Oil production capacity of Germany was rather meager, amounting to 0.6 million tons per year that was almost doubled after conquest of Poland that was able to produce 0.5 MT/y in 1939. This was still meager amount in comparison with USSR boasting an output of 29 MT/y, not to mention USA, an undisputed world leader in oil producton at the time, able to produce 182 MT/y. Of note was also Venezuela with the crude oil output similar to that of the USSR (27 MT/y) that decided to capitalize on the increased demand for oil in the time of war, and maintained neutrality, although, thanks to the better economic relations with USA and rather strong anti-German attitudes among the general populace, it eventually sided with Western Allies. On the other hand, even if this has not happened, the British blockade would largely prevent the Venezuelan oil shipments from reaching its destination in Germany, rendering this route unreliable at best. Additionally, Norway was not that much of an issue, given that the large-scale extraction of oil has started there only in 1970s.

This is why main German sources of crude oil was Romania and USSR. The former was one of the world's biggest extraction and refining sites of crude oil in mid-19th century, with the Mehedințeanu Brothers Refinery opened in 1856 being the first industrial-size refinery in the world. In 1939, the Romanian oil production capability was roughly 6.3 MT/y eclipsing other European countries with an exception of USSR. Speaking of latter, it was another important source of oil for Germany. Soviet shipments allowed by the German-Soviet Trade Agreement on 19th August 1939, and the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement of 11th February 1940. It is generally estimated that in 22 months between between signing the former agreement and breakout of hostilities on 22nd June 1941, USSR has been supplying Germany with over 900.000 tons of crude oil and oil products that amounted to 67% of the German stockpiles at the beginning of the Fall Barbarossa. This was not much in comparison with the vast scope of German operations, given that in October 1941, after mere four months of fighting on the Eastern front, the stockpiles dropped by 450.000 tons or almost 1/3rd of the total amount available.

Shortages of fuel was one of the reasons that made Hitler focus on the southern USSR and order the army to capture the Caucasian field in the vicinity of Baku. In the end of June 1942, German forces captured Rostov, on 9th of August they reached Maykop, on 13th of August the first units entered Stalingrad, and on 6th of October they reached Malgobek, roughly 100 km (65 miles) west of Grozny. Although they were still almost 600 km (380 miles) away from Azeri oil fields, Soviets became concerned with the possibility of the latter being captured. During evacuation to what is now Turkmenistan they managed to destroy large part of the infrastructure and closed 764 oil wells. They also destroyed large part of oil fields and associated infrastructure in Maykop prior to withdrawal in August, decreasing the monthly production capacity to roughly 250 tons. Additionally, the British prepared for the possibility of an aerial strikes against Baku petrochemical infrastructure from the bases in Iran, should Germans capture the Caspian oil fields. These plans were initially devised to attack USSR in case it continued supplying Germany, but were suspended after hostilities between the two latter countries broke out.

On the other hand, lack of crude oil does not need to mean lack of the fuels, lubricants and similar essentials of the mechanized transportation. Processes allowing production of synthetic fuel by liquefaction of bituminous coal have been developed in 1913 by Friedrich Bergius, while the synthesis of carbon monoxide and hydrogen into liquid hydrocarbons has been introduced in 1925 by Franz Fischer and Hans Tropsch. These inventions along with the state of the art German chemical industry allowed production of synthetic fuels on an industrial scale. In 1939 there were 14 operational synthetic fuel plants operating in Germany, with further 6 being in development, and although the processes were characterized by rather low efficiency in the ballpark of 10-20% (meaning that 1 ton of fuel required 5-10 tons of coal, depending on the type of final product), high coal production rate (205 MT/y in 1939 that rose to 250 MT/y in 1944) alleviated this shortcoming to some extent. In 1938, production of synthetic fuel achieved 1 MT/y and rose to 4 MT/y in 1943, but even though it surpassed the Soviet deliveries even before the invasion of USSR, it was still woefully inadequate. The plan to rise the production to 7 MT/y was never achieved mainly due to the extensive bombing of German petrochemical targets within the reach of Allied bombers.

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Agayev, V., Akhundov, F., Aliyev, F.T., Agarunov M., World War II and Azerbaijan in: Azerbaijan International, Summer 1995 (3.2), pp. 50-55.

Goralski, R., Freeburg, R.W., Oil & War: How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1987.

Stokes, R.G., The Oil Industry in Nazi Germany, 1936-1945 in: The Business History Review, vol. 59, no. 2 (Summer, 1985), pp. 254-277.