While the Germans did sink more ships at Jutland, the battle removed a key foundation of their naval strategy. Their general strategy before the battle presumed that raids by the High Seas Fleet would draw out part of the Grand Fleet. This part of the Grand Fleet could be overwhelmed by the whole High Seas Fleet. By continuing this strategy, the Grand Fleet could be whittled away to the point where the High Seas Fleet gained parity, or even superiority. After this, the High Seas Fleet could win a full fleet action. At Jutland, though, the High Seas Fleet was faced not with a squadron or division of the Grand Fleet, but with the Grand Fleet in its entirety. This was not a foe that the High Seas Fleet could defeat with any reliability. While the I Scouting Group had seen successes against the Battlecruiser Fleet, the Germans were lucky to save Seydlitz, and arguably Derfflinger, while the British losses were the result of lucky shots. The High Seas Fleet had come off much worse in the battlefleet engagement, suffering several ships heavily damaged, while the Grand Fleet had come through practically unscathed. Jutland made it clear that the Germans would be unable to defeat the Grand Fleet in detail, but would instead have to face it in full. The chances of success would be low, while losing the High Seas Fleet to little avail would be a significant blow to German morale.

While the strategic calculus had shifted, there were several German sorties. The first came on the 18th August 1916. Scheer sent the HSF to bombard the British coastal town of Sunderland. Shortly after departing the Jade, the battleship Westfalen was torpedoed by a British submarine and forced to withdraw. Alerted by signals intelligence, the Grand Fleet was already at sea, and radio messages sent by Westfalen gave Jellicoe the position of the HSF. However, as the Grand Fleet was steaming to meet the HSF, a light cruiser was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine, causing Jellicoe to act more cautiously. German zeppelins sighted the Grand Fleet, and this, combined with reports from submarines and intercepted radio messages, showed Scheer that he was outmatched, causing him to withdraw. As Jellicoe withdrew, unable to catch his quarry, he lost another light cruiser, again to a submarine attack. The HSF would sortie in October, hoping to draw the British into a torpedo-boat trap close to the German coast. However, the British didn't take the bait, with their forces remaining securely in port. The only outcome was the loss of the cruiser Munchen to submarine torpedoes.

Another sortie came in November 1916. The HSF sortied to cover the recovery of the submarine U-20, which had grounded on a sandbank on the Danish coast. While the fleet steamed northwards, the British submarine J-1 maneuvered into position to attack. Firing four torpedoes, she scored two hits, one on each of the battleships Grosser Kurfurst and Kronprinz. With a significant portion of his force damaged, Scheer was forced to withdraw. The rest of the year was used to repair and refit the battlefleet, while plans involving the battlecruisers had to be cancelled due to various mechanical issues. 1917 saw various plans tabled by Scheer, including plans for a raid on shipping on the coast of East Anglia, and a plan to respond to an Allied attack on the coast of Flanders. Both of these would be cancelled - the first because it was seen to be too risky and poor weather precluded airship reconnaissance, and the second because the Allied attack never occurred.

In 1918, the HSF made its last major sortie. British convoys carrying iron ore from Norway had been the target of several raids by German cruisers and destroyers through 1917 and 1918. In response to this, the British had begun to escort them with battleships. On the 23rd of April, the HSF sortied to destroy one such convoy. This operation managed to achieve near complete surprise, with the British unaware that the sortie was occurring. However, in the morning of the 24th, the battlecruiser Moltke had a major breakdown. One of her propellers fell off the ship, allowing the turbine driving that shaft to run wild and destroy itself. This immobilised the ship and caused significant flooding. Moltke had to be towed back to port by the battleship Oldenburg. Organising this required radio messages to be sent, which the British intercepted; Moltke would be torpedoed by a British submarine on the 25th. It also required the High Seas Fleet to remain in position to protect Moltke. Scheer sent the battlecruisers north to engage the convoy, but they found that the German intelligence had been lacking. The Germans had arrived the day before the convoy was due to sail. Unwilling to loiter off the Norwegian coast until the convoy sailed, Scheer returned to base.

A final sortie was planned for the 30th October 1918. This would have taken the HSF into the English Channel, with the aim of fighting a single decisive battle against the Grand Fleet. The sortie would have seen the HSF attack the Thames estuary and Flanders coast, while torpedo boats made night attacks on the Grand Fleet. It would then head to Terschelling on the Dutch coast, where Scheer planned to fight. A major minefield was laid to close off the British base at Scapa Flow, and six lines of U-boats were positioned to attrit the Grand Fleet as it steamed southwards. This operation would spark a major mutiny in the HSF, with sailors believing that their officers were planning a suicidal operation simply to save their honour, rather than for any strategic purpose. The mutiny led to the operation being cancelled, and was one of the first parts of the German revolution that led to the war's end.