In 1945-1946, the US sent George Marshall to China to negotiate a unity government between the Nationalists and the Communists. Was it a forgone conclusion that the Marshall Mission would fail, or was there some real chance of them reconciling their grievances?

by Telephonecrab
Jashin

I am sourcing this answer from The Rise of Modern China, by Immanuel Hsu.

As some background, Marshall became a special presidential ambassador to China after Patrick Hurley, the previous American envoy to China, resigned his post in protest of the change in American policy in China. The USA had adopted a new policy that continued their support of the Nationalists, but on the condition that they not use American arms to conduct a civil war and that they try to reach some sort of settlement with the Communists, as opposed to the old policy of unconditional support for the Nationalists. There are then sort of two perspectives to the stated question: from the American side, did they believe they could achieve some reconciliation between the Nationalists and the Communists, and from the Chinese side, did they think Marshall could really help them settle their differences?

From the Chinese perspective, there was basically no real chance that Marshall could succeed in his mission. The Nationalists and Communists were deeply distrustful of each other, and they were both confident in their ability to win a full civil war. They both paid lip service to Marshall's stated goals of ceasing the civil war, forming a coalition government, and integrating KMT and CCP forces into a national army, but they basically had no choice but to play along for the sake of politics. Marshall's background and position gave him a lot of prestige, and the fact that he represented the USA with all its power and the fact that he appeared sincere in his efforts to mediate meant that it would've been a tremendous loss of face for either party in China to snub him. Beneath the surface, they both saw Marshall's presence as an example of American meddling, and extremists in both parties saw him as an obstacle to their respective ultimate victories.

There was some progress towards the stated goals of the Marshall mission while he was there, but the robustness of the agreements he'd managed to negotiate were put to the test once he had to make a trip back to the USA in March of 1946. As soon as he was out of sight, the KMT and CCP scrambled to make maneuvers on the battlefield again, and the war escalated into large scale fighting within a month. Once Marshall returned to China, he was able to establish a 15-day truce on June 6, but the Nationalists and Communists were now both convinced they could win a full war and had no desire to go back to peaceful negotiations under those circumstances. Once the truce was over, they began fighting again, and the Nationalists won almost every battle over the next few months. The Communists accused the USA of using mediation as a smokescreen for their actual support of the Nationalists, and the Nationalists amidst their wave of victories ignored Marshall's pleas to stop fighting. With the Communists now doubting Marshall's integrity and the Nationalists ignoring his advice, Marshall realized he had failed in his mission, and he was recalled in January 1947.

From the American side, Marshall was sincere in his efforts, and while he was present in China his active mediation did allow him to make a lot of progress towards setting the terms of a coalition government and integrating CCP and KMT forces into one army. His early successes caused Truman to establish a United States Military Mission in China, staffed with 1000 officers and men. The commitment of a man with the prestige of Marshall and the commitment of these resources do suggest that the Americans believed it was possible for them to succeed in their efforts. The Americans probably believed they could serve as mediators, but in the end choosing to take this role ended up winning them the goodwill of neither party in China. And given the on-the-ground conditions, with both parties in China believing they could win a full victory in war, there was never really a realistic compromise that could've left them both satisfied in the long-term.