Week 122

 

Since we aren't ready to wrap things up yet with the international and internal repercussions of the affair of Fiume, let's at least take one step towards the attempted definition of a modus vivendi and the examination of the repercussions of the elections of November 1919, both in Italy and within Fiume.

Contrary to general belief – Italian foreign minister Tommaso Tittoni wrote to delegates Scialoja and De Martino in Paris on October 6^th 1919, inviting them to raise the issue “with Clemenceau, Mandel and Tardieu” – the Government is extremely concerned with the need to have D'Annunzio leave Fiume.

Since it can't make use of force because of absolute material impossibility, it has tried to find an accommodation with the National Council, which, together with all the citizens of Fiume, begins to be tired of D'Annunzio and his exaltation. The citizens of Fiume would be satisfied if, with D'Annunzio leaving, the Italian troops remained under command of an Italian general, who could be Badoglio or Caviglia, whom should have mandate by the Conference, thus giving to the Italian occupation an inter-Allied character […] in such a way that the material occupation upon mandate of the Conference wouldn't give Italy any special right until the definitive resolution of the issue by the Conference itself.

What Tittoni proposed, underlying the “urgent” need of finding a “provisional settlement” while a “definitive solution was prepared”, was a rather fortunate and not very likely scenario which would have brought back the Italian situation in Fiume, in substance, to what it had been before the incidents of early July, restoring the “inter-Allied” occupation regime under Italian command – even better, now without the presence of the French base – and returning the issue of an ultimate deliberation to the care of the Conference.

Regardless of whether the Allies could consider favorably such a proposition – and, as we'll see later, they might have been willing to accept it matter of fact, if the Italian Government was actually able to produce such a change, that is, but weren't especially inclined to facilitate it – it's fair to say that D'Annunzio had no intention to leave Fiume whatsoever, no matter how convenient the accommodation may have appeared to the citizenry, or to the National Council, unless the unconditional annexation as well as certain personal prerogatives he had acquired were guaranteed.

Indeed, Tittoni had written to Imperiali, in London, later that evening (21.00 pm), informing the Italian Ambassador that he had raised a complaint with Sir Rennell Rodd, as well as illustrating him, as “proof of the Italian good will”, his “projects of provisional and definitive sistemation”, concerning the recent communication delivered by means of former Ambassador Hardinge on behalf of Lord Curzon.

I voiced my disbelief for the absolute misunderstanding of the Italian things displayed by British politicians, who should be aware that the Italian Government is no more to blame for the abnormal extension of the situation in Fiume than England is for the interruption in the delivery of coal to her allies due to her strikes.

The Italian Government would have made use of force against D'Annunzio, if it had not found itself in the absolute material impossibility of doing so.

An appreciation of the situation which had not taken the Italian authorities much time, and indeed, by early October, Tittoni's tense choice was certainly justified and the perspective of a military action against D'Annunzio confined to the hypothetical past.

Which is not to say that [the Italian Government] is just looking indifferently at the extension of D'Annunzio's dictatorship; much to the contrary, by means of emissaries whom are constantly delivered, not to D'Annunzio whose obstinacy is irreducible, but to those who surround him and to the National Council of Fiume, it is looking for a way out of the situation.

It's up to the Allies to facilitate Italy's efforts, rather than making them harder with untimely threats against Italy which would provoke our justified complaints. Such threats, if carried off, would have no other result than to produce a serious crisis in Italy with serious repercussions throughout Europe.

Here in Italy, England has always been extremely popularity and friendship with England is, for Italians, a tradition. One can't see why England would wish to throw this away irreparably for the sake of an unsympathetic gesture. […]

The Italian concern with Hardinge's communication, an “informal admonishment” rather than an “ultimatum”, but certainly not an entirely friendly one – attributed, at least by Tittoni, to some form of pressure coming from the US – found its expression, beyond Tittoni's and Imperiali's direct initiatives – in the constant series of private exchanges in Paris where the French diplomacy appeared to have assumed the role of main counterpart for the Italian delegation.

Pichon said – De Martino informed Tittoni on the 6^th – that no step had been made by the Government of the US with the French Government, and that he was unaware as well of the British intimation.

The French minister promised to “ascertain the origin and motive of Curzon's communication to Imperiali”.

I observed to Pichon that it's absurd to blame the Italian Government for inaction, because of the terrible internal difficulties […] precisely in consequence of D'Annunzio's reckless initiative, difficulties which threaten to become ever more severe due to the election period […]

According to De Martino – in a different communication of the same day – Berthelot was equally surprised of the British communication, but felt confident “it isn't due to a step made by the American Government, since it would have made the same step with the French one and because Wilson's health doesn't allow for him to tend to political affairs”. Equally impossible, according to the French diplomat, was for such an initiative to be taken by his collaborators. Berthelot, albeit “in personal and non official fashion”, was inclined to ascribe the intitiative to “one of those abrupt deliberations of Lloyd George's”.

While reassuring the Italians of the “friendly attitude” of the French, “albeit assuming a passive demeanor”, Berthelot insisted on the opportunity of reopening negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia – if possible by direct talks between Tittoni and Trumbic – which would have produced the additional result of neutralizing any possible action from the US and the UK, keeping them with “le bec dans l'eau”; indeed it would have been absurd to “demand from Italy more than what the Yugoslavs were willing to accept”.

Later that same day, De Martino spoke with Tardieu who, also, didn't “give too much importance to the British communication”.

His explanation: it's an episode of British internal politics; there is in London a quantity of periodicals and newspapers of more or less Bolshevik imprint, which nobody cares about, but which have rights of introduction with certain government circles: those have most assuredly cried out against the Italian imperialism, D'Annunzio and the Royal Government; Lloyd George has certainly, I suppose, ordered a diplomatic step.

Nonetheless Tardieu agrees that the terms of the communication are unpleasant. He'll speak of it with Clemenceau, also since it's preferable to avoid any friction between Italy and England.

And, one last communication for the day (23.30 pm – De Martino to Tittoni)

Tardieu told me that, after our talk […] he spoke at length with Crowe [sir Eyre, chief British delegate for political affairs] concerning the matter of Fiume, and that in the most favorable disposition towards us, since he fully understands the severity of the situation faced by the Italian Government.

Tardieu preemptively pointed out that it can't be a responsibility of the French Government to take the initiative of a solution. To which I replied that I had no instruction to ask for one but that I wished […] to hear his suggestions on a way out from Wilson's intransigence.

Then Tardieu, speaking from his personal position, expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to undertake any new initiative with Wilson before he receives some form of satisfaction.

He doesn't know if it's viable, but the way might be the following: to aim our efforts at “dissociating” (I repeat, dissociating) D'Annunzio from Fiume's environment; and when we are able to tell Wilson that D'Annunzio's persona is out of the way, then we'll be able to start a new negotiation, and then, said Tardieu, you'll have our full support.

From my understanding this represent Clemenceau's point of view, inspired to a sincere desire of coming to a favorable solution.