I found a list of Alabama Supreme Court rulings that seems to suggest slaves have rights. This goes counter to literally everything I've been taught.

by ilikedota5

I don't think this list is fake or part of some Lost Cause narrative but I'm unsure what to make of this and would like help from people much smarter than me.

Maybe this is part of the contradictory nature of slavery (slaves are happy and contented since they are singing all the time, but simultaneously fearing slave rebellions) (benevolent but whipping)

https://www.lib.auburn.edu/archive/aghy/slaves.htm

Some that caught my attention.

  1. John Cunningham hired a slave named Dave. One evening, Cunningham’s son and overseer told Dave to feed and curry the horses and mules. Dave failed to carry out his assignment. The next day, the overseer confronted him, grabbed him by the collar, and told him to drop his pants for a whipping. Dave pulled a knife and cut young Cunningham, who then directed another slave, Step, to knock Dave in the head with an ax. Dave threatened Step, who backed away. Eventually, Dave broke and ran. He was charged with assault with intent to kill. On appeal, Judge Gibbons ruled that a master had "absolute dominion" over a slave and the right to enforce obedience. On the other hand, if a slave was merely disobedient, and not acting violently, the master could not threaten life and limb. Furthermore, slaves had a "natural right" to self-defense, but could not legally employ it "in the perpetration of a wrong." Dave v State, 22 Alabama 23 (1853).

slaves have a right to self-defense?

  1. The slave Joe belonged to Henry Skinner, who loaned him to William H. Spivey. Following Skinner’s death, Spivey sold the slave. Subsequently, he was convicted under Section 3130 of the code, which prohibited carrying away another’s slave and converting the same to one’s own use. Judge Rice noted that 3130 went beyond the common law in affording protection to "the most valuable species of personal property owned in this country." In addition to having monetary value, slaves were "intelligent creatures," with the power of volition and locomotion, which dictated laws "suited to the nature of the property intended to be protected." Under the common law, a bailee could not commit larceny "unless he broke the bulk of the package" of the goods under his protection. With slaves, the bailee committed a felony if he carried away a slave with criminal intent. Spivey v State, 26 Alabama 90 (1855).

intelligent creatures?

  1. Spencer stole a slave, but was apprehended. The day after his arrest, the slave made several incriminating declarations within Spencer’s hearing. He did not respond to the allegations. The original trial court accepted his failure to respond as evidence of agreement. Spencer appealed his convictions, contending in part that the declaration of a slave required no response from a white person. Judge Goldthwaite ruled otherwise. To reject the slave’s declaration as evidence would have meant that, under no circumstances, could a slave’s statement call for a response from a white man. Furthermore, there would have been no question of admissibility had Spencer replied to the slave'’ statement with a direct admission. In other words, it could be inferred from the silence of a white man that the statement of a slave was true. Spencer v State, 20 Alabama 24 (1852).

So in some circumstances, the words of slave were to be trusted as valid?

  1. Isaac J. Kirkendall, a white overseer, saw Abram, a slave, loitering around the quarters. He ordered him to work. Abram replied that he was sick and could not work. Kirkendall felt his pulse, declared him healthy, and again ordered him to work. Abram moved off slowly. Kirkendall struck him with a whip and the slave grabbed the whip. Kirkendall kicked at him and Abram grabbed his leg and threw him to the ground. Kirkendall pulled a gun and Abram knocked it out of his hand. The two continued fighting and the slave bit off a portion of the overseer’s upper ear. He was charged and convicted of mayhem against a white person, a capital offense. The prisoner appealed. Before the Supreme Court, his counsel argued that the ear was only partially bitten off, so the act did not constitute mayhem. He further contended that if a slave was unable to work he was not bound to do so. The court ruled that the act was not mayhem, but that the master or overseer was empowered to determine when slaves could and could not work. Judge Ormond wrote that "when engaged in mortal strife, his adversary armed with a deadly weapon," a slave might act according to "the instinctive dread of death, common alike to the bound and the free," and inflict a wound in self-defense "in which the will did not cooperate," willfulness being a component of the crime. State v Abram, 10 Alabama 928 (1847).

So if a slave is beaten severely enough where involuntary self-defense kicks in does that mean in some conditions the slaves is not punished?

  1. Thomas Burps suspected that one of Bowen Bennett’s slaves had stolen his hogs. Burps and several others, including Hobson Thompson, went to the slave’s quarters in search of the stolen meat. Judge Goldthwaite ruled that they had no right to do this without due process of law. The slave’s quarters were protected against illegal search no less than the master’s home, unless specified by statute. "Great abuses" would result if the law were otherwise. Thompson v State, 25 Alabama 41 (1854).

Slaves have due process and implied right to privacy?

  1. Wyatt ran away the same night his master’s gin house burned. The master directed his foreman and other slaves to capture him "dead or alive." Following Wyatt’s capture, the master said to him, "Well, boy, you have done it now." Later, he said, "these denials only make the matter worse." Wyatt confessed and was taken before a magistrate, to whom he again confessed. The Dallas Circuit Court sentenced him to death, but the case was appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Judge Chilton ruled the confession involuntary. The power of a master over a slave gave the former’s words extraordinary weight. The same inducement to confess vitiated Wyatt’s statement before the magistrate. Normally, confessions before a magistrate would not be excluded solely because the prisoner had not been warned of their consequences. In a case where the confessions were made earlier under circumstances that rendered it improper, the failure of the magistrate to warn the slave had a fatal effect. Wyatt v State, 25 Alabama 9 (1854).

Slaves cannot give a voluntary confession due to the power imbalance?

  1. Pleasant killed his owner, William Copeland. The indictment said that Pleasant belonged to "the late William Copeland." Judge Dargan noted that earlier decisions required the indictment of a slave for murder to contain the name of the owner. Copeland was dead so the indictment was defective. Pleasant v State, 17 Alabama 190 (1850).

That technicality worked?

  1. The state indicted Thurman for the rape of a white woman. This crime carried the death penalty for any "slave, free Negro, or mulatto" so convicted. Though Thurman had some black blood, he was not a mulatto in the strict sense of being the offspring of a white/black relationship. Judge Parsons asked: "If the statute against mulattos is by construction to include quadroons, then where are we to stop?" Consequently, he reversed and remanded the case. Thurman v State, 18 Alabama 276 (1850).

The anti-one drop of blood?

  1. George Eberlin sold sugar and candles to two slaves without their masters’ consent. The indictment failed to name the masters or the slaves, but described the latter as "one black boy, about twenty years of age, and one yellow boy, stout and heavy." On appeal, Eberlin argued that the indictment should have named the slaves and the masters. Judge Rice disagreed. Eberlin v Mayor of Mobile, 30 Alabama 548 (1857).

Is yellow boy supposed to be racist for asian or jaundice?

  1. Henry and George were mulattos living with a white man named Jones in Marion County. Before he died, Jones declared that they were born of a free woman and hence free themselves. Later, Winter was indicted for aiding in their escape from the administrator of the Jones estate. As mulattos, Henry and George were presumed to be slaves, but the presumption could have been rebutted by evidence of Jones’ declaration. At the trial, however, the judge refused to charge the jury to acquit if they had reasonable doubt of their slave status. On appeal, Judge Ligon ruled that the state had not proven Henry and George to be the property of Jones. He reversed the circuit court ruling. Winter v State, 20 Alabama 39 (1852).

I just have a hard time imagining the State giving the benefit of the doubt.

Why was a veneer of procedural due process even given at all? These cases were fairly in history as well, where the law was pretty clear about the status of slaves? It just seems hard to imagine it ever worked out for any of the slaves.

Who would represent the slaves? In some cases I can see a master paying for the it if there was clear benefit...

secessionisillegal

I haven't looked through them all one by one yet, and if there's one in particular you're interested in, please point it out. But perusing through just the first few under each heading, these cases aren't dealing with enslaved people as people. They're dealing with enslaved people as property and what the slaveholder and white people in general have a right to do with this "property". It even says so in the first paragraph of that page:

"Most of [these court cases] pertained to slaves as property, for property they were. Nevertheless, the law recognized slaves as persons under some circumstances, most notably when they were victims or perpetrators of crimes."

Which is true. These seem to all be better categorized under property law than under personal rights of the enslaved person:

The first batch ("rights and powers of owners") generally asks the legal question: Does this slaveholder legally own this property?

The second batch ("transfers") generally asks the legal question: Did the slaveholder make a legal sale/transfer of this property to another slaveholder?

The third batch ("hiring") generally asks the legal question: Does this slaveholder have the legal right to hire out this property?

The fourth batch ("fugitives") generally asks the legal question: Does the slaveholder have the legal right of ownership to recover this property?

The fifth batch ("regulations") generally asks the legal question: Can slaveholders and white non-slaveholders legally engage with this property in this way?

The sixth batch ("property") generally asks the legal question: When this enslaved property makes a cash transaction, does that cash belong to the slaveholder, or to the free white person who made the cash transaction, or to the free white person who received the cash transaction?

The seventh and eighth batches ("torts" and "crimes") are the ones that most closely actually treat enslaved people as people, but only to punish them. They generally ask the legal question: what are the punishments for an enslaved person when they broke the law? And, when this person breaks the law, what liability does the slaveholder have since it is his property that committed the offense?

The ninth batch ("crimes against") also border on actually treating enslaved people as people, but again, it's mostly about what free white people have a right to do: is it a crime for a white person to commit this kind of offense against this type of property? It is if it were committed against another free white person, does the same apply to the "property" that is an enslaved black person? The answer is sometimes yes, and sometimes no.

The tenth batch ("manumission") generally asks the question: does the slaveholder have the legal right to sell this property to the property themselves? Has the slaveholder legally sold the the property "into freedom" so now that the black person "owns" themselves? Sometimes yes, sometimes no.

You can see the actual 1833 Alabama Slave Code here. The laws basically fall into two categories: what a free white person can and cannot do to an enslaved black person, and what types of behaviors slaveholders are forbidden from allowing enslaved black people to do. It also includes the punishments when free white people, or enslaved black people, break any of these laws.

The best you can say is that enslaved black people were treated not as property, but the same as free white people, only in the case of extreme capital offenses against them.

For instance, the murder of an enslaved person is treated the same as the murder of a free white person....unless the enslaved person is acting in "insurrection". However, while it doesn't make it explicit here, if the white person claims "insurrection" then the court is always going to err on the side of it being true. For instance, going back to a 1669 slave law in Virginia, the courts presumed a slaveholder was not indictable for murder of an enslaved person they owned as property because the courts should assume that a slaveholder would never do that and deprive themselves of such valuable property.

Under both Virginia law, and the later Alabama laws, enslaved people, and black people in general, had no standing in court. They could not be a witness in a court of law, except as witness against a crime committed by another enslaved person. So if a white person murdered an enslaved black person in Alabama under the 1833 Slave Code, then charges could only be brought if the white person turned themselves in, or if there were another white person present to witness the crime who could bring the accusation to a court of law. A white person could murder an enslaved black person in the view of a hundred other black people, call it "insurrection", and the courts would assume the murderer was telling the truth and could not bring an indictment.

The rest of the Alabama Slave Code that look like "rights" are always painted in terms of what white people are allowed to do to black people. And again, since black people themselves had no standing in court, violations of any of them could only be brought by a white plaintiff against a white defendant, when one white person witnessed another white person commit the crime and was willing to bring an accusation to the attention of law enforcement. Some examples in the code:

  • A white person cannot subject an enslaved black person to cruel and unusual punishment. This isn't a right of black people, since black people have no standing in court to make the accusation - it's a limit on white rights, and a violation of this law can only be brought to the courts by one white person against another.

  • Slaveholders have a right to arm enslaved people on their land, but enslaved people are not allowed to be armed otherwise. Again, not a "right" of black people, but a right of what a slaveholder is allowed to do with their own "slave property" within the bounds of their real estate property, and a limit of what they can do with that "slave property" outside the bounds of their estate.

  • Slaveholders have a right to assemble more than five enslaved people together on their land, and white people are also allowed to assemble more than five enslaved people together at white-overseen church services, but otherwise, five enslaved people are not allowed to assemble (such as on public land, or on land of a non-slaveholder). Again, another right given to slaveholders, that is restricted outside the oversight of white people.

Most of the code specifies actions that free white people are not allowed to do with enslaved people (like marry them or teach them how to read and write), or actions that enslaved people cannot do without being punished for them, either through the lash, through prison, or through death.

One thing you'll notice is that free black people could not settle in Alabama, either newly emancipated or moving in from out of state. This is a new law as of 1833, I believe, so the few free black people already living in Alabama at that time were exempt, though I'm not 100% sure about that. For the rest, if discovered, their first offense gave these "free" people 39 lashes of the whip and 20 days to depart the state. This punishment could be carried out by any white person, not just law enforcement.

On a second offense, if the free black person still hadn't left the state within 20 days, then the free black person would be arrested and sold into slavery for one year.

If the free black person still remained for the 20 day period after the year was up, then they could be sold back into slavery for life.

So, no, it's really not accurate to say that enslaved black people had any real personal rights at all. The law, and the cases you provided, are all legally defined in terms of what white people have a right to do toward enslaved people.

Georgy_K_Zhukov

/u/Secessionisillegal covered a good deal. I would add a few links, to older answers as well https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/bu8jj2/a_tvtropes_page_claims_that_the_confederate/epbkb7t/ and https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/aku0d2/im_the_wife_of_a_slaveowner_in_the_southern_us_in/ef833ux/ which deal with the difference between theory and practice of what few supposed rights existed.

EdHistory101

Can you say a bit more about what you're seeing in the rulings? That is, are there particular cases you can cite to provide more context about what's leading to your confusion?

In addition, when you say "contradictory nature", are you referring to the mental gymnastics by White ensalvers to reconcile their inhumanity towards those they enslaved or something else?

There are several flairs and regular users who can speak to your confusion but we want to be sure we correctly understand your question. Thanks!