Super late response but the short answer here is simply no. Japan for all it's Bravado and suicidal devotion to the cause did not have a chance in hell of beating the United States in a war.

So their thought process stems as such. Japan potentially could have been looking at this through the scope of prior wars. The First Sino-Japanese war and the Russo Japanese war were by no means limited conflicts but in comparison to world war 2 they were indeed limited.

The Japanese had trounced Asia's traditional power of China, and scored a fantastic victory over the Russians in the first major defeat of a western power by a non western government. (yes there are other wars but they didn't propel said country to global power and prominence.) So the idea remained in their head that wiping out Americas Pacific fleet and leaving all of East Asia open to Japan would coerce American public opinion that fighting the war of the Pacific would be more trouble than it was worth.

Since Japan was the clear underdog here in all things material compared to the US they needed a quick decisive knockout blow because they knew fighting Americas vast strength and extensive industrial base would be a lost cause in the end. This is where Admiral Yamamoto came in and effectively blackmailed the country into launching his plan or face his resignation. One of Japan's most prominent military leaders simply resigning would have been a disaster for support of the war in China. So the plan went ahead and pearl harbor was conducted.

As the war continued and with the failure of Midway it became clear that the Americans were more resourceful than not and their naval doctrine was more effective than Japan's blind obedience to their own doctrine which was highly inflexible and did mix well with unforseen circumstances and was unecessarily complicated.

If you start to get into industrial output as well, at the time the Pacific war started the US in it's non war state had roughly 10 times the output of Japan and that was smack in the middle of The US still being caught in the last bits of the great depression. That gap increased significantly as the war went on with the US being the single largest producer and industrial power on the planet.

The US alone had brought in 1200 combat surface ships by 1945 and for lack of a better description were able to use comparitively small amounts of units from the Marine corps to effectively isolate and wipe out much of the Japanese army across the Pacific. Japan was also at a lack for key war material for most of the war like oil which heavily constricted their operations while the US was one of the if not the largest producer in the world of oil.

All in all it was a lost cause for Japan founded on overconfidence in their own abilities vs underestimation of the American abilities.

Toll, Ian (2012). Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific, 1941–1942. W. W. Norton and Company. ISBN 0-393-34341-3.

Potter, E. B.; Chester W. Nimitz (1960). Sea Power. Prentice-Hall.

Ofstie, Ralph A. (1946). The Campaigns of the Pacific War. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

Spector, Ronald. Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (1985)

Herman, Arthur. Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War II, p. IX, Random House, New York, NY, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4000-6964-4.