As is well-known, the Second Sino-Japanese War was kicked off by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. Crowley’s 1963 article “A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident” repudiated the widely-held idea that the incident was caused by a “Japanese conspiracy” to start a general war against China. Instead, Crowley established that Japanese command, both in the field and in Tokyo, wanted to avoid further escalation. In particular, the Operations Division of the Japanese General Staff, headed by Ishiwara Kanji (infamous for his participation in the Manchurian Incident of 1931), vehemently opposed any expansion of operations in China. The General Staff’s gaze was firmly set on the Soviet Union - any action in China was only a distraction. Attitudes in the Japanese civilian government led by Fumimaro Konoe were very much the same. Upon receiving news of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 8 July, the Konoe Cabinet cabled orders that emphasised “non-expansion” and “local settlement”.

Unfortunately for Ishiwara and Konoe, Chiang Kai-shek, leader of Republican China and the Guomindang (GMD), decided to escalate the situation. In China, the National Salvation Association had raised the struggle of Chinese guerrillas in Manchuria to a mythical status (as seen in Mitter’s Manchurian Myth, many of these guerrillas were not more than bandits), while intellectuals constantly attacked the policy of accommodation adopted by the Nationalist government. While their ire was mostly reserved for Premier Wang Jing-wei, Chiang often complained of the intellectuals, third parties, local warlords and indeed many members of the GMD who incessantly pressed for a stand against Japanese aggression. His headache was infinitely compounded by the Xi’an Incident of 1936, in which he was kidnapped by his subordinate and local warlord Zhang Xue-liang, and was forced to form a United Front with the Communists against Japan. The Communists, who conveniently did not share a border with Japan, had long advocated for a United Front, in part because the GMD had effectively isolated the Communists in Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region after successive anti-Communist campaigns. By advocating for a United Front, the Communists hoped to ease GMD pressure on their base areas and turn public opinion against Chiang’s government. With his promises at Xi’an receiving nation-wide attention, Chiang could ill-afford to continue his policy of accommodation with Japan. With growing international pressure on Japan, Chiang gambled that Japan would not dare escalate the situation. With this in mind, four GMD divisions were sent to North China to assert Chinese claims.

Konoe was also under pressure to “punish” Chinese arrogance. Many officials, journalists and intellectuals of a far-right inclination were displeased with the Konoe Cabinet, who they saw as too acquiescing towards China. Japan had since 1919 seen herself as occupying an enviable position as a “have-not” nation - lacking in natural resources and excluded from the international order of nations only because of her racial status. The Washington Naval Conference, which fixed Japanese naval strength at a level lower than America and Great Britain, and the Nine-Power Treaty, which affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, was seen as a western attempt to limit the expansion of Japan. Many saw the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as a sign of Chinese arrogance backed up by the self-serving western nations. Under pressure to respond, Konoe and Ishiwara planned to send three divisions from Japan to North China on 11 July. On the same day, a local cease-fire was worked out by the border units of both sides. Upon hearing the news, Ishiwara cancelled the mobilisation orders. However, an ill-timed press conference by Konoe that called for public support for general mobilisation inflamed jingoistic sentiments in Japan. Military attaches in China warned that the four GMD divisions were continuing northwards, while the Kwantung Army was champing at the bit to have a go at China. Ironically, Chinese and Japanese field officers proved to have a greater desire of de-escalation. The commander of local Chinese forces at Marco Polo Bridge, General Song Zhe-yuan, attended the funeral of his counterpart General Kanichiro Tashiro, who had suffered a heart attack during the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. He then met General Katsuki, the new Japanese commanding officer, on 18 July and personally apologised for the Incident. Unfortunately, events had moved past the control of field officers.

On 7 August, the Konoe Cabinet put forward Japan’s negotiating position. The Cabinet proposed to set up a demilitarised zone in the Beijing-Tianjin region; allow Chinese administration of north China (of course not including Manchuria); liquidate the East Hebei Autonomous Government; and to discuss the issue of Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia bilaterally. In return, China would grant recognition of Manchukuo; conclude an anti-Communist pact; and suppress anti-Japanese activity in China. An official reply was never received, as events in Shanghai had escalated the situation into a general war.

On 9 August, Lieutenant Isao Oyama of the Japanese Special Naval Landing Forces decided to enter Hongqiao Airport in Shanghai in a car for unknown reasons. He was shot dead by Chinese guards. Local Japanese authorities declared this to be an unsanctioned activity, and the Japanese Consul General apologised to the Chinese mayor. To prevent hostilities, Japanese night patrols in the International Settlement were all cancelled. However, the GMD government saw it as a provocation - Chinese forces moved into Shanghai, and on 14 August, Chinese bombers attacked Japanese naval installations there. The Japanese General Staff and army command bowed to public demands of retaliation, and the Second Sino-Japanese War was kicked into full gear.

The above narrative establishes that Japan war goals, at least initially, was not about “conquering” China. The Japanese army was wholly unprepared for a general war against China, and the Konoe Cabinet had no firm objectives in mind at the commencement of the Sino-Japanese War. There was no set line of territorial objectives that the army was supposed to reach - rather, Japan only had a vague concept that she had to “punish” China. Japan’s stated objective was an ambiguous promotion of “Japanese-Manchukuo-Chinese Cooperation” in combating communism and reducing western influence. This was probably seen to be highly ironic from the Chinese side, as while Konoe repeatedly stated Japan’s goal was to “stabilise Asia on the basis of cooperation between the two countries”, Japan continued to destroy any chance of stability and cooperation by pushing forces deeper and deeper into China. On 2 November, Foreign Minister Hirota Koki imposed harsher terms on China through German mediation: an autonomous Inner Mongolia; a demilitarised zone in north China; cessation of anti-Japanese activities; and cooperation in fighting communism. Chiang did agree to German mediation on 24 November, but once again, events conspired against both governments. The collapse of Chinese forces in Shanghai emboldened the Konoe Cabinet to impose even harsher terms that would have essentially transformed China into a puppet state. Chiang naturally refused, and the war dragged on.