a livid Eisenhower being ambushed by a Congressman who had organized a visit by GI wives who had brought a truckload of baby shoes to make their point about wanting them home now - and by 1946 the conventional militaries of the West had shrunk drastically.
As literally thousands of PhD theses have explained, following this point nuclear deterrence became the primary mechanism for NATO member defense. That's a bit beyond the purview of this answer, but a two line summary from The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat suffices for the focus of your question:
At least until 1957 the United States possessed a marked military superiority, above all an atomicoae, although by that date its advantage was waning both in strategic nuclear weapons and with respect to naval forces. By the 1970s at the latest, however, the Soviet Union had achieved a near military parity with the Western superpower.
NATO itself acknowledges this last point in now declassified briefings. So in short, by the early 1970s, even if the West had somehow accomplished a militarily successful nuclear first strike, it still would have had an uphill battle defending, let alone attacking.
Now there is indeed an interesting discussion to be had on things like rising expectations for NATO conventional forces following the Yom Kippur War (certain artillery and armor tactics held promise), along with the massive misunderstanding of each side when it came to their objectives (the Russians were far more defensively oriented than the West originally thought, but in turn the Russians constantly feared a possible attack to the point where the circumstances around Able Archer very nearly brought about a nuclear war in 1983). But even with all this, much of the evolution in military thinking over the course of the Cold War revolved around how long it could stay a conventional war before one side or the other took enough losses so that it would escalate into a nuclear conflict, and at least on the NATO side that continued to be viewed as something that was unacceptable except under those specific circumstances.
However, let's go back to when the West did have an advantage. One of the most frightening war plans ever conceived was 1949's Operation Dropshot, which was declassified in 1977 and received some publicity as a result of Anthony Cave Brown's somewhat salacious book on it, Dropshot. There's not much evidence that this made it much past initial and theoretical war planning stages to be taken seriously by political and military leadership, but it's worth noting as it can be argued this falls into what you're asking for, which is a plan that the United States had for offensive operations against the Soviet Union which involved anywhere between 75-300 nuclear weapons.
But when you actually read it? Even in 1949, what comes across in the actual plan (note: slightly sketchy source, but from a quick glance it does resemble the one I remember reading in the book) is that most of the objectives of this were to protect and hold allies - the UK, Northern Europe, and elsewhere - in the face of Warsaw Pact aggression rather than to invade the Soviet Union.
So even in the most ambitious plan formulated at a time when the Soviet Union had little to no ability to retaliate in similar fashion, the nascent NATO was mostly concerned with trying to stop the Soviet Union as best they could rather than invading it.