Now this is a really good question!

Before we get going I'll say there are some excellent books on the Treaty of Versailles / Paris Peace Conference and what the allies were trying to achieve but the best ones, to my mind, are:

1919: The Peacemakers by Margaret Macmillan

and

The Balance of Power by Peter Jackson

The reason why I like this question is because it's not something that in of itself is the topic of historiography but is more about the viewpoints of historians themselves and that's always interesting.

However, it also means that an answer for it could be hugely lengthy so to make it more manageable I want to cut it down a little bit to help narrow the focus.

For example; there have been numerous moments since 1919 that I think historical consensus towards the Treaty of Versailles would be very different to how it is today. Obviously the lead up to the Second World War would produce certain viewpoints, the 1960s and the work of Fritz Fischer might produce others. So to help us out I'm just going to focus on 'now' (for convenience say the last 10 or so years).

I also have to say that I am not an impartial participant in answering this question because I'm an active historian in the field of First World War studies and I have my own viewpoint on Versailles and how I teach it to my own students etc.

But with all of the above said I would say there might be a consensus towards the impact of the Treaty of Versailles on the outbreak of the Second World War but it's not in the manner that might be expected.

To add some context, I've been a member of the International Society for First World War Studies (https://www.firstworldwarstudies.org/) for over a decade and in that time (at conferences, reading material in the field, conversations with other members etc) I've never heard any historians really strongly espousing the view that the Treaty of Versailles was so harsh/punitive that it either made the Second World War inevitable or was itself a direct cause of the latter conflict.

The reasons for this are, I think, complicated. Firstly because, by our nature, historians today tend to veer away from placing too much emphasis on something that happened 20 years before the Second World War began. Without delving into counter-factual history; a lot goes on in those 20 years and, had some of them gone differently, events may have changed. For example; the Treaty of Versailles did not cause the Great Depression originating out of America. But that financial crash did greatly impact Germany's economy and election results in the years that followed. Is it perhaps not fair to say it had a greater impact than the Treaty of Versilles in elevating the Nazi Party to power? Whenever the economy in Germany diud well the Nazis got less votes in elections. When the economy did badly their vote share increased.

Further to this is also the idea that the Treaty of Versailles should not have been punitive or harsh. That the allied powers had made a clear error in seeking to punish Germany for the conflict. Much of this often hangs on the 'War Guilt Clause' which seemingly placed all blame on Germany and was an affront to their national pride. Even this clause though is deeply misunderstood. It is popularly considered a blunt tool to insult Germany with but, in reality, should be viewed almost as an admission of liability in an insurance claim form. Germany could not legally be forced to sign reparation without admitting they'd caused the car crash (for want of a better metaphor).

Further to this; why shouldn't the Treaty have been punitive or harsh? Certainly the French point of view at Paris was that Germany (then Prussia) had invaded them in 1870-71 and annexed significant portions of their country, taken reparations and inflicted a humiliating treaty. They had then returned in 1914 seemingly with the aim of doing much the same again. The French view was that the only way they could be kept safe was to dismantle the German military and to then bind the German state in legal ties (enforced internationally) which would prevent them from making war again.

This position was at odds with the American hope for a League of Nations in Europe and a democratically restored Germany, and the British hopes of a punished Germany who could still be useful as a trading partner to help rebuild the British economy.

The Treaty of Versailles didn't actually satisfy any of these parties and the French in particular were left with the feeling that the Treaty was nowhere near punitive enough and would only enflame Germany's sense of being wronged without actually impacting them longterm and preserving French safety.

And here is where we may actually arrive at our historians' consensus. It was not that the Treaty of Versailles was either too lenient or too harsh - it was that it was never properly enforced in the interwar years.

If you consider the 3 main parties at Paris; America, Britain, and France (Italy became increasingly sidelined and were furious when it turned out their promised gains from the 1915 Treaty of London weren't going to be provided) - America didn't ratify the Treaty (Wilson couldn't get it through Congress and they made a seperate peace with Germany), Britain made new trade deals with Germany but did not participate in military reprisals when Germany violated the treaty, and France who did undertake actions against Germany in the Ruhr (with Belgium) in 1923 but was often left unsupported internationally when Germany committed violations.

Any Treaty that is to be punitive at some level carries the threat; 'do this or else...'. In the inter-war years, however, it rapidly became clear to Germany that there was no 'or else' to really be worried about. France could not do much by itself and the rest of the previous allies didn't want to risk a second war. This situation would eventually evolve into the appeasement process towards Hitler in the 1930s.

If there is indeed a form of consensus among historians towards the Treaty I suspect it is based around this idea that the articles of Versailles were never properly enforced upon Germany. At the end of a war you can eitehr rehabilitate an enemy or crush them; Versailles didn't do either of these things. What it did do however was instil an aggrieved sense of victimisation in Germany that was never properly checked. As Germany then became more flagrant in breaching the Treaty and fully rearming this sense of being wronged was a powerful propaganda and recruiting tool.

It was now far too late for the allies to redo that which they had not adequately done in the first place.