Part 1

As vague as it sounds the answer is that it depends. Several factors influence the form that combat takes, such as (but not limited to) the combatants, their doctrines, what the capabilities of the units involved in a given action are, the objectives they have been assigned, the terrain over which the action is taking place, the time of day its taking place, the weather at present, and, more broadly, when this action is taking place in the greater context of the war, whether it be early, middle, or late war. Digging deeper into the nature of the combatants, whether or not the formations involved have combat experience (and the nature of that experience) will have an effect as well.

Let’s consider a few examples. You specifically mentioned Omaha Beach, so let’s start there. Something that is important to recognize is that some sixteen or so strongpoints constituted the primary defenses at Omaha. These were situated all along the beach but were most concentrated at each of the five draws that led off the beach- the spaces in between each draw were not covered as well, with slit trenches, smaller pillboxes, minefields, and machine gun nests constituting the primary defenses. Bluffs ring the beach, which lies in a crescent shape, and this makes for a very defensible position. The German troops manning these defenses varied from German regulars to conscripted foreigners, and they had ample support in the form of mortars, artillery, and anti-tank guns. Some of the strongpoints housed large caliber coastal artillery pieces to combat ships. Two infantry divisions, one veteran and one green, a ranger battalion (two actually committed), and a special engineer task force comprised of engineers and naval demolitions troops constituted American forces coming ashore. They could call on offshore naval gunfire for fire support and would rely on two tank battalions for organic fire support early in the landing, with organic field artillery coming in later.

For most of the men involved in the initial landings at Omaha Beach the scene was indeed one of carnage. The heavy bombers assigned to bomb the coastal defenses missed and dropped their bombs too far inland and the effectiveness of the preliminary naval bombardment was mixed. The tides combined with rough seas to swamp DD tanks and push landing craft toward the wrong beach sectors, and the problem of the latter was further aggravated by smoke and dust kicked up by the naval bombardment that obscured navigational landmarks, preventing effective course correction and navigation. The infantry were laden down with equipment that reduced their ability to move, and by the time they reached the beach after wading through the surf most were exhausted and capable of a fast walk at best. The only true cover that could be found ashore was the beach shingle, which reached ten feet high in some points, and that was several hundred yards away for the initial wave. This understandably resulted in slaughter in many areas of the beach. When the Special Engineer Task Force came ashore shortly after the first wave they found that they could not complete their objectives (clearing lanes through the beach obstacles to make way for landing craft and vehicles) because enemy fire was so intense and because the assault wave was using obstacles for cover. In the 1st Division sector dozens of tanks had been lost to swamping so there was little organic direct fire support to be found there; in the 29th Division sector several had been lost to enemy fire. The general disposition along the beach shortly after H-Hour was that of the assault wave clinging to the sand with their fingernails, pinned down by machine guns, artillery, mortars, and direct fire.

So what did all of this actually look like? In many places, particularly in front of the heavily defended beach exits, it looked similar to the image conjured in popular media, with machine gun fire stitching the sand, bodies all over, shells landing on the beach, tanks maneuvering and firing, destroyers shooting at bunkers, and men alternating between huddling behind beach obstacles and moving forward. Due to the issues with the tides and loss of navigational aids, in some areas men were heavily concentrated, while in others they were not. In some spots tanks hid as deeply as possible in the water to make themselves harder to shoot, while in others they drove along the beach, since it’s harder to hit a moving target than a stationary one. As the morning went on the water rose, more troops and equipment landed, and the beach got more congested. At the same time, however, the assault forces were reducing the enemy strongpoints. In a few spots assault teams had come ashore to little or no resistance, experiencing little or no shelling and little or no machine gun fire, and marched right up the bluffs. The experience of these elements were very different than those pinned down. Their fight really began on the bluffs, where they maneuvered through minefields and began storming pillboxes from the flanks. They could move fairly freely and closed with the enemy fortifications by fire and movement, where they either killed or captured the occupants. They then began moving inland, where their experience was one of advancing through fields and attacking pillboxes with grenades, bazookas, and BAR’s, using their ability to maneuver to flank the enemy where necessary. Forces still on the beaches could not maneuver and instead had to overcome the enemy by firepower. They relied on tank and naval gunfire to either reduce strongpoints or cover them by fire so that infantry could advance from the shingle or along the bluffs and close on them. This looked similar to what you would see in the movies, in the sense that there’s a bunch of explosions and a dramatic scene of tanks and infantry engaging the enemy against a backdrop of ships that are shooting as well. The reality, however, was more plain in a sense- armor maneuvering as much as necessary to avoid fire and shooting as much as necessary to cover the infantry, which move as quickly or slowly as necessary to work themselves in close to the enemy pillbox. Now and then the forces involved pause or even pull back so that a concentration of naval gunfire can be delivered, after which the tank-infantry attack, which is methodical, is resumed. This cycle repeats itself as much as necessary to reduce the enemy strongpoint, and then the attack shifts to the next one.

Not every engagement is Omaha Beach, however. Behind the beaches American troops entered hedgerow country and quickly entered into a state of static warfare that lasted for 49 days. During this period American troops found themselves attacking through fields into the teeth of mutually supporting defenses that were anchored in tall hedges that surrounded each field; the Germans emplaced machine guns into the hedges in such a fashion that several covered each field from the front and flanks, and they backed this formidable defense up with mortars and artillery. Combat here was slow and grinding- American troops would enter a field, become pinned down by machine gun fire, and then be subjected to mortar fire until they were cut to ribbons or retreated. In response American troops began to rely on artillery fire to neutralize the German positions, but this was insufficient without a proper attack to follow it. Over time American formations became battle-wise and confident, and eventually combat in the hedgerows became, like the fighting on Omaha Beach, a process. In a given attack an attacking force might be preceded by a short barrage on the German position, after which infantry would enter the field by either blasting a hole in the hedge, tearing it with a tank, or infiltrating through it. They would be covered by mortar fire or possibly artillery fire, organic machine gun fire, and fire from one or multiple M4 tanks or tank destroyers that may or may not follow them into the field. For the purpose of our illustration let’s say two tanks enter the field with the riflemen, and they maneuver to the sides of the field, keeping some twenty yards or so from the hedge to their flank. The infantry, of which there are about two dozen or so in the field with the tanks, would deploy forward and to the flanks quickly to neutralize German soldiers positioned in the hedges to the flanks that might knock out the tanks with panzerfaust or panzerschreck rocket launchers, while the tanks continue to rake the hedges ahead with machine gun and cannon fire. In some outfits the infantry might employ marching fire, where each soldier fires his weapon from the hip as he advances forward at a slow but steady pace in order to maximize volume and accuracy. He is shooting at where he thinks there might be enemy soldiers. At this point as the assault troops near the far hedge their supporting mortar fire lifts and moves to cover the next field to catch enemy troops in the open. Once reaching the far hedge the tanks cease fire so that the infantry can clear it and the attack resets. This is what an average attack looks like in the hedgerows of Normandy in mid-late July of 1944.

Once American troops were out of the hedgerows combat changed again. The Allies broke out of Normandy in late July, and in the process combat for several infantry and armored divisions took on a confusing nature, as they kept running into German forces in the process of retreating or moving to counter their advance. Sometimes the Americans found the Germans; sometimes it was the other way around. These units were moving to exploit the breakthrough achieved by Operation COBRA and were either mechanized and armored by nature or had been motorized through the issue of trucks.

This may be of interest to you as it discusses the difference between film and reality.