Week 113

 

On September 1^st 1919, Nitti gave his approval to the last minute changes which had been suggested the day before by Lloyd George during his meeting with Foreign Minister Tommaso Tittoni in Trouville. The two adjustments to the Allied plan for the definition of the Adriatic question (composed, in its not so final form, with the active collaboration of Clemenceau, Balfour and Tardieu) – to detach the port from the sphere of influence of the “special statute” to be attributed to the city of Fiume, and to place Zadar “under Italian protectorate or mandate, rather than sovereignty” - were meant to smooth out certain elements of the Italian claims which touched issues more sensitive for the US President Woodrow Wilson, issues, that is, on which he had previously expressed his views more firmly and on which he was extremely unlikely to change his mind. By then, the Allied appeal to Wilson was beginning to appear already somewhat of an extreme recourse to escape a situation of substantial stalemate, and various voices within the Italian government and Paris delegation – let alone, of course, the opposition – had begun to voice their doubts, and at times their discomfort, with the perspective results of a strategy which appeared to consist in a progressive dismantling of the Italian project of Adriatic revendications.

Prime Minister F.S. Nitti remained, both for contingent political reasons – his Ministry was, after all, expected to conclude “something” concurrently with the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles and with the definition of peace terms with Austria – and for his genuine belief in a policy of social pacification and international cooperation, firm in the opinion that Italy needed to pursuit (almost at all costs) the (no matter how unlikely) eventuality of a rapid agreement. The new corrections to the terms submitted to Wilson, from his point of view,

don't change anything substantial, and we need to be quick. All our colleagues agree that any delay works to our detriment and are fully supportive of your action.

The King, whom Nitti had met on September 2^nd 1919, appeared to reluctantly agree as well

Even if the solution of the Adriatic question and the modest colonial results leave him rather unimpressed – Nitti wrote, as usual, to Tittoni – he concurs on the necessity of avoiding any further delays to the definition of peace. Any delay at this point is an element of additional weakness because, if we don't obtain credits, the economical situation worsens and our resistance ability diminishes.

By now, the Country is resigned. Tomorrow I expect a quiet session at the Chamber. […]

And on the 5^th – after meeting with Scialoja in Rome – while there appeared to be “a lot of unrest in Fiume”, Nitti was still of the opinion that “any delay is extremely damaging”.

I am hopeful to contain this movement without too many inconveniences.

Nitti appeared more concerned with the busy parliamentary schedule, with Tittoni expected back in Rome on September 14^th (Tittoni had informed Nitti on the day before) to handle the ratification of the German Treaty on the 16^th and then open “the discussion of the treaty with Austria and the Adriatic settlement”.

Will we have time? It would be unfortunate to postpone to new legislature this insidious topic. Current Chamber would approve without too much opposition any settlement you'll be able to get; new Chamber is going to be more restless. Have you sent the telegram to Wilson?

The telegram was yet to be sent; but Tittoni was running a busy schedule as well, with the signature of the Treaty of St. Germain set for Wednesday, September 10^th 1919, the delivery of the Bulgarian Treaty on the 8^th and a new much needed meeting with Lloyd George (who was going to be in Paris “for three or four days after the signing”). In order to speed things up, he had already sent back a copy of the Austrian Treaty for the Parliamentary Committee to begin its examination ahead of the scheduled debate.

On this point, Nitti concurred, and – even if he regarded the existent committee as “poorly put together” (the committee had given him some trouble for the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles) – believed (for obvious time-saving reasons) best for it “to take care of the Austrian Treaty as well”. And concluded (September 6^th 1919)

If we could settle the Adriatic question before your return, it would be a true blessing. The Country needs to get out of this uncertainty and we need credit and stability.

Indeed, pressure, internal and external, for an international settlement of the matters of Fiume was rising again with the publication (during the last days of August 1919) of the proceedings of the inquest committee and the recommended establishment of a genuine inter-Allied occupation force. Even Italy's purportedly improved relations with France were not enough to entirely dissolve the looming clouds consequent to the severe “incidents” of July 6^th 1919.

In Paris, Tittoni had been faced with Clemenceau's mounting insistence with Italy's rapid absolution of the inquest deliberations – or, in Tittoni's words, his “obsession with Grazioli” - a fact which had prompted the Italian Foreign Minister to write in rather urgent terms to Nitti.

I can tell that he is a susceptible and emotional character [who] gives more importance to personal matters than to abstract ones. I ask you therefore to provide me with confirmation, as soon as possible, that Grazioli has left Fiume.

The replacement of the commander of the “inter-Allied” Italian occupation force had been troubling the Italian Government, High Command and Delegation in Paris since early July, when it had become immediately apparent that the inquest committee was going to ask for his replacement. Yet gen. Grazioli – who furthermore enjoyed the sympathy and support of the “national” opposition – had come to represent a symbol of the “Italian” occupation of Fiume, and his replacement carried the, not really implicit, meaning of a renunciation to the cause of “Italian Fiume”. Consequently both Nitti, Diaz and Tittoni had attempted, without fortune, to conjure up an alternative solution allowing them to remove him before the proceedings of the inquest committee became public. As neither this solution, nor a definition of the Adriatic question, materialized before the publication of the inquest results, the issue of replacing Grazioli was now brought back to the forefront of public debate.

Clemenceau was even less likely to forget about Grazioli after the incident of August 25^th when, after a miscommunication between Nitti and Tittoni, the latter had announced to the Conference the replacement of Grazioli (Aufust 27^th 1919), which had in fact not been carried off yet. The Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister had in fact previously concurred that it was possible to remove Grazioli, at least temporarily, by granting him a period of leave for health reasons. But since this deliberation was still awaiting execution when the inquest results were published, and its main purpose was removing Grazioli before the publication of the inquest results, doing so immediately after their publication appeared even more untimely.

Which doesn't answer as to why wasn't he sent on leave before the publication of the inquest results – but that's Nitti's explanation to Tittoni, and we'll have to make do.

On August 30^th Nitti wrote to his Foreign Minister (Not without remarking that the French commander and Grazioli's counterpart, gen. Savy, was allegedly still in Fiume) again that gen. Grazioli was expected to leave soon:

I made agreements with Diaz and Albricci […] and gen. Grazioli will be called back soon. We'll adopt the most courteous forms. Today we'll make dispositions for the withdrawal of the first brigade and division general Pittaluga will take his place in command. In order to avoid any inconveniences, gen. Grazioli is going to be called back to Rome in the meantime, to interview with the Minister of War.