I have seen the claim repeated in a variety of sources, but never quite tracked down what exactly is meant by the statement, who were these "left-leaning" officials and what purposed did it serve, if it actually happened?
The following administrators between 1932 and 1936 all went into "wilds" of Manchuria (some voluntarily), with the biggest wave being forcibly deported in 1936. Most of them returned by 1938:
- Kishi Nobusuke (Ministry of Commerce and Industry/MCI)
- Shiina Etsusaburo (MCI)
- Uemura Kogoro (MCI)
- Kogane Yoshiteru (later director of Fuel Bureau)
- Hashii Makoto (MCI)
- Minobe Yoji (MCI)
- Wada Hiroo (Agriculture Ministry)
- Sakomizu Hisatsune (Finance)
- Aoki Kazuo (Finance Ministry)
- Hoshino Naoki (Finance Ministry)
- Matsuoka Yosuke (Foreign Ministry)
- Yamamoto Takayuki (MCI)
- Hirai Tomisaburo (MCI)
- Ueno KÅshichi (MCI)
- Tamaki Keizo (MCI)
- Yoshida Teijiro (MCI)
- Ishihara Takeo (MCI)
- Koda Noboru (MCI)
- Shiseki Ihei (MCI)
Of the above, only Wada was actually a crypto-Marxist, though the rest of the group did admire the Soviet Five Year Plans and read the writings of Socialist economist Eugene Varga. However, they were not deported for alleged leftism, but for their attempts to control the zaibatsu, large family-owned corporations that had significant political control. Historian Inaba Hidezo describes the exiles, who were part of a bureaucratic faction called "reform bureaucrats" as primarily fascist, with some leftist influences.
Later, the entire group became associated with Communism in a little known incident in Japan (and virtually unknown in the West) known as the kikaku-in Incident, or Cabinet Planning Board Incident of 1941. By that time, they had joined a committee which included a crypto-Bolshevik writer affiliated with the then-Prime Minister, Konoe Fumimaro, who ironically was the highest ranking nobleman in Japan and a fascist admirer of Hitler. Their affiliation with this writer, Ryu Shintaro, led the zaibatsu to organize a corrupt police hit against them in which many were arrested and not tried until 1944-45. On the bright side, these officials became some of the most important people in post-war Japan and built the Japanese system as we know it today, including the Liberal Democratic Party.
Confused yet? It gets worse. The story of the Manchurian exiles and their remarkable comeback is a deep dive into the bureaucratic Game of Thrones that characterized Japanese politics after 1905.
Since the late 19th century, there had existed a factional divide between Japanese bureaucrats and the zaibatsu corporations. In 1886, Tokyo University (Todai) was founded to train future administrators of Japan, something that it (and especially its law school) still does to this day. The vast majority of Japanese "Grade 1" bureaucrats (those that pass the highest level of civil service exam) throughout Japanese history have come from Todai, with Kyoto University (Kyodai) a very distant second. In the 1980s, it was newsworthy when someone from a "normal" college rose above the level of Bucho (district chief) in any of Japan's ministries.
Japanese bureuacracy, unlike that of most other countries, was sourced from the best and brightest in the country and saw themselves as an elite. This put them on an inevitable collision course with Japan's well-connected business leaders, who also saw themselves as an elite. However, from the 1890s to the 1920s, conflict between the two was minimal: Japan in that period tied with the United States to have the world's highest overall growth rate (modern historians estimate 3% - slow by modern standards but close to three times the rate of most Western European countries), and the country's power seemed to be increasing.
All that changed in 1930, when preliminary results from Stalin's First Five Year Plan represented a bloodless catastrophe for Japanese foreign policy. Government-mandated industrialization in the Soviet Union was threatening to turn that country from a backwater into an industrial powerhouse. This was a problem for Japan, because the government since the collapse of the Russian Empire had seen the USSR as a potential area for colonization, having occupied Southeastern Siberia from 1917 to 1922.
In May of 1930, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry founded the Temporary Industrial Rationalization Bureau, or TIRB, led by Yoshino Shinji. Yoshino believed that Japan was a victim of "excessive competition" that led to industrial backwardness. While "excessive competition" might seem ironic in Western economics (how can too much competition be a bad thing?), MCI staff were generally social science and law students, and came up with a simple yet innovative critique of price competition. Sure, competition reduced consumer prices, but it also reduced profits, meaning less money was available to create new technologies and adapt to market changes. Further, net-zero profits meant some firms were necessarily failing, and their bankrupted facilities could never be perfectly re-appropriated by another company, creating waste. Yoshino resolved to increase industrial profits and spur on the adoption of more efficient industrial pratices and newer technologies, a process known in Japan as Sangyo Gorika or Industrial Rationalization.
This brought him into immediate conflict with conservative finance minister Inoue Junnosuke. The very next month, the vice-minister of MCI "retired" onto a corporate board, and Inoue lobbied Minister Tarawa to appoint Tajima Katsutaro, former head of the Fukuoka Mine Inspectors Bureau. This was outrageous for a number of reasons. First, Tajima was young and promoted over his seniors - a no-go in Japanese organizational culture in general. Second, in Fukuoka, Tajima was responsible for supplying the zaibatsu with coal and had a close working relationship with them.
Yoshino knew Tajima would be the end of his industrial rationalization scheme, but fortunately was saved by his protege, Kishi Nobusuke. Tajima indicated he intended to go through with a scheme cooked up by elected politicians to cut MCI salaries by 10%. Kishi organized 50 bureaucrats (many of which would be deported with him to Manchukuo) to threaten to resign. In June 1930, Yoshino and Tajima worked out a compromise where Kishi would be sent to Germany and the cuts would be relaxed. This led to a further agreement that Yoshino was quite satisfied with: the Important Industries Control Law of 1931. This law led to the slogan "jishu-tosei", or self-control, and effectively legalized cartelization as long as the government provided a ninka, or a license and a demanded level of price and output.
This achieved all Yoshino's objectives, but Kishi was more ambitious and wanted to replicate Soviet-style planning. In 1931, he got his chance when the Japanese army created Manchukuo. The same year, he used his influence to help them secure control of the profitable South Manchuria Railway company, and in the subsequent years "tested the waters" in Manchukuo by sending some of his subordinates there.